26,291 research outputs found
Some forgotten equilibria of the Bertrand duopoly!?
No full textThis note analyzes the Bertrand duopoly with constant but asymmetric marginal costs on a market with homogenous products. It is shown that there exist some equilibria that are ignored in the literature on IO. In addition, in this setting (perfectly or nearly perfectly) competitive equilibria exist.
Endogenous Timing of Moves in Bertrand-Edgeworth Triopolies
No full textWe determine the endogenous order of moves in which the firms set their prices in the framework of a capacity-constrained Bertrand-Edgeworth triopoly. A three-period
timing game that determines the period in which the firms announce their prices precedes the price-setting stage. We show for the non-trivial case (in which the Bertrand-Edgeworth triopoly has only an equilibrium in non-degenerated mixedstrategies) that the firm with the largest capacity sets its price first, while the two other firms set their prices later. Our result extends a finding by Deneckere and Kovenock (1992) from duopolies to triopolies. This extension was made possible by Hirata's (2009) recent advancements on the mixed-strategy equilibria of Bertrand-Edgeworth games
Cours de mécanique fait a l'École Navale Impériale : ouvrage destiné aux officiers de la Marine ...
No full textEl ed. Arthus Bertrand y el imp. E. Thunot trabajaron juntos a mediados del S. XI
THE COURNOT-BERTRAND PROFIT DIFFERENTIAL : A REVERSAL RESULT IN A DIFFERENTIATED DUOPOLY WITH WAGE BARGAINING
No full textThis paper compares Cournot and Bertrand equilibria in a downstream differentiated duopoly in which the input price (wage) paid by each downstream firm is the outcome of a strategic bargain with its upstream supplier (labour union). We show that the standard result that Cournot equilibrium profits exceed those under Bertrand competition - when the differentiated duopoly game is played in imperfect substitutes - is reversible. Whether equilibrium profits are higher under Cournot or Bertrand competition is shown to depend upon the nature of the upstream agents’ preferences, on the distribution of bargaining power over the input price and on the degree of product market differentiation. We find that the standard result holds unless unions are both powerful and place considerable weight on the wage argument in their utility function. One implication of this is that if the upstream agents are profit-maximising firms, then the standard result will obtain.differentiated duopoly ; wage bargaining ; Cournot ; Bertrand.
Comparing Cournot and Bertrand Competition in a Unionized Mixed Duopoly
No full textWe investigate a differentiated mixed duopoly in which private and public firms can choose to strategically set prices or quantities by facing a union bargaining process. For the case of a unionized mixed duopoly, only the public firm is able to choose a type of contract irrespective of whether the goods are substitutes or complements in the equilibrium. Thus, we show that social welfare under Bertrand competition is always determined by the public firm's dominant strategy, wherein the Bertrand competition entails higher social welfare than the Cournot competition. Moreover, there are multiple Nash equilibria in the contract stage of the game. Finally, our main results hold irrespective of the nature of goods, with the exception of when a sufficiently large parameter of complements is employed, the ranking of private firm's profit is not reversed, which is contrast to the standard findings.Wage Bargaining, Union, Cournot-Bertrand Competition, Mixed Duopoly.
Entretien avec Bertrand Méheust
No full textPrésentation de Bertrand Méheust Bertrand Méheust est docteur en sociologie, auteur d’une thèse sur l’histoire des débats autour du magnétisme animal (Méheust, 1999), prolongation d’un DEA de philosophie consacré au mesmérisme à l’université de Dijon en 1981. Il est aussi l’auteur de deux ouvrages qui proposent de rapprocher les expériences suscitées par des observations d’ovnis avec la science-fiction populaire et le folklore fantastique. Bertrand Méheust est l’un des rares chercheurs qui s’..
Cournot-Bertrand competition in a unionized mixed duopoly
No full textWe investigate a differentiated mixed duopoly in which private and public firms can choose to strategically set prices or quantities by facing a union bargaining process. For the case of a unionized mixed duopoly, only public firm is able to choose a type of contract based on the degree of substitutability in the equilibrium. Focusing on the case of substitute goods, we show that Bertrand (respectively, Cournot) competition entails higher social welfare than Cournot (respectively, Bertrand) competition if the degree of substitutability is relatively small (respectively, large). Thus, there are multiple Nash equilibria in the contract stage of the game. As a result, Singh and Vives' ranking of social welfare is reversed in a range of substitution values for which it is a dominant strategy for public firm to choose either quantity or price contracts.Wage Bargaining; Union; Cournot-Bertrand Competition; Mixed Duopoly
Quality Uncertainty as Resolution of the Bertrand Paradox
No full textWe show that in a homogeneous-good duopoly market with quality uncertainty and constant unit costs, the Bertrand paradox (i.e., marginal cost pricing) can be avoided.oligopoly, endogenous preferences, threshold utility
The Cournot-Bertrand profit differential: a reversal result in a differentiated duopoly with wage bargaining
No full textThis paper compares Cournot and Bertrand equilibria in a downstream differentiated duopoly in which the input price (wage) paid by each downstream firm is the outcome of a strategic bargain with its upstream supplier (labour union). We show that the standard result that Cournot equilibrium profits exceed those under Bertrand competition - when the differentiated duopoly game is played in imperfect substitutes - is reversible. Whether equilibrium profits are higher under Cournot or Bertrand competition is shown to depend upon the nature of the upstream agents’ preferences, on the distribution of bargaining power over the input price and on the degree of product market differentiation. We find that the standard result holds unless unions are both powerful and place considerable weight on the wage argument in their utility function. One implication of this is that if the upstream agents are profit-maximising firms, then the standard result will obtain
Cournot and Bertrand competition with asymmetric costs in a mixed duopoly
No full textWe investigate a differentiated mixed duopoly in which private and public firms can choose to strategically set prices or quantities when the public firm is less efficient than the private firm. Thus, regardless of whether the goods are substitutes or complements, if the degree of public firm's inefficiency is sufficiently small, there exists a dominant strategy for both public and private firms that choose Bertrand competition, while there exists a dominant strategy only for the private firm that chooses Bertrand competition if the degree of inefficiency is sufficiently large. Consequently, we show that regardless of the nature of goods, (i) social welfare under Bertrand competition is determined in equilibrium, if the degree of public firm's inefficiency is sufficiently small; and (ii) if the degree of its inefficiency is sufficiently large, social welfare under which the private firm sets its price and the public firm sets its quantity is determined in equilibrium. Moreover, the ranking of a private firm's profit is not reversed.Inefficiency, Cournot-Bertrand Competition, Mixed Duopoly
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