1,720,989 research outputs found

    PRICING STRATEGIES BETWEEN SINGTEL AND STARHUB

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    Bachelor'sBACHELOR OF SOCIAL SCIENCES (HONOURS

    PARADISE, PARADOX OR PANDORA'S BOX : ECONOMIZING THE PERFORMING ARTS IN SINGAPORE

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    Bachelor'sBACHELOR OF SOCIAL SCIENCES (HONOURS

    GAME THEORY WITH RESPECT TO STRATEGIC PLANNING IN THE SINGAPORE TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKET

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    Bachelor'sBACHELOR OF SOCIAL SCIENCES (HONOURS

    EQUILIBRIUM MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES FOR MERGERS

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    Master'sMASTER OF SOCIAL SCIENCE

    COMPUTER INDUSTRY

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    Bachelor'sBACHELOR OF SOCIAL SCIENCES (HONOURS

    EDITORIAL

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    Network Externality and Commercial Software Piracy

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    Contrary to the earlier findings under end-users piracy where the existence of strong network externality was shown to be a reason for allowing limited piracy, we find when the piracy is commercial in nature the optimal policy for the original software developer is to protect its product irrespective of the strength of network externality in the software users market.Copyright violations, Commercial/Retail piracy, Network externality, Quality

    Multicollinearity and maximum entropy leuven estimator

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    Multicollinearity is a serious problem in applied regression analysis. Q. Paris (2001) introduced the MEL estimator to resolve the multicollinearity problem. This paper improves the MEL estimator to the Modular MEL (MMEL) estimator and shows by Monte Carlo experiments that MMEL estimator performs significantly better than OLS as well as MEL estimators.maximum entropy

    On Software Piracy

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    The pervasiveness of the illegal copying of software is indeed a worldwide phenomenon. Economists argue that when the piracy takes place at the end-users’ level, the original software developer finds it profitable to allow limited piracy when the effect of network externality is reasonably strong in the users market. We argue when the piracy is of retail in nature, the same logic cannot be extended as the reason for piracy and show that it is always optimal for the original software developer to protect its software even when the effect of network externality is strong in the end-users’ market. We suggest that piracy depends on more fundamental issues like demand environment, market structure, nature of piracy and nature of competition. The other issue we cover here is the economic impact of piracy on the welfare of a society. We discuss various policy implications on regulating piracy in developing as well as developed markets.</jats:p
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