1,721,024 research outputs found
Actes de langage et (acte d)'énonciation
No full textSbisa Marina. Actes de langage et (acte d)'énonciation. In: Langages, 18ᵉ année, n°70, 1983. La mise en discours, sous la direction de Herman Parret. pp. 99-106
On argumentative rationality
No full textThe received picture of rationality, nowadays in trouble, is contrasted with the "argumentative" conception, inspired by Paul Grice's proposal to define rationality as an agent's desire that his or her moves are supported by reasons and a capacity to satisfy that desire at least to some extent. Some implications of the argumentative conception of rationality are unfolded: it involves a first-person perspective, requires criteria for the attribution of the capacity to justify one's moves, and allows for failures to behave or think rationally. Attribution of argumentative rationality to a human being does not follow from final evidence, but (when conceived as the attribution of an essential, as opposed to contingent, property), coincides with the acknowledgement of personhood, which in turn, being at least to some extent a matter of choice, is revealed to be an ethical task. So the argumentative conception of rationality may help us see why it still make sense to think of man as a rational being
Uptake and conventionality in illocution
No full textThe aim of this paper is to put forward a new way of conceiving of the conventionality of illocutionary acts, grounded in a new look at Austin’s original ideas. While the indispensability of uptake has correctly been deemed to be a hallmark of illocution, it has also been taken as evidence of the intention-based nature of illocutionary acts as opposed to their alleged conventionality. After discussing the readings of the “securing of uptake” offered by Strawson and Searle and commenting on the consequently established divide between “communicative” and conventional speech acts, I claim that illocutionary acts are conventional, first of all, because they have conventional effects. I show that Austin took such effects to be essential to illocution and argue that the bringing about of conventional effects is bound up with the indispensability of uptake
Evidentiality and illocution
No full textThis paper attempts to show that the linguistic or discursive marking of evidentiality plays a role in the performance of illocutionary acts and that its closeness to, and difference from, the attribution of epistemic modality can be explained in the light of an analysis of their respective relations to illocution. A newspaper article, displaying lexical and textual features pertinent to both evidentiality and epistemic modality, is analysed in a speech-act oriented manner, paying attention to the participation framework and its polyphonicity, in order to collect live material for the discussion of theoretical distinctions and relations. Evidentiality is then described as related to the preparatory conditions for illocutionary acts, assertive ones in particular, while epistemic modalisation appears to serve mainly the function of mitigating or boosting the speaker's commitment to the truth of the assumption she expresses or reports
Speech Acts Without Propositions?
No full textL'articolo sostiene che comprendere il linguaggio in termini di azione richiede fare a meno delle proposizioni. L'abbozzo di teoria degli atti linguistici dovuto a Austin non dava alle proposizioni alcun ruolo; esse sono state introdotte nella teoria degli atti linguistici più tardi, in seguito a critiche rivolte da Strawson e da Searle alla caratterizzazione data da Austin all'atto locutorio (l'atto di dire qualcosa) e alle sue idee sulla valutazione secondo verità/falsità. L'introduzione delle proposizioni ha avuto effetti di indebolimento sulla tesi che il linguaggio è azione, mettendo di nuovo in primo piano l'immagine tradizionale della comunicazione linguistica. Sostengo che, per dare senso alla caratterizzazione austiniana dell'atto locutorio, non c'è bisogno delle proposizioni e dò alcuni suggerimenti riguardo a come si potrebbe rendere conto della valutazione secondo verità/falsità in modo compatibile con la tesi che il linguaggio è azione, senza ricorrere alle proposizioni
How to read Austin
No full textThe goal of this paper is a reassessment of the contributions provided by John L. Austins book How to Do Things with Words to pragmatics. It discusses some assumptions belonging to the received reading of the volume, as regards its aim and structure, the conceptions of illocution and of perlocution, and the alleged exclusion of non-seriousness. Against the received reading, it is argued that How to Do Things with Words is structured as a proof by contradiction of the claim that all speech should be considered as action, that in illocution a major role is played by the conventionality of effects, that perlocution presupposes a conception of action as responsibility, and that Austin had reasons not to deal with non-seriousness in detail, albeit recognizing the issue as relevant to the study of the uses of language. In the conclusions, the tenets attributed to Austin are neither crtiticized nor defended, but an attempt is made to say what are their implications for research into language use and for philosophy
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