205,007 research outputs found

    Market access advances and retreats : the Uruguay Round and beyond

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    In the Uruguay Round negotiations, trade distorting agricultural policies were taken up substantively for the first time in any round of multi-lateral trade negotiations. Voluntary export restraints outside the Multifibre Arrangement (MFA) were in fact eliminated. Developing countries became equal partners with developed countries. Their tariff cuts covered as large a share of imports as those of the developed countries and were deeper. Because developing country tariffs were higher to start with, their cuts will save importers more (perdollar of imports covered) than will cuts by developed countries. Tariff bindings for most developing countries, although often above applied rates, were extended to 90 percent or more of imports. Few countries agreed to give foreigners unlimited market access in services, or full national treatment in more than a few service activities. But developed countries agreed to some liberalization of cross-border provision for 70 percent of service activities (compared with 25 percent in developing countries). Less positively, although trade restrictions on agricultural products were converted to tariffs, border protection was reduced less on agricultural than on industrial products, and there was little agreement on reducing trade-affecting subsidies. The textiles and clothing agreement binds developed countries to eliminate all MFA-sanctioned restriction but allows them to largely put off doing so until 2005. Concessions to which developing countries agreed are due now. Reciprocal concessions of particular interest are due in the future (elimination of the MFA) or yet to be negotiated (liberalization of agricultural trade). Also disquieting, since the Uruguay Round, developing countries have undertaken anti-dumping cases at a rate (per dollar of imports) three times higher than that for the United States--mostly against other developing countries.Economic Theory&Research,Rules of Origin,Export Competitiveness,Environmental Economics&Policies,Globalization and Financial Integration,TF054105-DONOR FUNDED OPERATION ADMINISTRATION FEE INCOME AND EXPENSE ACCOUNT,Environmental Economics&Policies,Rules of Origin,Export Competitiveness,World Trade Organization

    The unbalanced Ururguay Round outcome : the new areas in future WTO negotiations

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    The Uruguay Round involved a grand North-South bargain: The North reduced import barriers, particularly in textiles and agriculture. The South adopted new domestic regulations in such areas as services and intellectual property-changes that would lead to increased purchases from the North. In mercantilist economics, apples for apples-imports for imports. In real economics, apples for oranges. The authors argue that while the North's reduction of import barriers benefits both the North and the South, the new domestic regulations adopted by countries of the South could prove costly to those countries. To begin with, the regulations will be expensive to implement. And while the cost side of their impact is secured by a legal obligation (in the case of intellectual property rights, for example, the cost is higher prices for patented goods), the benefits side is not so secured.Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Theory&Research,Payment Systems&Infrastructure,Decentralization,Rules of Origin,Economic Theory&Research,Environmental Economics&Policies,TF054105-DONOR FUNDED OPERATION ADMINISTRATION FEE INCOME AND EXPENSE ACCOUNT,Trade and Regional Integration,World Trade Organization

    Developing countries and the Uruguay Round : negotiations on services

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    In the late 1980s many developing countries experienced something of a pardigm shift: governments began to pursue more market-oriented domestic policies. There was an increasing perception that liberalizing access to service markets was a potentially low-cost, effective method for improving the quality and efficiency of domestic service sectors. These unilateral policy developments increased the incentives for developing countries as a group to participate in a multilateral agreement to liberalize trade in services. The author explores the extent to which the initial negotiating positions of developing countries are reflected in the draft General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) that has emerged from the Uruguay Round negotiations. He investigates whether the unilateral policy changes implemented by many developing countries in the late 1980s had a discernible impact on the draft GATS for developing countries. Many developing countries are pursuing regulatory reform and liberalization. To what extent will signing the GATS help governments trying to make their service sectors more efficient? Is the result of the defensive negotiating strategy that was pursued consistent with the shift toward a policy of liberalizing service markets? This issue is of particular relevance insofar as recent liberalization-plus-privatization programs in developing countries were driven by external forces rather than domestic pressure (industry) groups - which might reduce the credibility of liberalization policies. Membership in a binding multilateral agreement could help bolster reform efforts by increasing the costs of backsliding.Trade and Services,Poverty Assessment,TF054105-DONOR FUNDED OPERATION ADMINISTRATION FEE INCOME AND EXPENSE ACCOUNT,Governance Indicators,Rules of Origin

    Agricultural trade liberalization in the Uruguay Round : one step forward, one step back?

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    After evaluating the Uruguay Round's impact on agriculture and border protection in the next decade, the author concludes that while there was significant reform of the rules - particularly the conversion of nontariff barriers into tariffs and the reduction and binding of all tariffs - in practice, trade will probably be liberalized less than expected. The objective of the Round was to reverse protectionism and remove trade distortions. This may not be achieved in practice, at least not until further reductions are carried out in future rounds of negotiations. The major exception to this conclusion is in high-income Asian countries, where protection for major commodities will be significantly reduced. The tariffication and binding of all tariffs on agricultural products represents a significant step forward. Liberalization is implicit because countries are prohhibited from arbitrarily raising tariffs to new higher levels. But many of the newly established tariffs are so high in many countries as to effectively prohibit trade. Patterns of liberalization vary considerably by commodity and by country. Generally, the extent of liberalization was diminished by binding tariffs to the base period of 1986-88, when border protection was at a high point. In most OECD countries, this was worsened by"dirty tariffication:"the new base tariffs offered even greater protection than the nontariff barriers they replaced. Even after the commitments to tariff reductions in the Round, the ad valorem measure of the final binding tariffs will remain higher than the average rate of protection in 1982-93. A number of developing countries in East Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East chose to lock in prior liberalization efforts on some products. But for most commodities, there will be little actual liberalization, since most developing countries chose to bind their tariffs at a maximum level. Even when countries reduced already-bound rates, bound tariffs remained significantly higher than current applied rates, giving countries the flexibility to raise tariffs later. The high level of bound tariffs may allow countries to apply variable tariffs below the bound level, thus failing to stabilize tariffs and improve market access. Moreover, the Round did not touch many of the worst distortions in developing countries, such as import subsidies, export taxes, state-trading monopolies, and domestic policies that implicitly tax agriculture.Trade Policy,Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Theory&Research,Export Competitiveness,Rules of Origin,Trade Policy,Rules of Origin,TF054105-DONOR FUNDED OPERATION ADMINISTRATION FEE INCOME AND EXPENSE ACCOUNT,Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Theory&Research

    What can the developing countries infer from the Uruguay Round models for the Millennium Round positions?

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    This paper discusses the results from general equilibrium trade models executed towards the end of the Uruguay Round, reporting both aggregate and regional gains. These results were generated some 5 years ago, and were important to the debates at the end of the Uruguay Round as to what would be the foregone gains were the Round not to conclude. The paper argues that there are substantial, and at times hard to explain inconsistencies across model results. One model shows most of the gains come from agricultural liberalization, another from textiles, and yet another from tariff cuts. One model shows developing countries account for around 10% of the total gain, another shows them to gain over 50%. One model shows developing countries losing from elimination of the MFA, another shows them as large gainers. One model shows that imperfectly competitive and scale economy effects double global gains, another shows almost no impact. These differences occur even where similar data sets, and benchmark years are used, and are hard to explain on the basis of parametric specifications for models seemingly used though these are frequently poorly exposited. The paper also discusses the verification of models relative to behaviour since the Round concluded, expressing skepticism as to its feasibility for reasons set out in the paper. It also attempts to discuss what, if any, are the implications for the developing countries, and the possible ways forward in making these models more useable in the Millennium Round

    Examining the effects of year-round education: a literature review

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    Plan BYear-Round Education (YRE) has been a largely debated topic in recent years. The literature reveals varied results pertaining to the effects of year-round programs, including its promise in alleviating summer learning loss. Some research proposes that summer learning loss is a real phenomenon, while others purport that it simply doesn’t exist. Nonetheless, an increasing number of school districts are implementing forms of year-round schooling and reporting positive academic results. Further, many argue YRE’s logistic and financial benefits. Nonetheless, continued research on YRE, using growth sensitive measures, is essential to lead future educational practice

    Development of a simulated round of golf

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    Purpose The aim of this study was to develop a laboratory-based treadmill simulation of the on-course physiological demands of an 18-hole round of golf and to identify the underlying physiological responses. Methods Eight amateur golfers completed a round of golf during which heart rate (HR), steps taken, and global positioning system (GPS) data were assessed. The GPS data were used to create a simulated discontinuous round on a treadmill. Steps taken and HR were recorded during the simulated round. Results During the on-course round, players covered a mean (±SD) of 8,251 ± 450 m, taking 12,766 ± 1,530 steps. The mean exercise intensity during the on-course round was 31.4 ± 9.3% of age-predicted heart rate reserve (%HRR) or 55.6 ± 4.4% of age-predicted maximum HR (%HRmax). There were no significant differences between the simulated round and the on-course round for %HRR (P = .537) or %HR max (P = .561) over the entire round or for each individual hole. Furthermore, there were no significant differences between the two rounds for steps taken. Typical error values for steps taken, HR, %HRmax, and %HRR were 1,083 steps, ±7.6 b·min?1, ±4.5%, and ±8.1%, respectively. Conclusion Overall, the simulated round of golf successfully recreated the demands of an on-course round. This simulated round could be used as a research tool to assess the extent of fatigue during a round of golf or the impact of various interventions on golfers

    Dating Scotland's Neolithic non-megalithic round mounds: new dates, problems and potential

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    The purpose of this contribution is to review briefly the non-megalithic round mounds of definite and probable Neolithic date in Scotland, and to draw attention to some accelerator mass spectrometry (AMS) radiocarbon dates, relating to the use of four of these monuments - Midtown of Pitgalssie, one of the cairns of Atherb, East Finnercy and Pitnacree - that have been commissioned by the author over the past seven years as part of an ongoing and broad-ranging, National Museums Scotland (NMS) radiocarbon dating initiative. The issues involved in obtaining these dates, and in seeking to obtain others for Scottish non-megalithic round mounds, will be outlined. Where the potential exists to obtain further new dates, this is pointed out

    The Unbalanced Uruguay Round Outcome: The New Areas in Future WTO Negotiations

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    The Uruguay Round involved a grand North-South bargain: The North reduced import barriers, particularly in textiles and agriculture. The South adopted new domestic regulations in such areas as services and intellectual property—changes that would lead to increased purchases from the North. In mercantilist economics, apples for apples—imports for imports. In real economics, apples for oranges. Finger and Nogués argue that while the North’s reduction of import barriers benefits both the North and the South, the new domestic regulations adopted by countries of the South could prove costly to those countries. To begin with, the regulations will be expensive to implement. And while the cost side of their impact is secured by a legal obligation (in the case of intellectual property rights, for example, the cost is higher prices for patented goods), the benefits side is not so secured.Uruguay Round, Services negotiations, Doha Round reciprocity

    Unequal Exchange: Developing Countries in the International Trade Negotiations

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    The outcome of the Uruguay Round show that the concessions given by developing countries were more valuable than those they received from industrial countries. I suggest that this outcome is explained by the aggresive demands from industrial countries and the lack of resources (human and financial) at the disposal of developing countries. The paper discussess the costs of these unequal exchanges, and the structural factors that help to understand the processess leading to these outcomes.Uruguay Round, Developing countries, Reciprocity,
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