1,721,345 research outputs found
Neurointerventions and Punishment
No full textAn increasing number of theorists have become preoccupied with the idea of using neurointerventions as a means of preventing offenders from reoffending. However, a traditional criticism against the rehabilitationist ideal of treating offenders in order to avoid recidivism has been that such an approach violates considerations of justice. The purpose of this chapter is to examine whether this traditional justice-based criticism is warranted if neurointerventions are administered as a crime prevention tool. It is suggested that this need not be the case. More specifically, it is argued that: 1) neurointerventions can be imposed as a type of punishment; 2) if this is the case, then properly imposed neurointerventions do not involve a breach of retributivist proportionality considerations; and 3) such interventions cannot be excluded as a type of punishment that should be banned in principle. Therefore, even though there may be other objections to the use of neurointerventions in the criminal justice system, the traditional justice-based objection against rehabilitationism does not seem sufficient to rule out the possibility of treating offenders by the use of neurointerventions.An increasing number of theorists have become preoccupied with the idea of using neurointerventions as a means of preventing offenders from reoffending. However, a traditional criticism against the rehabilitationist ideal of treating offenders in order to avoid recidivism has been that such an approach violates considerations of justice. The purpose of this chapter is to examine whether this traditional justice-based criticism is warranted if neurointerventions are administered as a crime prevention tool. It is suggested that this need not be the case. More specifically, it is argued that: 1) neurointerventions can be imposed as a type of punishment; 2) if this is the case, then properly imposed neurointerventions do not involve a breach of retributivist proportionality considerations; and 3) such interventions cannot be excluded as a type of punishment that should be banned in principle. Therefore, even though there may be other objections to the use of neurointerventions in the criminal justice system, the traditional justice-based objection against rehabilitationism does not seem sufficient to rule out the possibility of treating offenders by the use of neurointerventions
The Philosophy of Punishment
No full textWe usually regard it as wrong to assault someone physically or to deprive someone of liberty or property. But if this is the case, then why is it morally acceptable (or even required) for the state to impose punishments on citizens who have broken the law? The purpose of this chapter is to give an introduction to the philosophy of punishment as an academic field, to provide an overview of the various topics which are considered in the ensuing chapter of this handbook, and to present a few reasons that have motivated this work.We usually regard it as wrong to assault someone physically or to deprive someone of liberty or property. But if this is the case, then why is it morally acceptable (or even required) for the state to impose punishments on citizens who have broken the law? The purpose of this chapter is to give an introduction to the philosophy of punishment as an academic field, to provide an overview of the various topics which are considered in the ensuing chapter of this handbook, and to present a few reasons that have motivated this work
Consequentialism
No full textThe consequentialist view of punishment such as, in particular, the utilitarian theory, has constituted the dominant approach to punishment for almost two centuries. However, the theory has very few advocates in modern considerations of punishment. In fact, it has become almost conventional to hold that the theory has been ultimately rejected. In this chapter it is argued that this contention is mistaken. First, a few initial comments on the nature and implications of the consequentialist view of punishment are outlined. Second, it is argued that the standard objection that has been repeatedly raised against the consequentialist view—i.e., the punishment of the innocent objection—is non-conclusive. It is suggested that the evaluation of an ethical theory is basically a comparative question and that the interpretation of the objection as a reductio ad absurdum argument is consequently premature. Third, a few comparative advantages of the consequentialist view of punishment are presented.The consequentialist view of punishment such as, in particular, the utilitarian theory, has constituted the dominant approach to punishment for almost two centuries. However, the theory has very few advocates in modern considerations of punishment. In fact, it has become almost conventional to hold that the theory has been ultimately rejected. In this chapter it is argued that this contention is mistaken. First, a few initial comments on the nature and implications of the consequentialist view of punishment are outlined. Second, it is argued that the standard objection that has been repeatedly raised against the consequentialist view—i.e., the punishment of the innocent objection—is non-conclusive. It is suggested that the evaluation of an ethical theory is basically a comparative question and that the interpretation of the objection as a reductio ad absurdum argument is consequently premature. Third, a few comparative advantages of the consequentialist view of punishment are presented
How Should We Work as Penal Ethicists?
No full textWhy is it important to conduct research on the ethics of punishment? A plausible answer to which many penal ethicists seem to subscribe is that research is important in order to influence and guide penal practice. But if this answer is taken seriously, then a new question arises: Is the work of penal ethicists carried out in a way that accords with the aim of guiding penal practice? In this chapter it is argued that there are several barriers to impact arising from the way research is disseminated, the nature of research itself, and the lack of interest in being guided among decision-makers. Moreover, it is suggested that these barriers to impact may be surmountable, but that this will require a rethinking of the way we work as penal ethicists.Why is it important to conduct research on the ethics of punishment? A plausible answer to which many penal ethicists seem to subscribe is that research is important in order to influence and guide penal practice. But if this answer is taken seriously, then a new question arises: Is the work of penal ethicists carried out in a way that accords with the aim of guiding penal practice? In this chapter it is argued that there are several barriers to impact arising from the way research is disseminated, the nature of research itself, and the lack of interest in being guided among decision-makers. Moreover, it is suggested that these barriers to impact may be surmountable, but that this will require a rethinking of the way we work as penal ethicists
Punishment and Artificial Intelligence
No full textSuppose that computer scientists and engineers have developed a brand-new algorithm which is designed to determine sentences in individual criminal cases. Suppose, furthermore, that it seems that this algorithm is actually very good at doing this job. Would it then be justified to replace human sentencing judges with the sentencing algorithm? The answer to this question obviously depends upon many things. However, in this chapter focus is placed narrowly on the question of how we should compare human judges and the algorithm with regard to how well each is doing the job of determining the severity of the appropriate sentences. It is argued that, due to both theoretical and practical reasons, we do to a large extent currently lack the penal ethical resources to answer this question. The impetus behind these considerations is the assumption that the question may well become urgent in a not very distant future and that, in the absence of the requisite ethical considerations, there is a significant risk that decisions on this matter will be made on insufficient or even ethically arbitrary grounds.Suppose that computer scientists and engineers have developed a brand-new algorithm which is designed to determine sentences in individual criminal cases. Suppose, furthermore, that it seems that this algorithm is actually very good at doing this job. Would it then be justified to replace human sentencing judges with the sentencing algorithm? The answer to this question obviously depends upon many things. However, in this chapter focus is placed narrowly on the question of how we should compare human judges and the algorithm with regard to how well each is doing the job of determining the severity of the appropriate sentences. It is argued that, due to both theoretical and practical reasons, we do to a large extent currently lack the penal ethical resources to answer this question. The impetus behind these considerations is the assumption that the question may well become urgent in a not very distant future and that, in the absence of the requisite ethical considerations, there is a significant risk that decisions on this matter will be made on insufficient or even ethically arbitrary grounds
Sentencing and Algorithmic Transparency
No full textAlgorithmic transparency has received much attention in the current debate on the use of AI in sentencing. Concern has been expressed that the introduction or increased use of algorithms in the sentencing process may challenge the scrutability of and insight into the decision-making. However, there is a striking contrast between the repeated emphasis on the alleged challenge of algorithmic opacity and the lack of elaborate attempts at answering precisely what this challenge consists of. Drawing on the traditional discussion of the importance of judicial reason-giving, this chapter examines various reasons as to why and with regard to what algorithmic transparency may be morally important. It is argued that adherence to openness in the form of judicial reason-giving does not necessarily commit one to a view with regard to algorithmic transparency. Furthermore, even though there are strong reasons in favor of algorithmic transparency, the field still suffers from a lack of empirical research
Introduction:Exploring the normative significance of public opinion for state punishment
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