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    Symposium on Scientia Iuris: A Reply

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    In this reply, I express my gratitude to Amicus Curiae for hosting a symposium on my new book—Scientia Iuris: Knowledge and Experience in Legal Education and Practice from the Late Roman Republic to Artificial Intelligence (Springer, 2024)—as well as to the symposium’s guest authors for their insightful contributions. In so doing, I also engage with their comments on my analysis and argument. Keywords: scientia iuris; knowledge; experience; legal education; legal practice

    Symposium on Scientia Iuris: A reply

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    In this reply, I express my gratitude to Amicus Curiae for hosting a symposium on my new book—Scientia Iuris: Knowledge and Experience in Legal Education and Practice from the Late Roman Republic to Artificial Intelligence (Springer, 2024)—as well as to the symposium’s guest authors for their insightful contributions. In so doing, I also engage with their comments on my analysis and argument

    Presentazione di G. Matino, Lex et scientia iuris. Aspetti della letteratura giuridica in lingua greca (Napoli 2012)

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    Presentazione del volume "Lex et scientia iuris. Aspetti della letteratura giuridica in lingua greca" di G. Matin

    Scientia Iuris: Knowledge and experience in legal education and practice from the late Roman republic to artificial intelligence

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    Law’s regulatory reach has grown significantly over the past few decades. Yet, at the same time, law schools and legal professions in Western and Western-oriented jurisdictions have undergone an acute crisis. How is this possible? In this insightful and wide-ranging book, Luca Siliquini-Cinelli argues that these trends are in fact complementary manifestations of a single phenomenon—namely, that law is and will always be more capable of regulating social interaction without the experiential contribution of legal experts. Siliquini-Cinelli contends that the separation of law’s regulatory function from legal experts is structurally linked to the former’s nature and operational dynamics as an intellectual artifact to be used for ordering purposes. As a product of the intellect, law is a matter of knowledge, not experience. In fact, Siliquini-Cinelli holds, law’s artifactuality voids experience, including that of legal experts, making it redundant. This explains how law can thrive as a regulatory phenomenon while the very places where future legal professionals are formed and those places where it is practised are in crisis. To show this, Siliquini-Cinelli embarks upon a historical, philosophical, and comparative analysis of law’s artifactuality, focusing on the teaching, study and practise of law as intellectual endeavours, from the advent of juristic activities in the Late Roman Republic to current legal pedagogies, practices, and reforms in Civil and Common law jurisdictions. In so doing, Siliquini-Cinelli employs the Latin phrase ‘scientia iuris’ to explain why and how legal education and practice pursue knowledge at the expense of experience, and the serious implications this has for lawyering activities. Moving beyond established narratives, Siliquini-Cinelli argues that ‘scientia iuris’ ought not be reduced to dogmatic analysis (scientia iuris as doctrina iuris). Rather, ‘scientia iuris’ denotes the knowledge of the law sought by all those who teach, study, and practise it, and which is actualised through a form of legal thinking and argumentation that moves along reason’s metaphysical, constructivist lines (scientia iuris as cognitio iuris). Thus, scientia iuris is not the prerogative of a few legal scholars; rather, it lies at the very core of Western legal education and practice, broadly understood. The relevance of Siliquini-Cinelli’s original and interdisciplinary analysis is profound and far-reaching: the crisis that legal education and practice are undergoing is not an isolated, or accidental, event; it is a consequence of the very ways in which law has been taught, studied, and practised since Rome

    L'evoluzione della "scientia iuris" nel secolo XVI

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    Nel secolo XVI la riforma della 'scientia iuris' determina la crisi del diritto comune e l'apertura del confronto fra due 'scuole di pensiero', quella italiana o di 'mos italicus', fondata sui generi della glossa e del commento, e quella francese o di 'mos gallicus', interprete delle istanze di rinnovamento delle metodologie giuridiche medievali. Se l'interpretazione degli umanisti segna innegabilmente la perdita di validità del "Corpus iuris civilis", non ne nega ma anzi ne promuove il ruolo esemplare, assumendolo a parametro di razionalità nella formazione del diritto moderno. Dagli esperimenti metodologici cinquecenteschi ai codici, in una parabola che lega l'umanesimo giuridico alla nostra epoca, il tema/problema dello 'ius in artem redigere' coincide con la risoluzione di due ordini di conflitti: quello generazionale fra 'antichi' e 'moderni' e quello gnoseologico, di invenzione di una logica giuridica in grado di comporre il diritto in un compiuto sistema scientifico

    From Agroecology and Law to Agroecological Law? Exploring Integration Between Scientia Ruris and Scientia Iuris

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    Rus, the rural phenomenon understood in its entirety, marks the plurality and the interdependence of different complex systems that are based jointly on the land as a central point of reference. “Rural” expresses a quid pluris as compared to “agricultural”: if agriculture is understood traditionally as an activity aimed at exploiting the land for the production of material goods for use, consumption, and private exchange, rurality marks the reintegration of agriculture into a wider sphere, not only productive but also social and cultural; not only material but also ideal, relational, historic, and symbolic; not only private but also public. The natural and social sciences (scientia ruris), in approaching rus, at first became specialized, multiplied, and compartmentalized in a plurality of “first-order” disciplines; later, above all in recent decades, they have set up a process of integration into agroecology as a “second-order” polyocular, transdisciplinary, and common platform. The law (scientia iuris) seems instead to be frozen at the first stage. Following a reductionistic and hyperspecialized approach, the law has deconstructed and shattered the complex universe of rus into disjointed legal elementary particles, multiplying the planes of analysis and regulation (agricultural law, business law, environmental law, landscape law, town planning law, etc.), without caring to construct linkage platforms among the various legal fields. In this chapter, after examining some important experiences underway internationally, it is asserted that scientia iuris should experiment with the development of an agroecological law, like that which agroecology is today for scientia ruris. Agroecological law should counteract the antinomic interlegalities (among the various legal fields that deal with rural phenomena) through tools of negative coordination and favor instead compatible interlegalities through tools of positive coordination. In the conclusions are proposed by way of example four types of coordination tools: agroecological information collecting and sharing (AICS), agroecological zoning (AZ), agroecological planning (AP), and agroecological impact assessment (AIA)

    Learning Resources Review: Scientia Iuris: knowledge and experience in legal education and practice from the Late Roman Republic to artificial intelligence

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    Scientia Iuris: Knowledge and Experience in Legal Education and Practice from the Late Roman Republic to Artificial Intelligence by Luca Siliquini-Cinelli is a deeply comprehensive demonstration of historical jurisprudence. The author combines “diachronic legal history and philosophical archaeology” (p. 8) as the methodology of the book to understand two current circumstances occurring across Western jurisdictions. First, that “law, as a governing institution, is thriving”, and second, that contemporary legal education and the profession are in a catastrophic state (p. 1). Rather than framing these as antagonistic to one another, the author presents them as interrelated by suggesting that is the result of the law not needing “the experiential medium of legal experts” (p. 1). To explain this further, Siliquini-Cinelli presents a thorough account of the philosophy of knowledge and experience
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