1,721,027 research outputs found
JOM788435_DS – Supplemental material for Scientific Contributions of Within-Person Research in Management: Making the Juice Worth the Squeeze
Supplemental material, JOM788435_DS for Scientific Contributions of Within-Person Research in Management: Making the Juice Worth the Squeeze by Brian W. McCormick, Cody J. Reeves, Patrick E. Downes, Ning Li and Remus Ilies in Journal of Management</p
Employee Screening: Theory and Evidence
Arguably the fundamental problem faced by employers is how to elicit effort from employees. Most models suggest that employers meet this challenge by monitoring employees carefully to prevent shirking. But there is another option that relies on heterogeneity across employees, and that is to screen job candidates to find workers with a stronger work ethic who require less monitoring. This should be especially useful in work systems where monitoring by supervisors is more difficult, such as teamwork systems. We analyze the relationship between screening and monitoring in the context of a principal-agent model and test the theoretical results using a national sample of U.S. establishments, which includes information on employee selection. We find that employers screen applicants more intensively for work ethic where they make greater use of systems such as teamwork where monitoring is more difficult. This screening is also associated with higher productivity and higher wages and benefits, as predicted by the theory: The synergies between reduced monitoring costs and high performance work systems enable the firm to pay higher wages to attract and retain such workers. Screening for other attributes, such as cognitive ability, does not produce these results.
Employee Screening : Theory and Evidence
Arguably the fundamental problem faced by employers is how to elicit effort from employees. Most models suggest that employers meet this challenge by monitoring employees carefully to prevent shirking. But there is another option that relies on heterogeneity across employees, and that is to screen job candidates to find workers with a stronger work ethic who require less monitoring. This should be especially useful in work systems where monitoring by supervisors is more difficult, such as teamwork systems. We analyze the relationship between screening and monitoring in the context of a principal-agent model and test the theoretical results using a national sample of U.S. establishments, which includes information on employee selection. We find that employers screen applicants more intensively for work ethic where they make greater use of systems such as teamwork where monitoring is more difficult. This screening is also associated with higher productivity and higher wages and benefits, as predicted by the theory : The synergies between reduced monitoring costs and high performance work systems enable the firm to pay higher wages to attract and retain such workers. Screening for other attributes, such as cognitive ability, does not produce these results.elicit effort from employees, worker, Screening, Monitoring
Employee Screening: Theory and Evidence
Arguably the fundamental problem faced by employers is how to elicit effort from employees. Most models suggest that employers meet this challenge by monitoring employees carefully to prevent shirking. But there is another option that relies on heterogeneity across employees, and that is to screen job candidates to find workers with a stronger work ethic who require less monitoring. This should be especially useful in work systems where monitoring by supervisors is more difficult, such as teamwork systems. We analyze the relationship between screening and monitoring in the context of a principal-agent model and test the theoretical results using a national sample of U.S. establishments, which includes information on employee selection. We find that employers screen applicants more intensively for work ethic where they make greater use of systems such as teamwork where monitoring is more difficult. This screening is also associated with higher productivity and higher wages and benefits, as predicted by the theory: The synergies between reduced monitoring costs and high performance work systems enable the firm to pay higher wages to attract and retain such workers. Screening for other attributes, such as cognitive ability, does not produce these results.
AUTHENTIC LEADERSHIP AND FOLLOWERS’ OUTCOMES: A RESOURCE PERSPECTIVE
Ph.DDOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (BIZ
DYING TO WORK: THE EFFECTS OF MORTALITY SALIENCE ON JOB ATTITUDES
Ph.DDOCTOR OF PHILOSOPH
TO HELP OR TO HARM? PERFORMANCE SOCIAL COMPARISONS, SOCIAL EMOTIONS, AND INTERPERSONAL BEHAVIORS
Ph.DDOCTOR OF PHILOSOPH
FEELING YOUR PAIN AND FEELING YOUR JOY: A DAILY INVESTIGATION OF THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF EMPATHIZING AT WORK
Ph.DDOCTOR OF PHILOSOPH
GIVEN FISH OR TAUGHT TO FISH? THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF RECEIVING DEPENDENCY-ORIENTED VERSUS AUTONOMY-ORIENTED HELP
Ph.DDOCTOR OF PHILOSOPH
HOW SERVICE PROVIDERS REACT TO AND ATTRIBUTE CUSTOMER VOICE BEHAVIOR: A FRAMEWORK OF SELF-ENHANCEMENT AND SELF-PROTECTION MOTIVES
Ph.DDOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (BIZ
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