1,721,081 research outputs found
Recent critics of Mill’s qualitative hedonism
No full textTwo recent critics of Mill’s qualitative hedonism, Michael Hauskeller and Kristin Schaupp, argue that Mill’s distinction between higher and lower pleasures was largely unsuccessful. They allege that Mill failed to demonstrate that some pleasures are lexically preferred to others, and indeed that this can be shown false by the fact that most people would not renounce supposedly lower pleasures, such as chocolate or sex, even for greater amounts of higher pleasures, such as reading or opera. I respond that many of these criticisms rest on uncharitable assumptions or interpretations of Mill’s position. We need not suppose that Mill was even trying to do the things he supposedly failed to do. However, considering these objections may lead us to a more plausible interpretation of Mill’s views, according to which the quality of pleasures, along with their quantity, contributes towards happiness. There is no need to suppose that ‘higher pleasures’ must be lexically preferred to lower ones, or even to be dogmatic about which pleasures are higher
Who are 'we' to speak of benefits and harms? and to whom do we speak? A (sympathetic) response to Woollard on breast feeding and language
No full textIn a recent article, Fiona Woollard draws attention to a number of problems, both theoretical and pragmatic, with current discourse around infant feeding. References both to the ‘benefits of breastfeeding’ and ‘harms of formula’ are problematic, since there is no obvious baseline of comparison against which to make these evaluations. Further, she highlights the pragmatic consequences of these linguistic choices. Saying that formula feeding harms babies, for instance, is likely to exacerbate feelings of guilt and shame felt by many mothers who use formula, for various reasons. Since I agree with much that Woollard says, this response is mostly sympathetic, but I wish to draw attention to one point that is largely missing from her analysis. The pragmatic effect of an utterance depends significantly on who is speaking, to whom, and in what context. Thus, we might differentiate between what it is appropriate to say in a professional context, such as an academic journal, from what one might say in a policy document or to a new mother. While we should always be careful about the language that we use, we need not assume that the same language is appropriate in all contexts nor that equal care is always required
Democratic Equality. By James Lindley Wilson. Princeton, NJ and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2019. 320p. $39.95 / £34.00 hardcover
No full textJ.S. Mill on harm prevention
No full textAccording to J. S. Mill’s liberty principle, the only legitimate justification for restricting the freedom of competent adults is to prevent harm to others. However, this is ambiguous between two interpretations. The harm causation version (Brown, 1972) has it that only conduct that is itself harmful is liable to interference. In contrast, the general prevention of harm version (Lyons, 1979) allows interference with conduct that does not itself cause harm, such as refusals to assist others, so long as this interference prevents harm from occurring. Mark Tunick (2024) has recently offered new arguments for the harm causation interpretation, suggesting that only this can explain Mill’s resistance to legal interference with prostitutes. This paper challenges Tunick’s arguments. First, I show that Mill does not clearly restrict interference to the proximate causes of harm. While he prefers interference to focus on the clients, rather than singling out the prostitutes, he is prepared to countenance interference with the prostitutes as well. Further, his preference for focusing on the clients is explicable, even if not required by the liberty principle.<br/
Letter in response to Armitage (2023) Non-directed (Altruistic) Kidney Donation: Altruism or Insurance Policy? J. Eval. Clin. Pract., doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/jep.13929.
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Harm to What Others? J. S. Mill’s Ambivalence Regarding Third-Party Harm
No full textJohn Stuart Mill’s harm principle holds that an individual’s freedom can only be restricted to prevent harm to others. However, there is an important ambiguity between a strong version, which limits legitimate interference to self-defense and therefore prohibits society from protecting third parties (those who are not its members), and a narrow version, which grants any society universal jurisdiction to prevent non-consensual harms, no matter who is harmed. Mill sometimes appeals to the strong harm principle to preclude interference, but elsewhere endorses measures (including humanitarian foreign intervention and animal cruelty laws) to protect third parties, suggesting that he subscribes only to the weak harm principle. This ambiguity regarding who it is that society has standing to protect has important implications for the scope of individual freedom
A further defence of the right not to vote
No full textOpponents of compulsory voting often allege that it violates a ‘right not to vote’. This paper seeks to clarify and defend such a right against its critics (Lardy in Oxf J Leg Stud 24:303–321, 2004; Hill in Aust J Polit Sci 50:61–72, 2015a; in Crit Rev Int Soc Polit Philos 18:652–660, 2015b). First, I propose that this right must be understood as a Hohfeldian claim against being compelled to vote, rather than as a mere privilege to abstain. So construed, the right not to vote is compatible with a duty to vote, so arguments for a duty to vote do not refute the existence of such a right. The right against compulsion is most easily defended within a liberal framework, hence its critics often appeal instead to a republican conception of freedom. In the latter part of the paper, I argue that even these republican arguments are inconclusive. Even non-dominating interference still conditions freedom, which may require justification. Further, citizens can live up to republican ideals, so long as they are vigilant; they need not actually vote. Thus, republican arguments fail to refute a right not to vote
Equality in the allocation of scarce vaccines
No full textIn the event of a pandemic, demand for vaccines may exceed supply. One proposal for allocating vaccines is to use a lottery, to give all citizens an equal chance, either of getting the vaccine (McLachlan) or of survival (Peterson). However, insistence on strict equality can result in seriously suboptimal outcomes. I argue that the requirement to treat all citizens impartially need not be interpreted to require equal chances, particularly where citizens are differently situated. Assuming that we want to save lives, we should also seek to use vaccine efficiently, so far as this is compatible with equality. Thus, in allocating vaccine, we may want to be sensitive to i) different levels of need and/or ii) effects on vaccine production. While such policies may result in unequal chances, they may even improve everyone’s chances. In such cases, the resultant inequality is not a violation of impartiality, but a consequence of considering each person’s claim seriously
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