309 research outputs found
Aue, Erkenbert von (Ritter) an Germerode, Stift - 1272-05-27
zu 09: abhängendes Sgl.-Bruchstück; zu 14: Sglr.: Bodo von Heimburg "Heimene- burg".{'name': 'DFG', 'uri': 'dfg.png'
A Fun-Loving Friend in Solidarity and Comrade: An Obituary for Bodo Zeuner (1942-2021)
Bodo Zeuner war der PROKLA als Autor und Mitglied des Fördervereins 50 Jahre eng verbunden, arbeitete in den 1970er-Jahren im Redaktionskollektiv Gewerkschaften mit. Am 30. November verstarb Bodo Zeuner im Alter von 79 Jahren.Bodo Zeuner was closely associated with PROKLA for 50 years as an author and member of the friends’ association, and worked in the editorial collective trade unions in the 1970s. On November 30, Bodo Zeuner died at the age of 79
Rechtliche Abhandlungen / von Bodo, Samuel, Friedrich, Edlen von Berger, des Heil. Röm. Reichs Ritter
Autopsie nach Ex. der ULB Sachsen-AnhaltVorlageform des Erscheinungsvermerks: Schwerin, 1787. Gedruckt mit Bärensprungschen Schriften
Learning in networks: An experimental study using stationary concepts
Our study analyzes theories of learning for strategic interactions in networks. Participants played two of the 2 x 2 games used by Selten and Chmura (2008) and in the comment by Brunner, Camerer and Goeree (2009). Every participant played against four neighbors and could choose a different strategy against each of them. The games were played in two network structures: a lattice and a circle. We compare our results with the predictions of different theories (Nash equilibrium, quantal response equilibrium, action-sampling equilibrium, payoff-sampling equilibrium, and impulse balance equilibrium) and the experimental results of Selten and Chmura (2008). One result is that the majority of players choose the same strategy against each neighbor. As another result we observe an order of predictive success for the stationary concepts that is different from the order shown by Selten and Chmura. This result supports our view that learning in networks is different from learning in random matching. --experimental economics,networks,learning
A simple questionnaire can change everything: Are strategy choices in coordination games stable?
This paper presents results from an experiment designed to study the effect of self reporting risk preferences on strategy choices made in a subsequently played 2x2 coordination game. The main finding is that the act of answering a questionnaire about one's own risk preferences significantly alters strategic behavior. Within a best response correspondence framework, this result can be explained by a change in either risk preferences or beliefs. We find that self reporting risk preferences induces an increase in subjects' risk aversion while keeping their beliefs unchanged. Our findings raise some questions about the stability of strategy choices in coordination games. --coordination game,questionnaire,risk preferences,beliefs,best response correspondence
Experimental evidence of context-dependent preferences in risk-free settings
This study investigates context effects in general and the compromise effect in particular. It is argued that earlier research in this area lacks realism, a shortcoming that is a major drawback to research conclusions and stated management implications. The importance of this issue is stressed by previous research showing that behavioral anomalies found in hypothetical experimental settings tend to be significantly reduced when real payoff mechanisms are introduced. Therefore, to validate the compromise effect, an enhanced design is presented with participants making binding purchase decisions in the laboratory. We find that the compromise effect holds for real purchase decisions, and therefore is validated, and is not an artificial effect in surveys on hypothetical buying decisions. While conclusions and implications for marketing managers, derived in previous work assume that context effects hold for real market decisions, the results created by this enhanced design close this gap in the literature. --decision-making,anomalies,irrelevant alternatives,context effects
Upstalsboom - An Example of Caring Economics
In recent years, innovative approaches to corporate culture and leadership, such as the concept of New Work and its meaning and value-oriented corporate management, are gaining attention in science and organizational practice. However, critical voices doubt their feasibility citing challenges associated with their benefit realization. Nevertheless, through a case study of Upstalsboom, a German medium-sized family business in the tourism industry, the authors of this article illustrate how a people-centered, meaning-oriented corporate culture, and values-based leadership are not only possible and successful, but also sustainable from a crisis-resistant stability and resilience perspective. A reconstruction of the company\u27s development along biographical events and lived experiences of the CEO and co-author, Bodo Janssen, shows a high congruence with Riane Eisler’s path leading to the development of her concept of Caring Economics and caring organizational policies through a partnership orientation - the antithesis of dominance orientation systems
The public loss game: An experimental study of public bads
We analyze cooperative behavior of participants who faced a loss. In particular, we extend the Public Good Game by a fixed loss in the beginning of every period. We show that humans change their behavior compared to corresponding studies with gains only. First, in contrast to literature on gains, we observe significant order effects. When participants first play a treatment with punishment, they cooperate less and face higher punishment costs than when first playing a treatment without punishment. The changes are that drastic that punishment does not pay in the first case, while it does in the later. Second, for participants first playing without punishment the contributions in the very first period of play determine the contributions throughout both treatments of the game, yielding higher contributions in the punishment treatment than when playing with gains. Participants punishing first, show no comparable behavior. --public good,punishment,losses,experiment
A Note on Case-Based Optimization with a Non-Degenerate Similarity Function
The paper applies the ��realistic-ambitious�� rule for adaptation of the aspiration level suggested by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1996) to a situation in which the similarity between the available acts is represented by a non-degenerate function. The paper shows that the optimality result obtained by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1996) in general fails. With a concave similarity function, the best corner act is chosen in the limit. Introducing convex regions into the similarity function improves the limit choice. A sufficiently fine similarity function allows to approximate optimal behavior with an arbitrary degree of precision.
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