51 research outputs found
Four steps to copy heaven
No full textRoger Horberry and Gyles Lingwood, the authors of forthcoming copywriting bible, 'Read Me', detail four steps to reach copy nirvana.</p
Four steps to copy heaven
No full textRoger Horberry and Gyles Lingwood, the authors of forthcoming copywriting bible, 'Read Me', detail four steps to reach copy nirvana.</p
Read me: 10 lessons for writing great copy
No full textMost of us think we can write. Most of us are wrong.If that’s you then help is at hand. Read Me is a complete course in creative copywriting led by Roger Horberry, a highly experienced professional copywriter, and Gyles Lingwood, course leader on one of the UK’s top advertising degrees. Their combined knowledge and experience makes Read Me an essential resource for any ambitious copywriter.Each chapter is a self-contained lesson on subjects ranging from tone of voice to storytelling, branding to audience engagement, and meme-making to effective messages. Read Me also includes detailed contributions from 17 of the world’s smartest commercial writers, and practical exercises to help you pump up your powers of persuasion.The result is a high-energy ride through the world of creative copywriting that will help you craft persuasive, brilliant and effective messages for print and pixels. We’re too good to you, we really are.</p
Read me: 10 lessons for writing great copy
No full textMost of us think we can write. Most of us are wrong.If that’s you then help is at hand. Read Me is a complete course in creative copywriting led by Roger Horberry, a highly experienced professional copywriter, and Gyles Lingwood, course leader on one of the UK’s top advertising degrees. Their combined knowledge and experience makes Read Me an essential resource for any ambitious copywriter.Each chapter is a self-contained lesson on subjects ranging from tone of voice to storytelling, branding to audience engagement, and meme-making to effective messages. Read Me also includes detailed contributions from 17 of the world’s smartest commercial writers, and practical exercises to help you pump up your powers of persuasion.The result is a high-energy ride through the world of creative copywriting that will help you craft persuasive, brilliant and effective messages for print and pixels. We’re too good to you, we really are.</p
Independent National Security Legislation Monitor annual report 2014-2015
No full textThis is the first annual report from the current Independent National Security Legislation Monitor, Roger Gyles, who has been tasked with assessing the appropriateness and effectiveness of Australia\u27s national security legislation.
Introduction
This is my first annual report to the Prime Minister as the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor (INSLM).
On 11 December 2014 the then Prime Minister appointed me as the acting INSLM, under section 20 of the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor Act 2010 (INSLM Act) (see also section 33A of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901). There was a vacancy in the office of the INSLM. The first INSLM, Bret Walker SC, held the office from his appointment on 21 April 2011 for a period of 3 years. I acknowledge the significant contribution made by my predecessor, Bret Walker SC, as INSLM to the counter-terrorism and national security aspect of public policy in Australia.
There was no person performing the functions of the INSLM following the expiration of the term of appointment of Bret Walker SC in April 2014 until my appointment as the acting INSLM. On 19 March 2014, the Government introduced into the Parliament (the House of Representatives) the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor Repeal Bill 2014, which was designed to repeal the INSLM Act and abolish the office of INSLM. The Government ultimately decided against pursuing that Bill. On 17 July 2014 the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor Repeal Bill 2014 was withdrawn from the House of Representatives Notice Paper. The Bill had been referred to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee for inquiry and report, but that became unnecessary when the Bill was withdrawn (although the Committee did receive publicly-available submissions on the subject).
My initial appointment was on an acting basis due to the requirement for security clearance prior to a substantive appointment. Security clearance was obtained on 24 April 2015. On 20 August 2015 I was appointed to be the part-time INSLM for a period of two years by the Governor-General, acting on the advice of the Federal Executive Council, under section 11(1) of the INSLM Act. That period is less than the three-year term of the first INSLM and expires prior to the time limit imposed by section 6(1B) of the INSLM Act (discussed further below). I was not consulted about the term of the appointment before it took place.
This annual report relates to the period of acting appointment between 11 December 2014 and 30 June 2015
Certain questioning and detention powers in relation to terrorism
No full textIntroduction
This report is to review the operation, effectiveness, and implications, of the relevant legislation, including consideration as to whether it: contains appropriate safeguards for protecting the rights of individuals; remains proportionate to the threat of terrorism, or threat to national security, or both; and remains necessary. Assessment as to whether the legislation is being used for matters unrelated to terrorism and national security is required.
I must have regard to Australia’s obligations under international agreements and to the arrangements agreed from time to time between the Commonwealth, the States, and the Territories, to ensure a national approach to countering terrorism.
A review of div 3 of pt III of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) (ASIO Act) and any other provision of that Act as far as it relates to that division, pursuant to s 6(1)(b) of the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor Act 2010 (Cth) (INSLM Act) is required to be completed by 7 September 2017. That division provides the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) with special powers relating to terrorism offences, being questioning warrants (QWs), and questioning and detention warrants (QDWs), and related matters. That time limit requires that the review take place notwithstanding s 9 of the INSLM Act.
A review of pt IC of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) (Crimes Act) is also one of the functions of the office. That part provides for the detention (and questioning) of persons arrested for Commonwealth offences. Subdivision B of div 2 deals with terrorism offences.
The Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission (formerly the Australian Crime Commission) (ACIC) has compulsory questioning powers. The arrangements that are in place mean that those powers apply to certain terrorism offences, and to that extent, may be reviewed pursuant to s 6(1)(b) of the INSLM Act.
Combining those reviews provides a better perspective than separate reviews and is the best use of limited resources.
The existence and exercise of other powers relating to counter-terrorism and national security vested in federal and state bodies form part of the backdrop to this review and report.
The previous Independent National Security Legislation Monitor (INSLM), Mr Bret Walker SC, reviewed and made recommendations about ASIO QWs, and QDWs, in chs IV and V of his 2012 Annual Report. He dealt with police powers of questioning post-arrest and pre-charge in Appendix F of the same report, but made no recommendations as to them. He touched on pre-emptive detention for questioning by the then Australian Crime Commission, and the New South Wales Crime Commission, in ch V of that report.
The principal recommendation was that QDWs be abolished by repeal of the relevant statutory provisions. That recommendation has not been acted on. Several changes to the QW procedures were recommended, some based on the assumption that QDWs would be abolished. Only some have been adopted.
These powers are revisited in this report in light of experience over recent years and the current security situation. This review has involved public and private written submissions, public and private hearings, private consultations, and the voluntary and compulsory provision of information. As much material as possible has been published on the INSLM website. The submissions published there give a comprehensive account of the considerations and arguments that have been advanced and taken into account. It is unnecessary to reproduce all of that information in this report. An account of the review process may be found at Appendix 1.
I should immediately say there is no evidence any of the powers under review, the use of which has been based on terrorism or national security, have been used for matters unrelated to terrorism or national security.
Roger Gyles
Independent National Security Legislation Monitor
 
London
No full textThis study investigates the impact of class attendance and the use of optional formative assessment tasks on student performance. We hypothesise that a positive relationship exists between students ’ attendance rates and their success on assessment tasks. We also hypothesise a positive relationship between the extent to which students use formative assessment tasks (in the form of on-line multiplechoice question sets) and their success on summative assessment tasks. The question of whether attendance and the use of formative assessment have a complementary or substitutional impact on results is also investigated. The results indicate that after controlling for other factors likely to affect student performance, attendance at class and use of on-line formative assessment tasks do affect student performance. However, there is no further synergistic performance improvement to be achieved from both being a good attendee and a high user of the self-assessment quizzes. 41 42 Collett, Gyles, and Hrasky Further, attendance and self-assessment opportunities do not act as substitutes for each other. That is, students cannot compensate for poor attendance by making greater use of the self- assessment opportunities and vice versa. Key words: formative assessment, summative assessment, attendance Data availability: Data are available on request from the third author
Control order safeguards (INSLM) report special advocates and the counter-terrorism legislation amendment bill (No 1) 2015
No full textThis paper examines proposed changes to control order safeguards.
Background
The then Prime Minister referred the following matter to me pursuant to s 7 of the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor Act 2010 (INSLM Act):
… whether the additional safeguards recommended in the 2013 Council of Australian Governments Review of Counter-Terrorism Legislation in relation to the control order regime should be introduced, with particular consideration given to the advisability of introducing a system of special advocates into the regime, as recommended in the advisory report on the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment Bill (No 1) 2014 by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (PJCIS) – tabled on 20 November 2014.
Recommendations
That the recommendation of the COAG Review as to the introduction of a system of special advocates into the control order regime be accepted and implemented, if proposed s 38J of the NSI Act in Schedule 15 of the 2015 Bill is to become law; and
That proposed s 38J of the NSI Act in Schedule 15 of the 2015 Bill should not come into force until Recommendation 1 has been implemented.
 
Report on the impact on journalists of section 35P of the ASIO Act
No full textThis report argues that section 35P of the ASIO Act is not justified, and that it does not contain adequate safeguards for protecting the rights of outsiders and is not proportionate to the threat of terrorism or the threat to national security.
Purpose
This report discusses the impact on journalists of the operation of section 35P of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (ASIO Act) concerning offences for the disclosure of information relating to a special intelligence operation (SIO).
Impact
The impact of section 35P on journalists is twofold:
A. It creates uncertainty as to what may be published about the activities of ASIO without fear of prosecution. The so-called chilling effect of that uncertainty is exacerbated because it also applies in relation to disclosures made to editors for the purpose of discussion before publication.
B. Journalists are prohibited from publishing anywhere at any time any information relating to an SIO, regardless of whether it has any, or any continuing, operational significance and even if it discloses reprehensible conduct by ASIO insiders.
Issues
The basic problem with section 35P is that it does not distinguish between journalists and others (outsiders) and ASIO insiders. The application in this manner of broad secrecy prohibitions to outsiders is not satisfactorily justified, including by precedents in Australia or elsewhere.
The SIO scheme is necessary and proportionate to the present threats to security. The statutory and administrative procedures in force are appropriate safeguards against abuse. A secrecy provision relating to the scheme is not inappropriate. However, section 35P is not justified. It does not contain adequate safeguards for protecting the rights of outsiders and is not proportionate to the threat of terrorism or the threat to national security.
Section 35P is arguably invalid on the basis that it infringes the constitutional protection of freedom of political communication. Section 35P is also arguably inconsistent with article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and so not in accordance with Australia’s international obligations.
Three basic flaws need to be addressed. The first is the absence of an express harm requirement for breach (of the basic offence) by a journalist or other third party. The second is that recklessness is the fault element in relation to the circumstance described in section 35P(2)(c)(ii) (that is, in relation to the latter harm requirement in the aggravated offence). The third is the prohibition of disclosure of information already in the public domain.
Recommendations
Section 35P should be redrafted to treat insiders and outsiders separately, with one part dealing with third parties and another part dealing with insiders. There should be a basic offence (penalty five years imprisonment) and an aggravated offence (penalty 10 years imprisonment) in relation to both insiders and outsiders.
Insiders
The basic offence and the aggravated offences for insiders would be as per current section 35P.
Outsiders
The basic offence for outsiders would have the same elements as section 35P(1), but with the additional physical element that the disclosure of the information will endanger the health or safety of any person or prejudice the effective conduct of an SIO. Recklessness would be the default fault element in relation to this last physical element.
The aggravated offence for outsiders would have the same elements as section 35P(2) except that the fault element for (c)(ii) should be knowledge rather than recklessness (in other words, the fault element for the circumstance that the disclosure will endanger the health or safety of any person or prejudice the effective conduct of the operation should be specified to be knowledge).
There should be a defence of prior publication (not available to a member or ex-member of the intelligence and security services in respect of information available to them in that capacity)
Independent National Security Legislation Monitor annual report 2016
No full textThis is the sixth annual report from the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor, who has been tasked with assessing the appropriateness and effectiveness of Australia\u27s national security legislation.
This annual report relates to the period between 1 July 2015 and 30 June 2016
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