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Diritti, definizioni, generazioni. Vie d’una riflessione
El artículo es un argumento sobre el tema de los derechos humanos.
Se hace hincapié sobre su naturaleza y se atiende a la interrogante sobre
si los derechos humanos son una correlación lógica de derechos y deberes,
o son una exigencia humana, en sentido estricto. Se aborda el tema
de la naturaleza de estos derechos a partir de un argumento lógico: los
derechos humanos dan cuenta de su positividad o expresan más bien
cuestiones diversas utilizadas de modo diverso por las personas en contextos
diversos. Por ello, en un razonar desde el pragmatismo realista del
autor, se trata en este trabajo de integrar todas estas perspectivas en una
definición amplia de Derechos Humanos
Analysis of language and legal rights within the Scandinavian debate: human rights: a “hidden” essence?
The new approach of analytical jurisprudence was in line with the tradition of Scandinavian realism. My contribution addresses the search for differences and similarities by describing the contribution of Scandinavian authors on legal rights and more explicitly their ontological and semantic nature, the issues of a definition and its practical utility within the legal system. The debate on legal rights arose in the 40's may be considered as still actual in the sense that the semantic and pragmatic approach has nowadays involved the issues concerning the nature of human rights. It is recognizable in the debate on human rights a pragmatic approach on the subject seem to predominate. Pragmatic and realistic instances get the upper hand. The definition of a theoretical concept (as "human right" or "legal right") does not say anything concerning the content and moreover the forms of protection or the immunities which should be stated as fundamental. Scandinavians seem to avoid ontological-substantial definitions
The doubting philosopher: Norberto Bobbio. Outlines of his legal philosophy within Italian legal culture
Realism vs. Idealism. Ross vs. Castberg. Path of a dispute upon law and human rights
In Scandinavia, an animated debate arose in the 40's between the Swedish legal philosophers supporting Hägerström's theory of reality and some Logic Empiricism's postulates and, in opposition, a moderate attempt to re-propose Natural Law and the normative concept of Law, represented by the Norwegian Frede Castberg. This study focuses on the theoretical differences between the Scandinavian Realism and the Idealism, mostly by highlighting Castberg's normative Idealism and his programme of Modern Natural Law. It follows a deepened analysis of Castberg's criticism toward Ross's realistic approach concerning democracy, freedom, equality and human rights. By taking these two contrasting viewpoints into account, this study pays attention to the very colourful Norwegian theoretical debate on human rights by describing the contribution of some authors which, although theoretically inspired by Realism, Pragmatism and Analytical Philosophy, seem to reap the harvest of Idealism's efforts. The research main role is to clarify, through methodological comparison, the different traditions of Realism and Idealism as to the epistemological foundation of the concepts of Law and human rights. Moreover, this study, through an investigation of a large parts of literature, sheds light upon the implications of such theories within the field of the practice of human rights
Argumentando a partir de los derechos humanos. La ponderación en serio
En los Estados constitucionales modernos, se encuentra un conspicuo set de derechos, principios y valores éticos. En el presente trabajo se insiste en la necesidad de tener muy presente las investigaciones relativas a la racionalidad, el conflicto y los valores. Precisamente, porque los derechos se basan en argumentos y el balancing es una técnica argumentativa; resulta que el balancing se mueve dentro de un razonamiento práctico con el propósito de construir plataformas argumentativas que justifiquen las decisiones. Reflexionar sobre las interconexiones entre las varias plataformas teóricas es tomar en serio la ponderación, evitando el riesgo de pauperizar la Constitución y minimizar el principio de soberanía
Angelic, brute, or responsible rights?
The specification of legal rights in the Analytical Theory has been characterized by sobriety and rigor and such a lesson has become of great significance in contemporary normative debate on justice and fairness. In this paper I will primarily mention Hohfeld’s table of correlatives and Ross’s variation of it (1), secondly, two competing theories of rights: on the one hand, the ‘choice theory’ of rights in the version defended by Hart (2) and, on the other hand the ‘interest theory’ supported by MacCormick (3). Far from engaging in reasoning about the nature or the foundation of rights, the present paper identifies potential weaknesses in these accounts since, from one hand they do not suitably help us to understand what is truly in jeopardy in the debate over the issue and on the other hand they do not take stock of a philosophical justification of the genesis of the “new” human rights (4). The attempt of achieving an understanding of rights as responsible rights, neither as angelic outcomes of positivity nor as brute interests, is via the concept of the person. Within a normative praxis, persons partake and construct reasons so that freedom takes shape sub nomine of responsibility. In a nutshell, I refer to the Aristotelian normative praxis – at length interpreted by José de Sousa e Brito – as the place where deciding is to be justified in view of “all possible ends” and humans take the responsibility for it
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