178,073 research outputs found
Viaggio curioso, scientifico, antiquario per la Valachia, Transilvania e Ungheria fino a Viena fatto da Domenico Sestini
No full textRare Sion 538 Domenico Sestini. - Firenze : Nella Stamperia di Luigi e Fratelli Magheri, 1815. - [2] f., XXVIII, 355 p. : il. ; 21 cm. Însemnări. - Donaţia Gh. Sion. - Coperta 1-r.: super ex-libris monogramBCU Cluj. - Coperta 1-vs.: ex-libris etichetă.BCU Cluj. - F. gardă-r., f. tit.-r.: ex-libris tampon.BCU Cluj
To buy or to do it yourself? Pollution policy and environmental goods in developing countries
No full textWe analyse the effects of emissions taxes set by a developing country within a two-country model, with two asymmetric downstream firms and a foreign upstream eco-industry, and under the assumption that the more efficient firm may either obtain the environmental technology from the foreign innovator, or engage in abatement effort or finally do not abate at all. A tougher climate policy may become the key driver for inducing the more efficient firm to engage in production of the abatement technology, leading also to a fall in total emissions. The impact on aggregate welfare is not clear-cut and heavily depends on firms’ heterogeneity: only if the cost asymmetry is low enough the transition to the mixed equilibrium with one licensee and the other firm exerting abatement effort would make the society better off
Pricing Discretion and Price Regulation in Competitive Industries
No full textPrice capped firms enjoy a large degree of pricing discretion, which may harm customers and competition. We study two alternative regulatory regimes to limit it: the first regime (Absolute) places a fixed upper limit to the prices charged in captive markets, while the other regime (Relative) constrains the captive prices relatively to the competitive ones. Under the Relative regime, captive prices are only weakly lower and competitive prices are always higher than under the Absolute regime. However, the number of competitors and/or their output may be higher under the Relative regime. While the effects on aggregate welfare are ambiguous, there is some evidence that the Relative regime is more likely to increase consumers’ surplus and social welfare the more efficient are the competitors. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2006Price regulation, Pricing discretion, Competition, L13, L50,
Strategic Timing in R&D Agreements
No full textWe present a model of endogenous formation of R&D agreements among firms in which also the timing of R&D investments is made endogenous. The purpose is to bridge two usually separate streams of literature, the endogenous formation of R&D alliances and the endogenous timing literature. This allows to consider the formation of R&D agreements over time. It is shown that, when both R&D spillovers and investment costs are sufficiently low, firms may find difficult to maintain a stable agreement due to the strong incentive to invest noncooperatively as leaders. In such a case, the stability of an R&D agreement requires that the joint investment occurs at the initial stage, thus avoiding any delay. When instead spillovers are sufficiently high, cooperation in R&D constitutes a profitable option, although firms also possess an incentive to sequence their investment over time. Finally, when spillovers are asymmetric and the knowledge mainly leaks from the leader to the follower, to invest as follower becomes extremely profitable, making R&D alliances hard to sustain unless firms strategically delay their joint investment in R&D
Strategic timing in R&D agreements
No full textWe study the endogenous formation of R&D agreements in a R&D/Cournot duopoly model with spillovers where also the timing of R&D investments is endogenous. This allows us to consider the incentives for firms to sign R&D agreements over time. It is shown that, when both R&D spillovers and investment costs are sufficiently low, firms may find difficult to maintain a stable agreement due to the strong incentive to invest noncooperatively as leaders. In this case, the stability of an agreement requires that the joint investment occurs at the initial stage, thus avoiding any delay. When spillovers are sufficiently high, the coordination of R&D efforts becomes a profitable option, although firms may also have an incentive to sequence noncooperatively their investment over time. Finally, when spillovers are asymmetric and knowledge mainly leaks from the leader to the follower, investing as follower may become extremely profitable, making R&D agreements hard to sustain unless firms strategically delay their joint investment in R&D. © 2013 © 2013 Taylor & Francis Ltd
Correction to: "On a class of Hermite-Obreshkov one-step methods with continuous spline extension" [Axioms 7 (3), 58, 2018]
No full textThe authors of the above mentioned paper specify that the considered class of one-step symmetric Hermite-Obreshkov methods satisfies the property of conjugate-symplecticity up to order p + r, where r = 2 and p is the order of the method. This generalization of conjugate-symplecticity states that the methods conserve quadratic first integrals and the Hamiltonian function over time intervals of length O(h-r). Theorem 1 of the above mentioned paper is then replaced by a new one. All the other results in the paper do not change. Two new figures related to the already considered Kepler problem are also added
R&D and foreign direct investment with asymmetric spillovers
No full textThis paper analyzes how firms' R&D investment decisions are affected by asymmetries in knowledge transmission, considering different sources of asymmetry such as unequal know-how management capabilities and spillovers localization within an international oligopoly. We show that a better ability to manage knowledge flows incentivizes the firm to invest more in R&D. By introducing geographically bounded spillovers, we also find that one-way foreign direct investment (FDI) stimulates the multinational enterprise to raise its own R&D and that an FDI equilibrium is more likely to occur. Finally, spillovers localization leading to two-way FDI is welfare improving when compared with non-localized spillovers. © 2012 Copyright Taylor and Francis Group, LLC
Geometric Hermite interpolation by spatial Pythagorean-hodograph cubics,
No full textIt is shown that, depending upon the orientation of the end tangents \t_0,
\t_1 relative to the end point displacement vector \Delta\p=\p_1-\p_0, the
problem of Hermite interpolation by PH cubic segments may admit zero,
one, or two distinct solutions. For cases where two interpolants exist, the
bending energy may be used to select among them. In cases where no solution
exists, we determine the minimal adjustment of one end tangent that permits a
spatial PH cubic Hermite interpolant. The problem of assigning tangents to a
sequence of points \p_0,\ldots,\p_n in , compatible with a
piecewise--PH--cubic spline interpolating those points, is also briefly
addressed. The performance of these methods, in terms of overall smoothness
and shape--preservation properties of the resulting curves, is illustrated by
a selection of computed examples
Buying or Performing Abatement: Environmental Policy and Welfare When Commitment Is (Not) Credible
No full textWe build an asymmetric duopoly model featuring two polluting firms that are heterogeneous in terms of production efficiency. The less efficient firm performs abatement by buying an environmental good in exchange for a fixed fee, while the more efficient one engages directly in abatement. In this set-up, we compare two environmental policy settings: one where the regulator commits to policy before observing abatement investment, and one where such commitment is not credible (i.e. time consistency). We conclude that, in the latter setting, emission taxes are lower, whilst aggregate profits and consumers’ surplus are enhanced with respect to the case with commitment. The welfare ranking is not straightforward, as commitment may make society better off than under time consistency, depending on the degree of technological asymmetry in production. Moreover, policy makers might be “trapped” in a time-consistent policy scenario, due to the interest of involved stakeholders, at the expense of environmental policy effectiveness
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