113 research outputs found
Roger E. Meiners and AL. H. Ringleb. — The Legal Environment of Business
No full textDeysine Anne. Roger E. Meiners and AL. H. Ringleb. — The Legal Environment of Business. In: Revue Française d'Etudes Américaines, N°19, février 1984. Hollywood au miroir. p. 156
Roger E. Meiners and AL. H. Ringleb. — The Legal Environment of Business
No full textDeysine Anne. Roger E. Meiners and AL. H. Ringleb. — The Legal Environment of Business. In: Revue Française d'Etudes Américaines, N°19, février 1984. Hollywood au miroir. p. 156
How Might Adam Smith Pay Professors Today?
No full textAdam Smith’s proposal for paying professors was intended to induce increased faculty knowledge. If students have imperfect information about what they learn, and universities can only imperfectly measure the input of faculty time in student learning, publications may be used to measure faculty knowledge. If professors’ ability to publish is positively related to their ability to produce student learning, which universities can imperfectly measure, publications may be necessary to attract more able professors. Since research signals faculty knowledge, schools that do not value publications per se could require higher publication standards and pay higher wages than schools that value only publications.
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Victim compensation ::economic, legal, and political aspects /
No full text
The economics of victim compensation
No full textCongress has considered adopting a program to provide a 75 percent subsidy for the costs of state programs which would give payments to the victims of criminal attacks. All victims, in state and federal jurisdictions, would be compensated for their losses, should they not have sufficient private insurance.
The traditional arguments made for victim compensation are reviewed and criticized. An institutional history of the victim's role in society discusses the various forms of compensation that existed in different jurisdictions. The distinction between civil law and criminal law appeared to lead to the demise of compensation by the criminal. The various forms of public compensation adopted in most Anglo-Saxon countries since the early 1960s are reviewed.
After deriving an estimate of the possible costs of public victim compensation in the United States, the theory of public choice is applied to explain the origins of the political pressures for the compensation program. The theory of bureaucracy produces predictions as to the impact of the federal subsidy to state programs and with respect to the motives of the administrators of such programs.
Rawlsian notions of justice provide a proper perspective for a consideration of equity in a democratic setting. The application of such a paradigm of justice does not, contrary to the traditional views on equity, generate a compensation program of the nature of the one considered here.
A program designed to be just and to provide equal treatment for equal victims would also be based on some criterion of efficiency. The moral hazard problem is discussed with respect to public compensation. A simple economic model is developed to display the possible inefficiency of the compensation program as currently proposed.
Finally, the growth of crime and the decline in punishment over the last three decades are explored. If there has been a collective loss of will to enforce the laws and punish the law-breakers, victim compensation may be nothing more than a perverse response to the problems generated by a change in behavioral standards with respect to crime.Ph. D
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