12,381 research outputs found
Responsibility for Rationality
No full textThis book develops the foundations of an ethics of mind by investigating the responsibility that is presupposed by the requirements of rationality that govern our attitudes. It thereby connects the most recent research on responsibility and rationality in a unifying dialectic. How can we be responsible for our attitudes if we cannot normally choose what we believe, desire, feel, and intend? This problem has received much attention during the last decades, both in epistemology and ethics. Yet, its connections to discussions about reasons and rationality have been largely overlooked. The book has five main goals. First, it reinterprets the problem of responsibility for attitudes as a problem about the normativity of rationality. Second, it connects substantive and structural rationality by drawing on debates about responsibility. Third, it supports recent accounts of the normativity of rationality by explicitly defending the view that epistemic reasons and other ‘right‑kind’ reasons are genuine normative reasons, and it does so by drawing on recent discussions about epistemic blame. Fourth, it breaks the stalemate between rationalist and voluntarist accounts of mental responsibility by proposing a hybrid view. Finally, it argues that being irrational can warrant moral blame, thus revealing an unnoticed normative force of rational requirements. Responsibility for Rationality is an original and essential resource for scholars and advanced students interested in connecting strands of normative theory within epistemology, metaethics, and moral psychology
Effects of ECG sampling rate on QT interval variability measurement
No full textAbstract not availableMathias Baumert, Martin Schmidt, Sebastian Zaunseder, Alberto Port
Das kündlich Grosse Geheimniß der Gottseligkeit : In unterschiedenen Weihenachts- Neuen Jahrs- Passions- Oster- Himmelfahrts- und Pfingst-Predigten im Münster zu Straßburg erkläret ...
No full textvon Sebastian Schmidt/ der heil. Schrifft Doct. der Theol. Facult. in Straßburg Seniore, des Kirchen- Convents daselbsten Praesidenten/ und des Stiffts zu St. Thomae DechantenVorlageform des Erscheinungsverm.: Lüneburg/ Gedruckt und verlegt durch Johann Stern. Anno MDCLXXXIV
Die Lehre von Gott/ Dessen göttlichen Wesen/ und dreyen Personen in demselbigen einigen göttlichen Wesen/ Von der Beichte/ Busse/ von Policey und weltlichem Regiment
No full textNach Anleitung Des I. XI. XII. und XVI. Artic. Augstb. Bekenntnisses erkläret/ von Sebastian Schmidt/ Der H. Schrifft Doct. und vornehmsten Profess. zu Straßburg ...Vorlageform des Erscheinungsvermerks: Lüneburg/ Gedruckt und verlegt durch Johan[n] Stern Anno MDCXCI
Purchasing under threat: Changes in purchasing patterns during the COVID-19 pandemic
No full textData from an online questionnaire on changes in purchasing behavior under the COVID-19 pandemic. For further details see the readme.txt
Responsibility for Attitudes, Object-Given Reasons, and Blame
Full text linkI argue that the problem of responsibility for attitudes is best understood as a puzzle about how we are responsible for responding to our object-given reasons for attitudes – i.e., how we are responsible for being (ir)rational. The problem can be solved, I propose, by understanding the normative force of reasons for attitudes in terms of blameworthiness. I present a puzzle about the existence of epistemic and mental blame which poses a challenge for the very idea of reasons for attitudes. We are left with three options: denying that there are any reasons for attitudes, opting for pragmatism about reasons for attitudes, or arguing that the challenge rests on a misunderstanding of the normative force of reasons for attitudes. I finally suggest a version of the last strategy. We can understand the normative force of reasons for attitudes, and thereby solve the problem of mental responsibility, by acknowledging that the way we blame each other for failing to respond correctly to our reasons for attitudes is different from the way we blame each other when one failed to respond correctly to reasons for action
Episode 35: Alexis Castellanos, Author of “Isla to Island”, and Her Panel Presentation during the Operación Pedro Pan Two-Day Event
No full textIn Part 1 of “Operación Pedro Pan: The Voices and Stories of Cuba’s Child Exodus—A Knights HistoryCast Mini-Series,” the Department of History’s Sebastian Garcia talked with Alexis Castellanos, an author, illustrator, graphic novelist, and a panelist at the esteemed, conspicuous, and powerful “Operación Pedro Pan: Honoring the Cultural, Historical Legacy of Cuba’s Child Exodus” Two-Day Program that Florida Humanities, UCF’s Department of English and Department of Modern Languages and Literatures sponsored (see https://cah.ucf.edu/pedro-pan/ for more details on sponsors and the program in general).
Sebastian structured this specific episode on Alexis Castellanos’ Isla to Island, a wordless graphic novel grounded by her personal family history and the history of Operación Pedro Pan (Operation Peter Pan). By analyzing such a historic event through the medium of fiction, Sebastian argued that this is one of the most unique Knights HistoryCast episodes of all time. Naturally, their conversation expanded to what she talked about during her panel presentation in Panel One, Day 1 of the event that featured “internationally renowned scholars that discussed the political, historical, and cultural legacy of Operación Pedro Pan (1960-1962).” (https://cah.ucf.edu/pedro-pan/)
To purchase Isla to Island (strongly recommend), check out: https://islatoisland.com/.
To find out more about Alexis and her professional work, check out her website at https://alexiscastellanos.com/https://stars.library.ucf.edu/knightshistorycast/1034/thumbnail.jp
Wie vernünftig sind Verschwörungstheoretiker? Corona und intellektuelles Vertrauen
No full textSebastian Schmidt (Zürich) fragt in seinem Beitrag »Wie vernünftig sind Verschwörungstheoretiker?«, wie es um die Vernunft derjenigen steht, die einer Verschwörungstheorie über die Corona-Pandemie anhängen. Im Umgang mit Corona scheint sich zu bestätigen, was die Psychologie seit Jahrzehnten lehrt: Menschen unterliegen in ihrem Denken kognitiven Fehlern und Verzerrungen. Doch ist verschwörungstheoretisches Denken, das solche Fehler ebenfalls begeht, deshalb irrational? Schmidt warnt davor, einander zu leichtfertig als irrational zu betrachten, und verweist auf die wichtige Rolle, die intellektuelles Vertrauen in Wissensgemeinschaften spielt. Am Beispiel des sogenannten Bestätigungsfehlers führt er aus, dass Menschen, die ihre Überzeugungen nicht fortwährend kritisch prüfen, in diesem Verhalten durchaus rational sein können
Recension du livre de Jochen Schmidt & Sebastian Kaufmann. Kommentar zu Nietzsches Morgenröthe [J. Schmidt]/ Kommentar zu Nietzsches Idyllen aus Messina [S. Kaufmann]
No full textJochen Schmidt – Sebastian Kaufmann. Kommentar zu Nietzsches Morgenröthe [J. Schmidt]. Kommentar zu Nietzsches Idyllen aus Messina [S. Kaufmann](Historischer und kritischer Kommentar zu Friedrich Nietzsches Werken, 3, 1). Un vol. de xiv-611 p. Berlin, Boston, De Gruyter, 2015. Prix : 69,95 €. ISBN 978-3-11-029303-6 (hbk) ; 978-3-11-029327-2 (pdf) ; 978-3-11-038889-3 (e-book)
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