118,054 research outputs found
Recommended from our members
Card from Anna Sacconi to Emmett L. Bennett, Jr., December 15, 1971
No full textSacconi sends a card wishing Bennett a happy new year.Classic
Recommended from our members
Fax from Anna Sacconi to Emmett L. Bennett, Jr., February 1, 1992
No full textSacconi sends details about an academic stay for Bennett in Rome.Classic
A Rawlsian view of CSR and the Game Theory of its Implementation (Part II): Fairness and Equilibrium
No full textThis is the second part of an comprehensive essay of the Rawlsian view of corporate social responsibility (CSR thereafter) understood as an extended model of corporate governance and objective function, based on the extension of fiduciary duties owed to the sole owner of the firm to all the company stakeholder (for this definition see part I, Sacconi, 2010a, infra). As in the first part, CSR is also understood as a self-sustaining institution - i.e. as a self-sustaining system of descriptive and normative beliefs consistent with the equilibrium behaviors performed repeatedly by agents in the domain of action of corporate governance (firms and their stakeholders). But equilibria are multiple in the game representing the strategic interaction among the firm and its stakeholders - modeled as a repeated trust game or some similar ‘social dilemma game’ (Ostrom, 1990). Thus asserting that CSR satisfies the Nash equilibrium condition as an institution is not enough. There is also an equilibrium selection problem. This the place where the Rawlsian social contract (Rawls, 1971, 1993) enters again the picture by performing its main role as normative equilibrium selection device from the ex ante perspective: that is, the ex ante impartial selection of a unique equilibrium amongst the many possible in the repeated trust game involving the firms and its stakeholders. Note that this was its second role previously suggested (see section 5 part I, and left to this part where it is treated at length), as distinguished from the role of shaping the players’ expectations so that in the ex post perspective they are able to predict the agreed solution as the result of a cognitive process of beliefs convergence to the equilibrium, which is focused on in part III, (see Sacconi, 2011 and Sacconi 2008)
L'Università nella prospettiva della responsabilità sociale : un modello di Governance Multistakeholder. in A. Cassone, L.Sacconi (a cura di), Autonomia e responsabilità sociale dell'università. Governance e Accountability, Milano: Giuffrè Editore
No full textA Social Contract Account for CSR as an Extended Model of Corporate Governance (I): Rational Bargaining and Justification
No full textThis essay seeks to give a contractarian foundation to the concept of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), meant as an extended model of corporate governance of the firm. It focuses on justification according to the contractarian point of view (leaving compliance and implementation problems to a related article, [Sacconi 2004b, forthcoming in the Journal of Business Ethics]). It begins by providing a definition of CSR as an extended model of corporate governance, based on the fiduciary duties owed to all the firm’s stakeholders. Then, by establishing the basic context of incompleteness of contracts and abuse of authority, it analyses how the extended view of corporate governance arises directly from criticism of the contemporary neo-institutional economic theory of the firm. Thereafter, an application of the theory of bargaining games is used to deduce the structure of a multi-stakeholder firm, on the basis of the idea of a constitutional contract, which satisfies basic requirements of impartial justification and accordance with intuitions of social justice. This is a sequential model of constitutional bargaining, whereby a constitution is first chosen, and then a post-constitutional coalition game is played. On the basis of the unique solution given to each step in the bargaining model, the quest for a prescriptive theory of governance and strategic management is accomplished, so that I am able to define an objective-function for the firm consistent with the idea of CSR. Finally, a contractarian potential explanation for the emergence of the multi-fiduciary firm is provided. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2006fiduciary duties, stakeholder theory, theory of the firm, incompleteness of contracts, social contract, bargaining games, distributive justice, impartiality,
Watch dogs VS. collusione tra regolamentati e regolamentatori : una teoria economica dei codici di condotta della pubblica amministrazione
No full textLIUC PAPERS-41 Serie Economia e Impresa 10, maggio 1997 In this essay I suggest a first-best solution to the collusion problem in a three-levels principal-supervisor-agent hierarchy (Tirole 1986, Laffont-Tirole 1993) in the context of a repeated games model. I introduce a new player in the component game i.e. a group of consumers which is also modelled as the constituency of the principal. An ex ante incomplete constitutional contract of authorisation links the principal to the group of consumer. At the next move in the game the group of consumers has a choice on the level of support and compliance to the principal's authority, which I intend as a specific investment. Due to the incompleteness of contracts problem, according to the economic theory of corporate culture (Kreps 1990) and code of ethics (Sacconi 1997), the principal may only announce a code of basic principles of good administration, being not automatically enforceable. In the repeated game among the three levels hierarchy and an infinite series of short-lived groups of consumers/supporters, I prove by a reputation effects construction (Fudenberg-Levine 1989, 1992) that the first best contract offered by the principal to the supervisor and the agent is part of a self-enforcing equilibrium profile making possible to the principal to get a payoff that approximates the Stakelberg payoff in nearly all the component games
- …
