18,201 research outputs found
Does Cash Flow Cause Investment and R&D: An Exploration Using Panel Data for French, Japanese, and United States Scientific Firms
The role of financial institutions and corporate governance in the conduct and performance of industrial firms, especially in the area of technological innovation and international competition has been hotly debated in the recent past. The results presented here are a contribution to the empirical evidence on the behavior of individual firms that exist in somewhat different institutional environments. Using a Panel Data version of the Vector Auto Regressive (VAR) methodology, we test for causal relationship among sales and cash flow on the one hand and investment and R&D on the other, using three large panels of firms in the scientific (high technology) sectors in the United States, France, and Japan. Our findings are that both investment and R&D are more highly sensitive to cash flow and sales in the United States than in France and Japan. Corresponding, both investment and R&D predict both cash flow and sales positively in the United States, while the impact is somewhat more mixed in the other countries.investment, R&D, panel data, international comparisons, cash flow, firm-level
Cash flow is cash and is a fact. Net income is just an opinion
A company's profit after tax (or net income) is quite an arbitrary figure, obtained after assuming certain accounting hypotheses regarding expenses and revenues. On the other hand, its cash flow is an objective measure, a single figure that is not subject to any personal criterion. In general, to study a company's situation, it is more useful to operate with the cash flow (equity cash flow, free cash flow or capital cash flow) as it is a single figure, while the net income is one of several that can be obtained, depending on the criteria applied. Profit after tax (PAT) is equal to the equity cash flow when the company is not growing, buys fixed assets for an amount identical to depreciation, keeps debt constant, and only writes off or sells fully depreciated assets. Profit after tax (PAT) is also equal to the equity cash flow when the company collects in cash, pays in cash, holds no stock (this company's working capital requirements are zero), and buys fixed assets for an amount identical to depreciation. When making projections, the dividends and other forecast payments to shareholders must be exactly equal to expected equity cash flows.Cash flow; Net income; Equity cash flow; Free cash flow; Capital cash flow;
Investment, R&D and liquidity constraints
In this contribution, we present a novel instrument to control for investment opportunities in studying the investment-cash-flow sensitivity. More in particular we introduce the book value of R&D. We argue this instrument has advantages over other theories of investment, especially when focussing on the corporate governance aspects of the investment-cash-flow sensitivity. On the other hand, it implies the investment-cash-flow sensitivity can only be studied in high-tech environments. These have corporate governance problems of their own. To investigate their effect, a signalling model is extended for R&D induced investment opportunities, and estimated on a panel of Belgian data.
Hedging Cash Flows from Commodity Processing
Agribusinesses make long-term plant-investment decisions based on discounted cash flow. It is therefore incongruous for an agribusiness firm to use cash flow as a plant-investment criterion and then to completely discard cash flow in favor of batch profits as an operating objective. This paper assumes that cash flow and its stability is important to commodity processors and examines methods for hedging cash flows under continuous processing. Its objectives are (a) to determine how standard hedging models should be modified to hedge cash flows, (b) to outline the differences between cash flow hedging and profit hedging, and (c) to determine the effectiveness of hedging in reducing cash flow variability. A cash flow hedging methodology is developed. This methodology is similar to that used for batch profit hedging. This methodology balances the daily cash flow destabilizing effect of futures positions against the periodic cash flow destabilizing effect of cash price changes. The resulting cash flow hedges are simulated for soybean processors. These hedges are less effective than batch profit hedging. The reduction in cash flow variance achieved through hedging, though small, is nonetheless statistically significant.Agribusiness, Marketing,
Why Do U.S. Firms Hold So Much More Cash Than They Used To?
The average cash to assets ratio for U.S. industrial firms increases by 129% from 1980 to 2004. Because of this increase in the average cash ratio, American firms at the end of the sample period can pay back their debt obligations with their cash holdings, so that the average firm has no leverage when leverage is measured by net debt. This change in cash ratios and net debt is the result of a secular trend rather than the outcome of the recent buildup in cash holdings of some large firms. It is concentrated among firms that do not pay dividends. The average cash ratio increases over the sample period because the cash flow of American firms has become riskier, these firms hold fewer inventories and accounts receivable, and the typical firm spends more on R&D. The precautionary motive for cash holdings appears to explain the increase in the average cash ratio.
Are There Financing Constraints for R&D and Investment in German Manufacturing Firms?
Using a newly constructed panel dataset of German enterprises, I estimate R&D and capital investment equations for the time period from 1990 to 1994. Simple accelerator specifications indicate considerable sensitivity of R&D and investment to cash flow for relatively small firms. Much of this effect vanishes already once error-correcting behavior is taken into account, but a significant positive relationship between cash flow and investment remains for relatively small firms. In the case of R&D, weak but significant cash flow persist both for small and large firms. The evidence from Euler equation estimates is not conclusive. The investment Euler equation for large firms appears to perform relatively well and yields results close to those expected under the null hypothesis of no financing constraints. The estimates from the Euler equation for R&D are not informative. Additional evidence from survey data suggests that the cash flow sensitivity of investment in small firms is likely to reflect financing constraints.
Corporate cash-holding decisions: Amman stock exchange
This thesis was submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy and awarded by Brunel University.Using a panel data analysis of a sample of 80 listed non-financial Jordanian firms during the period from 2000 to 2011, we investigated the corporate cash-holding decision. The firm’s decision to hold cash has come to the fore in last two or three years as a result of the recent global financial crisis, and the impact that this has had on the firms’ ability to raise funds from external sources. There is evidence in the US, for example, that firms have increased their holdings of cash as a result of increasing constraints from external sources. This current study therefore examines this issue from the point of view of a developing economy. We started by investigating the empirical determinants of corporate cash holdings; the results showed that firm size and growth opportunities have no significant effect on corporate cash-holding decisions, while firm’s cash flow, leverage, and liquid assets substitute have a significant negative effect on cash-holding decisions, and profitability and cash dividends have a positive effect on cash-holding decisions. Then we investigated empirically how cash-holding affects the value of corporate firms. Based on Fama and French’s (1998) valuation model and Faulkender and Wang’s (2006) model, the results showed that the marginal value of each Jordanian Dinar (JD) is valued at a discounted value of 0.41 JD; with higher leverage the marginal value of cash is declining, with a higher level of cash the marginal value of cash is increasing and, finally, cash dividends have no significant effect on shareholders’ value. We also investigated empirically how a group of explanatory variables affect a firm’s debt ratio by focusing on the liquidity variable. Results showed that the total debt ratio is positively affected by firm size and is negatively affected by growth opportunities, profitability, assets tangibility and total liquidity, cash, and non-cash liquidity. The long-term debt ratio is positively affected by firm size, non-debt tax shield, asset tangibility, total liquidity, cash, and non-cash liquidity, while the long-term debt ratio is negatively affected by growth opportunities and profitability. For the short-term debt models, the debt ratio is negatively affected by firm size, asset tangibility, and liquidity in its different forms. An investigation into the speed of adjustment showed that Jordanian firms quickly adjusted the total and long-term debt ratio, while they do not have an optimal or target short-term debt ratio
Share reacquisitions, surplus cash, and agency problems
This paper investigates the role that excess cash plays in explaining actual open market share reacquisitions and examines the impact of agency problems on the payout decision. Using data from the U.K., where disclosure regulations make it possible to directly measure the volume and value of shares reacquired, we find that repurchase activity clusters in cash generative industries where investment opportunities are scarce. Holding investment opportunities constant at the firm level, we find that abnormally high cash flows from operating and (to a lesser extent) investing activities drive both the probability of a repurchase and the amount spent reacquiring shares. Comparing a subset of repurchases that are unambiguously driven by the desire to distribute surplus cash with a cash-matched sample of nonrepurchasing firms, we find that repurchasers are characterized by lower managerial entrenchment. Repurchasers also report superior improvements in postrepurchase operating performance and are less likely either to fail or be targeted in corporate control contests during the two-year period following the payout decision. Our results support the view that managers use share reacquisitions as flexible tool for distributing transitory cash surpluses, but only in the absence of serious agency problems between inside and outside shareholders
Cash holdings, corporate governance and financial constraints
We examine the relation between cash holdings, quality of governance and financial constraints. We find that firms with strong shareholder rights hold more cash, contrary to the predictions of agency theory. This result is partly due to the positive correlation that exists between governance quality measures and the degree of financial constraint faced by the firm. We show that governance quality has no impact on cash holdings by financially unconstrained firms. It does, however, have a positive impact on the cash holdings of certain financially constrained firms, particularly family firms. Anti-takeover provisions give these firms extra flexibility, enabling them to issue shares without the founding family losing control, and provide an alternative to high cash holdings.cash holdings; financial constraints; governance
Cash holdings, corporate governance and financial constraints.
We examine the relation between cash holdings, quality of governance and financial constraints. We find that firms with strong shareholder rights hold more cash, contrary to the predictions of agency theory. This result is partly due to the positive correlation that exists between governance quality measures and the degree of financial constraint faced by the firm. We show that governance quality has no impact on cash holdings by financially unconstrained firms. It does, however, have a positive impact on the cash holdings of certain financially constrained firms, particularly family firms. Anti-takeover provisions give these firms extra flexibility, enabling them to issue shares without the founding family losing control, and provide an alternative to high cash holdings.Governance; Financial Constraints; Cash Holdings;
- …
