1,720,986 research outputs found
Stakeholder consultations as reputation-building: a comparison of ACER and the German Federal Network Agency
No full textStakeholder engagement is thought to increase the legitimacy of independent regulatory agencies (IRAs). However, there is little research on how IRAs use the information that stakeholders contribute. We argue that the organizational reputation approach can explain different reactions to stakeholder engagement. IRAs usually rely on a reputation based on technical expertise. However, if IRAs have little capacities, they fall back on procedural or moral reputation. We analyze the consultations of the German Federal Network Agency (FNA) and the European Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) on planning electricity networks. Both have complex audience situations and an incentive to cultivate a technical reputation. However, their capacities differ. The FNA has capacities to cultivate a technical reputation, and selectively discusses technical contributions. ACER has less capacities. It selectively reacts to comments that criticize procedural aspects of network planning. Hence, we show how reputational concerns and capacities shape consultation procedures
Learning in iterated consultation procedures – The example of the German electricity grid demand planning
No full textPublic participation has become a conditio sine qua non when planning infrastructure projects. However, current research is concerned with one-time experiments and can not elucidate long-term effects of iterated consultations. Our argument is that consultations have learning effects over time. We test our argument using the German procedure for electricity grid demand planning as a case. Using dictionary coding and a quantitative analysis, supplemented by a qualitative text analysis, we show that participants get better in framing their contributions by using the “right” keywords. Hence, consultations evolve over time and improve in terms of the output legitimacy they generate
Going beyond dyadic consultation relationships: information exchange in multi-step participation procedures
No full textFor decades, political scientists have observed the diffusion of complex governance arrangements including public participation procedures to ameliorate the democratic deficit inherent in these often-opaque structures. This article asks how the information provided in consultation statements is used by the consulting actors. To account for the multi-step character, the article combines exchange theory with a principal-agent approach, acknowledging that several actors in a delegation chain might be interested in the provided information. We use a typical case of a multi-step procedure – participation in German grid development – to test both theories. Neither the private firms nor the regulator use information provided in their own consultations, contradicting exchange theory. But the regulator considers ecological submissions made in the firms’ consultation, as the principal-agent approach suggests. Thus, a principal-agent approach allows us to find influence of consultation statements that exchange theory cannot detect
Why Does the German Participation Regime Exceed European Requirements?
No full textThe building of electricity grids is a major challenge of infrastructure planning. According to Directive 2009/72/EU, “ten-year network development plans” outline which grids are to be built. Regulatory agencies have to consult “actual or potential system users” on these plans. However, Germany exceeds these requirements and conducts three rounds of full-fledged public participation. Using rational choice and sociological institutionalism, this article argues that the over-implementation of Directive 2009/72/EU is due to two causes: First, the old German corporatist system of grid planning was dysfunctional. Second, there was a major discourse on public participation following the contentious railway project “Stuttgart 21.” The domestic implementation of Directive 2009/72/EU then opened a window of opportunity for advocates of public participation to implement their preferences. A comparison with France corroborates the argument that both conditions must be fulfilled to cause a major reform
Kommunale Akteur:innen in den Konsultationen zum Netzausbau - Akteur:innen, Argumente, Auswirkungen
No full textLegitimation durch Verwaltungsverfahren? Was sich die Politik von Konsultationen beim Stromnetzausbau verspricht
Full text linkDie Energiepolitik erlebt zurzeit einen enormen institutionellen Wandel: Schon bei der Bedarfsplanung für den Netzausbau wird die Öffentlichkeit in Form von Konsultationen durch die Übertragungsnetzbetreiber und die Bundesnetzagentur einbezogen. Der Artikel untersucht, was die Entscheidungsträger dazu bewegte, Konsultationsverfahren verpflichtend einzuführen. Aus der Literatur zum Thema Öffentlichkeitsbeteiligung lassen sich dabei fünf mögliche Ziele ableiten: Eine demokratietheoretische Perspektive sieht Konsultationen als Mittel, um die Input-Legitimität von Policies zu steigern. Eine tauschtheoretische Perspektive dagegen betont, dass durch Konsultationen Expertenwissen in den politischen Prozess einfließt und Output- Legitimität erzeugt. Der soziologische Institutionalismus sieht Konsultationen als Resultat von institutionellem Isomorphismus an. Eine Prinzipal-Agenten- Perspektive sieht Konsultationen vor allem als Mittel, um Agenten zu kontrollieren, da die Prinzipale durch die Konsultationen mehr Informationen erhalten. In der politischen Praxis schließlich wird vor allem die Hoffnung geäußert, dass Konsultationen nicht nur Entscheidungen besser legitimieren, sondern letztlich auch mehr Akzeptanz für Policies erzeugen. Im Lichte dieser Perspektiven untersucht der Artikel die Einführung der Konsultationsverfahren und zeigt, dass die politischen Akteure sich vor allem die Steigerung der Inputlegitimität und der Akzeptanz des Netzausbaus durch die Öffentlichkeitsbeteiligung erhoffen. Allerdings finden sich auch viele Belege für institutionellen Isomorphismus, also dafür, dass Beteiligungsverfahren eingeführt wurden, "weil man das so macht". Dieses Faktum führt zu pessimistischen Prognosen über die Fähigkeit der Konsultationen, die erhoffte Wirkung auch zu erreichen.The German energy transformation ("Energiewende") is a major political experiment. This experiment does not only comprise new policies, but also establishes new governance structures. The planning of electricity grids had once been a prerogative of the executive and state-owned enterprises. Now, this planning process involves extensive public participation, which marks a substantial procedural innovation for Germany. This article aims to discern the underlying motives and expectations legislators and stakeholders had when establishing these participation procedures. The academic discussion offers five perspectives on public participation: The first perspective stems from democratic theory and argues that consultation procedures improve the input legitimacy of policies. Second, the political exchange approach argues that consultation procedures enhance the output legitimacy of policies by adding technical expertise to the policy process. Third, for the principal- agent approach, consultations establish fire alarms that allow political principals to govern their administrative agents. Fourth, the most skeptical perspective stems from sociological institutionalism and sees consultations as symbolic actions, designed to conform to widely held notions of legitimacy. Fifth, in political practice a prevalent argument is that participation procedures induce high levels of acceptance for decisions. Applying these five perspectives, the article finds that decision-makers hoped to increase input legitimacy and acceptance by establishing participation procedures. In addition, mechanisms of institutional isomorphism were drivers, too.This result suggests a pessimistic prognosis regarding the effects of the procedure
Konflikte und Handlungsspielraum von Akteuren in der Implementation europäischer Energiemarktrichtlinien–Das Beispiel Sicherheit der Stromnetze
No full textNeuere Ansätze der Europäisierungsforschung betrachten die Implementationsphase nach der Transposition europäischer Richtlinien. Unser Beitrag verwendet den Akteurzentrierten Institutionalismus, um nachzuzeichnen, wie sich Konflikte in der Implementationsphase abspielen. Kernargument ist, dass erst während der Implementationsphase erkennbar wird, welchen Wandel eine Richtlinie wirklich erzeugt. Wir illustrieren unser Argument anhand der Umsetzung der Regeln für die Sicherheit der Stromnetze aus dem dritten Energiemarktpaket in Deutschland. Ergebnis ist, dass sich Konflikte über den Strommarkt auch in der Implementationsphase fortsetzen. Die eigentlich "regulierten" Übertragungsnetzbetreiber wurden aufgrund der Informationsasymmetrie zum Regulierer, der für andere Akteure regulatorische Anforderungen definiert. Die Bundesnetzagentur schränkte diese Befugnisse der Übertragungsnetzbetreiber dahingehend ein, dass sie kleinere Stromproduzenten - vor allem erneuerbarer Energien - von diesen Anforderungen ausnahm. Die in der Implementation gefundene Lösung reflektiert daher stark die Machtbalance deutscher Akteure - obgleich es bereits das dritte Energiemarktpaket ist und der Sektor schon relativ europäisiert sein sollte.Current Europeanization research focuses on the implementation phase following the transposition of European directives. Our contribution uses actor-centered institutionalism to trace the conflicts emerging in this implementation phase. Our argument is that the true amount of change caused by a directive becomes visible only in the implementation phase. We illustrate this argument analyzing the implementation of the third energy market package in Germany. The result is that conflicts over market design continued in the implementation phase. The nominally "regulated" transmission system operators turned into regulators defining regulatory requirements for other market participants. The federal network agency curtailed these powers of the transmission system operators so that smaller producers - especially of renewable energies - were exempted. The implementation thus reflects the power balance between German actors - even though it is the third energy market package, and the sector should exhibit convergence on a European model
Self‐enforcing path dependent trajectories? A comparison of the implementation of the EU energy packages in Germany and the Netherlands
No full textSince the 1990s, the EU has attempted to create a common electricity market. However, EU legislators are unsatisfied by the results. We argue that differentiated implementation of directives over time creates path dependencies that entrench national differences. The actor constellation of parties and incumbent operators at the beginning of the liberalization path determines how well countries implement liberalizing directives. The implementation, in turn, changes the actor constellation for the next directive, increasing or decreasing the institutional power of incumbents. We illustrate our argument analyzing the implementation of the first three energy market packages in Germany and the Netherlands. Both countries had similar electricity markets at the beginning of market liberalization, but their actor constellation was slightly different. German implementation gradually strengthened vertically integrated utilities, while Dutch implementation dismantled these utilities through unbundling. These paths became self‐reinforcing, counteracting European harmonization efforts
Transnational Regulatory Networks as Means of EU Governance : The Administrative Dimension of Multilevel Coordination
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