1,790 research outputs found
La polemica antiscettica nel IV libro di Lucrezio. Un'eco antiochea?
No full textThis contribution suggests the hypothesis of a rather late dating, in the context of the Epicurean tradition, of the anti-sceptical dispute conducted by Lucretius in the fourth book of his poem (spec. vv. 469-521). To this end, some parallels between the Lucretian polemic and the position that Cicero, in the Lucullus, attributes to Lucullus, spokesman of Antiochus of Ascalon (135/130-68 BC), will be examined. The assonance between the controversy conducted by Lucullus against academic scepticism and the arguments outlined in the fourth book of De rerum natura, together with the elements of Stoicism ascribed to Antiochus’ “syncretism”, testify to how Lucretius’ verses could be the result of a comparison with various “endemic” instances of the philosophical temperament of the years in which their author lived and wrote
Una religiosità caleidoscopica. La religione dei filosofi greci, a partire dall’Octavius di Minucio Felice
No full textSpiegare l’errore. A proposito di alcune recenti linee di ricerca
No full textIl presente contributo mira a presentare e discutere in chiave critica alcuni dei nove saggi contenuti nella raccolta Axiological Confusion and Its Causes («ΠΗΓΗ / FONS Revista de estudios sobre la civilización clásica y su recepción» 5, Special Issue, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Instituto de Estudios Clásicos “Lucio Anneo Séneca”, Madrid 2020), curata da E. Malaspina e J. Wildberger. La nota rivolge un’attenzione particolare ad alcune problematiche di epistemologia epicurea toccate dagli Autori, con l’intento di tornare a riflettere, ancora una volta, su temi assai controversi quali l’ἐπιβολή e la πρόληψις, la cui comprensione si rivela fondamentale al fine di spiegare il darsi dell’errore, sia gnoseologico che, per conseguenza, etico.The present contribution aims to present and critically discuss some of the nine essays gathered in the collection Axiological Confusion and Its Causes («ΠΗΓΗ/FONS Revista de estudios sobre la civilización clásica y su recepción» 5, Special Issue, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Instituto de Estudios Clásicos “Lucio Anneo Séneca”, Madrid 2020), edited by E. Malaspina e J. Wildberger. The critical review pays particular attention to some controversial issues concerning Epicurean epistemology, such as the notions of ἐπιβολή and πρόληψις, whose understanding turns out to be fundamental in order to explain how both gnoseological and ethical error arises.Cette contribution vise à présenter et à discuter de manière critique quelques-uns des neuf essais contenus dans le recueil Axiological Confusion and Its Causes (« ΠΗΓΗ / FONS Revista de estudios sobre la civilización clásica y su recepción ») 5, numéro spécial, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Instituto de Estudios Clásicos « Lucio Anneo Séneca », Madrid 2020), sous la direction de E. Malaspina et J. Wildberger. La note accorde une attention particulière à certaines questions d’épistémologie épicurienne abordées par les auteurs, dans l’intention de réfléchir à nouveau à des sujets aussi controversés que l’ἐπιβολή et la πρόληψις, dont la compréhension s’avère fondamentale pour expliquer la survenue d’erreur, à la fois gnoséologique et, par conséquent, éthique
Morbus. Malattia e physiologia in Lucrezio
Full text linkIn una situazione di portata eccezionale come quella attualmente attraversata dal pianeta intero, il rinato
interesse per Lucrezio rischia di rimanere circoscritto al macabro e, forse, inaspettato resoconto della cosiddetta
‘peste’ di Atene, a cui il poeta affida l’epilogo del De rerum natura (DRN). L’episodio del mortifer aestus, che
seminò di cadaveri i campi della terra di Cecrope, rientra, però, in realtà, nel quadro più ampio, e non meno
interessante, della trattazione lucreziana dei morbi nel VI libro dell’opera. Come è da intendersi, per Lucrezio,
la malattia? Cosa la accomuna agli altri fenomeni naturali? Come prende possesso del soggetto che ne è
interessato
Cogenza e contemporaneità dell'etica epicurea a partire da una recente raccolta di studi
Full text linkThe following critical note aims at highlighting the liveliness and depth of three crucial thesis of Epicurean Ethics, by drawing on a recent publication, edited by Enrico Piergiacomi, of a selection of essays by Phillip Mitsis, A. S. Onassis Professor of Hellenic Culture and Civilization at the New York University. The issues addressed are freedom, pleasure and death, in relation to which Epicurus’ disconcerting teachings show a surprising ability to dialogue with the later history of moral thought. In this regard, the philosophy of Kepos turns out to be a definitely contemporary interlocutor, able to stimulate our rational capacity, contributing, at the same time, to the problems of our time
Lucretius’ prolepsis
No full textThis paper aims to investigate the equivalent of Epicurus’ πρόληψις, the second criterion of the Epicurean Canonic (DL X 31 = fr. 35 Usener), in Lucretius’ De rerum natura (DRN). Taking stock of the several occurrences of the Latin terms notitia and notities in the six books of the poem, I show that Lucretius’ view about preconception remains faithful to Epicurus’ πρόληψις, and that the poet does not endorse a less empiricist position than his Master because of some influence of the Stoic ἔννοια. To this end, I will also briefly address an important case in which πρόληψις, albeit not clearly mentioned, plays an essential role, namely the prolepsis of the deity (DRN V 1169–1182). Finally, I explain how Lucretius can be of some help in grasping the controversial relationship between the criterion of πρόληψις and that of ἐπιβολὴ τῆς διανοίας (animi inectus/iactus), showing in which way the poet seems to consider the latter as a criterion of truth in its own right
Passioni epistemologiche. Uoluptas e dolor come criteri di verità in Lucrezio
No full textTὰ πάθη, namely pleasure (ἡδονή) and pain (ἀλγηδών), represent the third criterion of truth envisioned by Epicurean Canonic. Besides acting as practical criteria directly pointed to action, these two affections work as gnoseological criteria, employed by διάνοια in order to distinguish between actions that should be performed and those we should rather avoid. The present contribution argues that even before any rational operation, namely in thinking them as something self-evident (ἐναργές) and a-rational (ἄλογον), these “basic” feelings – Epicurus’ πάθη and, above all, Lucretius’ uoluptas and dolor – may rightfully be described as criteria of truth: a truth which is at “zero grade” and which pertains to things rather than judgements, but which nonetheless possesses an unquestionable epistemological value
La religione dei filosofi greci. Da Talete agli Stoici
No full textQuale fu l’atteggiamento dei filosofi greci nei confronti delle tradizioni mitico-religiose delle loro città? Come caratterizzare la loro «teologia», la loro concezione della pietà, durante i tre grandi periodi della storia del pensiero greco? Da Talete agli Stoici, in un itinerario pregno di contrasti, ambiguità e impreviste armonie, Daniel Babut accompagna il lettore nelle nervature più sottili del pensiero religioso dei filosofi greci, mostrandone il progressivo sviluppo nel tempo e ricreando al contempo, con perizia, un dialogo tra i diversi attori posti in scena. La rete di somiglianze e dissomiglianze che ne deriva rivela l’originalità e il carattere peculiare di ciascuna posizione, sfatando falsi miti e dimostrando come, da cornici di pensiero spesso congeneri, poterono scaturire esiti antitetici, talvolta paradossali. Un solo punto fermo: l’inseparabilità della religione dei filosofi dalla religione popolare, nell’impossibilità di una completa fusione tra le due. Come il sofista nell’omonimo dialogo platonico, il Dio dei filosofi greci sembra sfuggire a qualunque tentativo di cattura; prendendo a prestito le parole di Eraclito, egli «vuole e non vuole essere chiamato con il nome di Zeus» (22 B 32 D.-K.). Da acuto storico della filosofia, Babut osserva e non giudica, dando voce agli Antichi, senza pretendere di trasferire loro le categorie e i criteri forgiati dagli sviluppi religiosi occorsi nei secoli successivi
Lucretius' epistemological language
No full textThe article deals with some issues of Lucretius' epistemological language. The aim of the essay is to show that the poet's lexical choices prove to be particularly significant for any attempt to assess Lucretius' reception of Epicurean theory of knowledge in the light of a compariscon with Aristotle's theory of the soul and perception. Specifically, this chapter focuses on the terminology the Latin author uses to theorize and designate (1) visual sense-perception (and, more specifically, the potestas of sight), (2) prolepsis (which Lucretius renders by means of the words notitia/notities), (3) the 'impetus' of the soul (animi iactus/iniectus, inice mentem) and, in the semiotic sphere, (4) the very concept of 'sign' (signum, uestigium, indicium). Keeping always in the background a comparison with the writings of Epicurus and some of the Epicureans (Philodemus above all), as well as taking advantage of the comparison with testimonies external to the Epicurean tradition (from Aristotle's De anima to some Ciceronian passages), this chaptertries to bring out the precision with which Lucretius weighs and selects the technical terms he emloys, not only moved by the need to present, in Latin, the epistemological teaching promoted by his master, but also with the primary objective of defending Epicurus against objections and invectives (coming from schools and philosophical directions other than the Garden) that aimed to undermine its validity and, above all, its scientific relevance
Sulle "orme" di Epicuro. Il "De rerum natura" di Lucrezio, fra tradizione e innovazione
No full textCamminare sulle orme segnate da Epicuro (DRN V, 55), vagliandone, in maniera critica, insegnamenti e precetti. Così Lucrezio sembra rapportarsi agli ipsissima verba del Maestro e, in generale, alla tradizione passata, le cui tracce (σημεῖα, vestigia), solo se correttamente interpretate sulla base di quel pensare induttivo proprio della σημείωσις e, in generale, del metodo scientifico epicurei, possono divenire chiavi di lettura del presente e delle problematiche, in continua trasformazione, che lo contraddistinguono.Treading in Epicurus’ footsteps (DRN V, 55) and considering his teachings and precepts in a critical light. This is how Lucretius seems to deal with his master’s ipsissima verba and, in general, with the previous tradition. The traces (σημεῖα, vestigia) of this legacy need interpreting on the basis of the kind of thinking which is known as σημείωσις and, more broadly, the Epicurean scientific method. It is only thanks to this process that these traces can become a key to read the present and its ever-changing issues and challenges
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