1,753,638 research outputs found
2D-shear wave elastography : number of acquisitions can be reduced according to clinical setting
No full textAbstract: BACKGROUND The factors affecting intra-operator variability of two-dimensional shear wave elastography (2D-SWE) have not been clearly established. We evaluated 2D-SWE variability according to the number of measurements, clinical and laboratory features, and liver stiffness measurements (LSM). METHODS At least three LSM were performed in 452 patients who underwent LSM by 2D-SWE (supersonic shear imaging) out of an initial database of 1650 patients. The mean value of the three LSM was our best measurement method. Bland-Altman plots were used to evaluate intra-operator variability when considering only one, or the first two measurements. Variability was assessed by taking the absolute value of the difference between the first LSM and the mean of the three LSM. Logistic regression was used to assess the factors associated with the highest tertile of variability. RESULTS The limit of agreement was narrower with the mean of the first and second measurements than with each measurement taken separately (-\u20092.83 to 2.99\ua0kPa vs. -\u20095.86 to 6.21\ua0kPa and -\u20095.77 to 5.73\ua0kPa for the first and second measurement, respectively). A BMI\u2009 65\u200925\ua0kg/m2 and a first LSM by 2D-SWE\u2009 65\u20097.1\ua0kPa increased the odds of higher variability by 3.4 and 3.9, respectively. Adding a second LSM didn't change the variability in patients with BMI\u2009<\u200925 and a first LSM by 2D-SWE\u2009<\u20097.1\ua0kPa. CONCLUSIONS Intra-operator variability of LSM by 2D-SWE increases with both a high BMI and high LSM value. In patients with BMI\u2009<\u200925\ua0kg/m2 and a first LSM\u2009<\u20097.1\ua0kPa we recommend performing only one LSM
The Impact of the 1996 SSI Childhood Disability Reforms: Evidence from Matched SIPP-SSA Data
No full textThe Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 changed the definition of disability used to determine eligibility for disabled children under the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program and made other changes in the program. The law required the redetermination of eligibility status for children potentially affected by the new definition of disability. As a result, an estimated 100,000 children were expected to lose SSI benefits. The goal of this paper is to understand the impact of benefit loss on affected children and their families. The analysis draws on data from the 1992, 1993 and 1996 panels of the Survey of Income and Program Participation matched with Social Security Administration records on SSI program participation. The data are used to analyze the impact of the loss of SSI income as a result of the 1996 legislation on family labor supply, welfare program participation, and income and poverty. Compared with families that lost SSI benefits due to normal attrition from the program, the excess benefit loss due to the 1996 childhood disability reforms is associated with lower levels of family labor supply, higher levels of participation in AFDC/TANF and food stamps, and lower levels of family income relative to poverty. For some outcomes, these effects—measured one month after benefit loss—persist for up to 12 months.
The Effects of Changes in State SSI Supplements on Pre-Retirement Labor Supply
No full textBecause the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program is means-tested, with both income limits and asset limits, those on the margin of eligibility for the elderly component of the program face incentives to reduce labor supply (or earnings) prior to becoming eligible. Our past research relying on cross-state variation in SSI benefits found evidence consistent with the predicted negative labor supply effects. However, a reliance on cross-state variation necessitated reliance on less-than-ideal control samples. In contrast, this paper uses CPS data covering a 22-year period, which permit identification of the effects of SSI from within-state, time-series variation in SSI benefits, using a better control sample. The evidence points consistently to negative effects of more generous SSI payments on the labor supply of likely SSI participants aged 62-64. The implied elasticities of labor supply with respect to benefits, for those with a high probability of SSI participation, are generally in the range of 0.2 to 0.3, looking at both employment and hours of work.
Food Stamp Benefits Adjust to Earnings with and without Cross-Program Effects from TANF and SSI Cash Assistance
No full textAs households participating in the Food Stamp Program and other public assistance programs work more, the additional earnings are partially offset by a reduction in food stamp benefits and cash assistance from Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) or Supplemental Security Income (SSI). The rate at which food stamp benefits and TANF or SSI cash assistance are reduced with an increase in earnings is referred to as the programs effective benefit reduction rate (EBRR). This report derives FSP EBRRs for earnings with and without cross-program effects from adjustments to TANF or SSI cash assistance due to the additional earnings. The estimated FSP EBRRs are combined with TANF EBRRs and SSI EBRRs to estimate an effective tax rate on earnings in terms of these program benefits. With the authority for TANF programs devolved to States in 1996 Welfare Reform Law, FSP and TANF EBRRs as well as effective tax rates on earnings will vary by State. This report illustrates the treatment of earnings among these programs and the variation in treatment across states.Food Consumption/Nutrition/Food Safety,
Routes of survial of SSI in India and its futurity - a study of pre and post reform period
No full textThe small scale sector in India has particularly emerged as a vibrant and dynamic segment of the economy. The strategy of economic development of any country that formulate programmes for removal of poverty by providing large scale employment, education and training, capital formation, effective mobilisation of resources, balanced economic growth, expansion of trade, transport and equitable distribution of national income with effective involvement and participation of all its citizens in the accomplishment of the goal, cannot neglect small scale industrial sector (SSI). The second generation of economic reforms is underway with vigour. Liberalisation of key sectors is gaining momentum with more relaxed regulatory framework to provide further impetus to growth. Over the past decade, Indian economy has undergone transition phase witnessing the challenges of more free and market oriented environment of the Liberalised era. Being one of the major growth drivers of the economy, the biggest challenge before SSI is not only to survive but also to grow and compete on a sustainable basis. This paper compares the performance of SSI in pre and post liberalised period and focuses on policy changes which have opened new opportunities for this sector. Technology development and strenthening of financial infrastructure is needed to boost SSIand thus growth target can be achieved.ssi, globalized world, role of ssi
The Supplemental Security Income Program and Incentives to Take Up Social Security Early Retirement: Empirical Evidence from Matched SIPP and Social..
No full textFeatures of the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program and the social security retirement system may interact in a manner that creates incentives for prospective SSI recipients to take social security early retirement (SSER). This paper takes a first close look at this issue. The work disincentives posed by SSI rules and the potential interactions between the SSI and SSER programs are outlined in a basic theoretical framework. The hypotheses that emerge can be tested using public-use microdata linked to Social Security Administration records. We first present evidence supporting the hypothesis that SSI rules induce prospective SSI recipients to substantially reduce work activity (by various measures) prior to age 65. We then present two types of evidence on SSI-SSER interactions. We do not find a simple correspondence between generous SSI benefits and SSER use, which might be an expected indirect SSI-SSER interaction. However, estimates for some specifications for SSER receipt, derived directly from the theoretical interaction between SSER and SSI rules through the household budget constraint, provide evidence of a direct interaction between SSER and SSI, with SSI inducing use of SSER for those individuals for whom the SSI-SSER interaction eliminates the reduction in benefits associated with early receipt of social security benefits.
The Supplemental Security Income Program and Incentives to Claim Social Security Retirement Early: Empirical Evidence from Matched SIPP and Social Security Administrative Files
No full textFeatures of the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program and the social security retirement system interact to create incentives for prospective participants in the aged portion of SSI to withdraw from the labor force and make an early old age insurance (OAI) claim under social security. This paper takes a first close look at this SSI-OAI interaction. The work disincentives posed by SSI rules and the potential interactions between the SSI and social security programs are outlined in a basic theoretical framework. The impact of SSI rules on the financial cost of delaying the initial OAI claim is calculated using earnings records of actual SSI recipients. Regression specifications for early OAI claims that include variables intended to capture the influence of SSI are estimated. Throughout, the analyses are enhanced by access to Social Security Administration records that have been matched to individuals in the Surveys of Income and Program Participation.
Public Health Insurance and SSI Program Participation Among the Aged
No full textPrevious researchers have noted that the ‘categorical’ Medicaid eligibility accompanying the welfare programs Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) often far exceeds the value of these programs’ cash benefits. It may be the case that the accompanying health insurance, not the cash benefit, is often the decisive factor in welfare participation. If so, welfare participation should decrease when cash and health insurance benefits are unbundled. We present a simple model of program participation with heterogeneous valuation of health insurance and transaction costs of participation. We evaluate the following four implications of the model: 1) SSI participation declines with the expansion of alternative routes to Medicaid (i.e., noncategorical Medicaid); 2) the availability of noncategorical Medicaid increases Medicaid participation among SSI nonparticipating eligibles; 3) the average SSI benefit collected by welfare recipients is higher when noncategorical Medicaid is available; and 4) the average SSI benefit rejected by nonparticipating SSI eligibles is higher when noncategorical Medicaid is available. Overall, the findings on the model’s testable implications are mixed. The estimates imply strikingly large effects of the presence of alternative routes to Medicaid on both SSI and Medicaid participation, but the results for the hypotheses about SSI benefit amounts are sensitive to controls for recipient characteristics.
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