161,618 research outputs found
Open Access Mandates and the "Fair Dealing" Button
No full textWe describe the "Fair Dealing Button," a feature designed for authors who have deposited their papers in an Open Access Institutional Repository but have deposited them as "Closed Access" (meaning only the metadata are visible and retrievable, not the full eprint) rather than Open Access. The Button allows individual users to request and authors to provide a single eprint via semi-automated email. The purpose of the Button is to tide over research usage needs during any publisher embargo on Open Access and, more importantly, to make it possible for institutions to adopt the "Immediate-Deposit/Optional-Access" Mandate, without exceptions or opt-outs, instead of a mandate that allows delayed deposit or deposit waivers, depending on publisher permissions or embargoes (or no mandate at all). This is only "Almost-Open Access," but in facilitating exception-free immediate-deposit mandates it will accelerate the advent of universal Open Access
A Quantile Based Test of Protection for Sale Model
No full textThis paper proposes a new test of the Protection for Sale (PFS) model by Grossman and Helpman (1994). Unlike existing methods in the literature, our approach does not require any data on political organizations. We formally show that the PFS model provides the following prediction: In the quantile regression of the protection measure on the inverse import penetration ratio divided by the import demand elasticity, its coefficient should be positive at the quantile close to one. We examine this prediction using the data from Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000). The results do not provide any evidence favoring the PFS model.Quantile Regression, Protection for Sale, Political Economy
Sale Leaseback Transactions: Price Premiums and Market Efficiency
No full textSale-leaseback transactions are ubiquitous in real estate markets in the United States with annual volume estimated to be greater than $7 billion. However, there is no evidence concerning the price impact of such transactional arrangements. Using a data set of sale-leaseback transactions, this study examines the price impact on commercial property transactions across seven markets. The findings reveal that transactions structured as saleleasebacks occur at significantly higher prices than market transactions. In addition, after accounting for income differentials, buyers and sellers are appropriately pricing the transactions resulting in no undue advantage to either party, that is, the expected price premium is accounted for in the saleleaseback prices.
Discretionary Capitalization Of R&D: Evidence On The Usefulness In An Australian And Canadian Context
No full textThis study addresses the discretionary capitalization of R&D costs in Australia and Canada. We demonstrate, for both samples, that the discretionary capitalization of development costs (hereafter capitalized D) by the manager results in balance sheet and income numbers that are more highly associated with market value, relative to the corresponding "asif" numbers generated by expensing GAAP. Moreover, we show that a dollar worth of capitalized D is worth more than a dollar worth of expensed R&D, for the same firm. This points to a corroboration role for capitalization. As a caveat, our results hold only when the samples are partitioned on the materiality of capitalized D. Our results point to a potentially useful signalling role for discretionary capitalization, in Australian and Canadian capital markets. However, while the manager’s capitalized D is associated with firm value, it has at best a modest advantage over what the analyst can do, using the researchercreated capitalized R&D. Thus, the regulatory policy debate must consider the small incremental benefits from allowing discretionary capitalization compared to the costs associated with earnings management when discretion is allowed.Griffith Business SchoolNo Full Tex
Protection for Sale with Imperfect Rent Capturing
No full textWe extend the protection for sale framework by modelling non tariff barriers. Explicitly introducing partial rent capturing leads to a testable specification that bridges the gap between the theoretical Grossman and Helpman (1994) model and its empirical implementation, where coverage ratios have been used to measure protection. Our econometric analysis supports the augmented specification and leads to more realistic estimates for the structural parameters of the model. --
Protection for Sale Under Monopolistic Competition : An Empirical Investigation
No full textThis paper proposes a general empirical framework to estimate the protection-for-sale model, where the protection regime shifts according to a sector's market structure (perfectly or monopolistically competitive). We base the protection structure on Grossman and Helpman (1994) for the subset of perfectly competitive sectors and on Chang (2005) for the subset of monopolistically competitive sectors. The two protection regimes are simultaneously estimated with joint constraints. The results of the J-test consistently reject the homogeneous (perfect competition) protection-for-sale model often adopted in previous literature and suggest a direction of improvement toward the proposed heterogeneous protection structure model.endogenous trade policy, campaign contribution, monopolistic competition, intraindustry trade, import penetration
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Stuck in a time warp: security interests in chattel mortgages and the bills of sale legislation in Nigeria
No full textExamines the law in Nigeria on the use of the bill of sale as a security device in the form of a chattel mortgage. Considers issues including the definition of "personal chattels," the formal requirements of a bill of sale, the remedies for its breach and the effect of a borrower's bankruptcy. Discusses the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Regulations on security interests in moveable property. Evaluates the regime and suggests reforms
Protection for Sale Under Monopolistic Competition: An Empirical Investigation
No full textThis paper proposes a general empirical framework to estimate the protection-for-sale model, where the protection regime shifts according to a sector's market structure (perfectly or monop-olistically competitive). We base the protection structure on Grossman and Helpman (1994) for the subset of perfectly competitive sectors and on Chang (2005) for the subset of monop- olistically competitive sectors. The two protection regimes are simultaneously estimated with joint constraints. The results of the J-test consistently reject the homogeneous (perfect compe- tition) protection-for-sale model often adopted in previous literature and suggest a direction of improvement toward the proposed heterogeneous protection structure model.endogenous trade policy; campaign contribution; monopolistic competition; intrain- dustry trade; import penetration
Immaginedesign
No full textDiario di un'esperienza didattica. Laboratori del Disegno P1/P2. Facoltà del Design - Politecnico di Milan
DRAWING AND PHOTOGRAPHY FOR DESIGN; PROBLEM SOLVING APPROACH IN DESIGN PROJECT EDUCATION
No full textContributo sul metodo di formazione adottato in seno al LABORATORIO del DISEGNO per il Corso di laurea in DESIGN del PRODOTTO alla FACOLTA' del DESIGN del Politecnico di Milano
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