1,354,439 research outputs found
Le immigrazioni da problema a opportunità
Giorgia Marini e Giorgio Rodano, sintetizzando il loro recente libro, mostrano che le politiche migratorie possono essere migliori di quelle in atto, anche continuando a contrastare l’immigrazione irregolare e i trafficanti che la gestiscono. La crisi demografica, l’invecchiamento della popolazione e il ristagno economico richiedono flussi di migranti molto maggiori degli attuali. Per assicurarli i due autori suggeriscono di attivare un servizio di trasporto regolare, sicuro (e pubblico) capace di mettere fuori mercato i trafficanti
Franco Rodano e la storia del “partito cattolico” in Italia
Franco Rodano è stato considerate la mente della strategia comunista del “compromesso storico” con la Democrazia Cristiana. Il saggio esamina le interpretazioni di Rodano del cattolicesimo politico e delle sue relazioni con la Chiesa in un lungo periodo, che va dal 1945 agli anni ’80, mostrando come, in un contesto sempre segnato da uno strettissimo rapporto con l’attualità politica, temi e problemi delle riflessioni di Rodano mantengano una profonda continuità.Franco Rodano has been considered the real mind behind the Italian Communists' strategy of the "compromesso storico" with Christian Democracy. The essay examines Rodano's ideas and interpretations about Italian political Catholicism and its relationship with the Church in a long period, beginning with 1945 and ending with the 80s. This shows that, although always in a context of a deep link with politics, there is a deep continuity of themes and problems in Rodano's reflections
A Simple Explanation of the Taylor Rule
The modern New Keynesian literature discusses the stabilizing properties of Taylor-type interest rate rules mainly in the context of complex optimizing models. In this paper we present a simple alternative approach to provide a theoretical rationale for the adoption of the Taylor rule by central banks. We find that the Taylor rule can be derived as the optimal interest rate rule in
a classical Barro-Gordon macroeconomic model. The successful practice of central bankers, at the core of the Great Moderation, and currently re-invoked to re-normalize monetary policy after the unprecedented quantitative-easing actions aimed to escape the Great Recession, can perfectly be explained by standard theory, without recourse to more complicated derivations
A biomechanical comparison between racewalking and normal walking stance phase
The purpose of this study was to understand the peculiarities of lower limbs kinematics and kinetics during racewalking stance, by comparing it with normal walking gait. Four young but skilled athletes were analysed through a motion analysis system and a force platform. Results were expressed in terms of average kinetics and kinematics curves. Many differences emerged between the two walking modes, most of which can be reconducted to the rules that govern this sport. These observations might be useful, both for trainers and practitioners, to gain more insight in racewalking technique and proficiency, but they are just a first step toward an effective application “on the field”. In fact, an individual analysis might discover the athlete’s distinctive biomechanical characteristics and consequently might help in setting better training methodologies
Lead, Follow or Cooperate? Endogenous Timing and Cooperation in Duopoly Games
The aim of this paper is to extend Hamilton and Slutsky’ (1990) endogenous timing game to include the possibility for players to cooperate. At an initial stage players are assumed to announce both their purpose to play early or late a given duopoly game as well as their intention to cooperate or not with their rival. The cooperation and timing formation rule is rather simple: when both players agree to cooperate and play with a given timing, they end up playing their strategies coordinately and simultaneously. Otherwise, they play independently with the timing as prescribed by their own announcement. We check for the existence of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (in pure strategies) of such a cooperation-timing duopoly game. Two main results on the emergence of cooperation are provided. If players’strategies in the symmetric duopoly game are strategic substitutes and there is no discount, cooperating early is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the extended timing-cooperation game. Conversely, cooperating late (at period two) represents an equilibrium when players’strategies are strategic complements. Other equilibria are also possible. Most importantly, our model shows that, in general, the success of cooperation is a¤ected by the endogenous timing of the game. Moreover, the slope of players’best-replies appears crucial for the success of cooperation as well as for the choice of players to sequence their strategies
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