1,720,970 research outputs found
Lead, Follow or Cooperate? Sequential versus Collusive Payoffs in Symmetric Duopoly Games
Full text linkIn many strategic settings comparing the payoffs obtained by players under full cooperation to those obtainable at a sequential (Stackelberg) equilibrium can be crucial to determine the outcome of the game. This happens, for instance, in repeated games in which players can break cooperation by acting sequentially, as well as in merger games in which firms are allowed to sequence their actions. Despite the relevance of these and other applications, no full-fledged comparisons between collusive and sequential payoffs have been performed so far. In this paper we show that even in symmetric duopoly games the ranking of cooperative and sequential payoffs can be extremely variable, particularly when the usual linear demand assumption is relaxed. Not surprisingly, the degree of strategic complementarity and substitutability of players’ actions (and, hence, the slope of their best replies) appears decisive to determine the ranking of collusive and sequential payoffs. Some applications to endogenous timing are discussed
Sequential vs Collusive Payoffs in Symmetric Duopoly Games
Full text linkIn many strategic settings comparing the payo¤s obtained by players under full cooperation to those obtainable at a sequential (Stackelberg) equilibrium can be crucial to determine the final outcome of the game. This happens, for instance, in repeated games in which players can break cooperation by acting sequentially, as well as in merger games in which firms are allowed to sequence their actions. Despite the relevance of these and other applications, no fully-fledged comparisons betwen collusive and sequential payo¤s have been performed so far. In this paper we show that even in symmetric duopoly games the ranking of cooperative and sequential payoffs can be extremely variable, particularly when the consuete linear demand assumption is relaxed. Not surprisingly, the degree of strategic complementarity and substitutability of players'actions (and, hence, the slope of their best-replies) appears decisive to determine the ranking of collusive and sequential payoffs. Some applications to endogenous timing are discussed
Il consumo e la 'durata' delle politiche fiscali: Effetti non-keynesiani di medio periodo.
No full text
Lead, Follow or Cooperate? Endogenous Timing and Cooperation in Duopoly Games
No full textThe aim of this paper is to extend Hamilton and Slutsky’ (1990) endogenous timing game to include the possibility for players to cooperate. At an initial stage players are assumed to announce both their purpose to play early or late a given duopoly game as well as their intention to cooperate or not with their rival. The cooperation and timing formation rule is rather simple: when both players agree to cooperate and play with a given timing, they end up playing their strategies coordinately and simultaneously. Otherwise, they play independently with the timing as prescribed by their own announcement. We check for the existence of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (in pure strategies) of such a cooperation-timing duopoly game. Two main results on the emergence of cooperation are provided. If players’strategies in the symmetric duopoly game are strategic substitutes and there is no discount, cooperating early is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the extended timing-cooperation game. Conversely, cooperating late (at period two) represents an equilibrium when players’strategies are strategic complements. Other equilibria are also possible. Most importantly, our model shows that, in general, the success of cooperation is a¤ected by the endogenous timing of the game. Moreover, the slope of players’best-replies appears crucial for the success of cooperation as well as for the choice of players to sequence their strategies
Five Essays on Neoclassical and Neo-Schumpeterian Growth Theory
Full text linkRodano, Giorgio Giannini, Massimo Marchetti, Enric
Multiple attractors and global bifurcations in a Kaldor-type business cycle model
No full textWe consider a Kaldor-type discrete-time nonlinear business cycle model in income and capital, where investment is assumed to depend both on the difference between normal and current levels of capital stock, and on the difference between the current income and its normal level, through a nonlinear S-shaped increasing function. As usual in Kaldor business cycle models, one or three steady states exist, and the standard analysis of the local stability and bifurcations suggests that endogenous Oscillations occur in the presence of only one unstable equilibrium, whereas the coexistence of three equilibria is characterized by bi-stability, the central equilibrium being on the boundary which separates the basins of the two stable ones. However, a deeper analysis of the global dynamic properties of the model in the parameter ranges where three steady states exist, reveals the existence of an attracting limit cycle surrounding the three steady states, leading to a situation of multistability, with a rich and complex dynamic structure
- …
