43 research outputs found
Services trade and growth
No full textThe competitiveness of firms in open economies is increasingly determined by access to low-cost and high-quality producer services - telecommunications, transport and distribution services, financial intermediation, etc. This paper discusses the role of services in economic growth, focusing in particular on channels through which openness to trade in services may increase productivity at the level of the economy as a whole, industries and the firm. The authors explore what recent empirical work suggests could be done to enhance comparative advantage in the production and export of services and how to design policy reforms to open services markets to greater foreign participation in a way that ensures not just greater efficiency but also greater equity in terms of access to services.Economic Theory&Research,Banks&Banking Reform,Transport Economics Policy&Planning,ICT Policy and Strategies,Emerging Markets
An Assessment of Telecommunications Reform in Developing Countries’, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2909
No full textFink, Mattoo, and Rathindran analyze the effect of The authors find that both privatization and policy reform in basic telecommunications on sectoral competition lead to significant improvements in performance using a new panel data set for 86 performance. But a comprehensive reform program, developing countries across Africa, Asia, the Middle East, involving both policies and the support of an and Latin America and the Caribbean over the period independent regulator, produced the largest gains-an 1985 to 1999. The authors address three questions: 8 percent higher level of mainlines and a 21 percent o What impact do specific policy changes-relating to higher level of productivity compared to years of partial ownership and competition-have on sectoral and no reform. Interestingly, the sequence of reform performance? matters: mainline penetration is lower if competition is o How is the impact of change in any one policy introduced after privatization, rather than at the same affected by the implementation of the other, and by the time. The authors also find that autonomous factors, overall regulatory framework? such as technological progress, have a strong influence- Does the sequence in which reforms are on telecommunications performance, accounting for an implemented affect performance? increase of 5 percent a year in teledensity and 9 percent in productivity over the period 1985 to 1999
Landlocked or policy locked ? how services trade protection deepens economic isolation
No full textA new cross-country database on services policy reveals a perverse pattern: many landlocked countries restrict trade in the very services that connect them with the rest of the world. On average, telecommunications and air-transport policies are significantly more restrictive in landlocked countries than elsewhere. The phenomenon is most starkly visible in Sub-Saharan Africa and is associated with lower levels of political accountability. This paper finds evidence that these policies lead to more concentrated market structures and more limited access to services than these countries would otherwise have, even after taking into account the influence of geography and incomes, and the possibility that policy is endogenous. Even moderate liberalization in these sectors could lead to an increase of cellular subscriptions by 7 percentage points and a 20-percent increase in the number of flights. Policies in other countries, industrial and developing alike, also limit competition in international transport services. Hence,"trade-facilitating"investments under various"aid-for-trade"initiatives are likely to earn a low return unless they are accompanied by meaningful reform in these services sectors.Transport Economics Policy&Planning,Markets and Market Access,Public Sector Corruption&Anticorruption Measures,Economic Theory&Research,ICT Policy and Strategies
Consequences of Vertical Separation and Monopoly: Evidence from the Telecom Privatizations
No full textTwo common policy instruments used by governments around the world to increase the availability of basic telephony (i.e., local, long distance, and international service) have been: (1) award monopoly rights on basic services to cross-subsidize residential local telephony; and (2) separate vertically (i.e., structural separation) the owner of the local fixed network from the provider of long distance or international telephone services. I use data from a panel of 67 countries during the seven years following the privatization of the telephone monopoly and find that contrary to wide spread beliefs: (1) monopoly on basic services is not associated with lower residential telephony prices; quite the opposite, monopoly increases residential local prices; (2) monopoly does not help universal service provision and lowers the use of international telephony; and (3) mandatory vertical separation reduces international telephony usage and the number of fixed lines in service. In summary, monopoly and vertical separation harm those consumers that were precisely designed to help: the downstream (business) users of international telephony and the upstream users of residential local telephony.
Does health insurance impede trade inhealth care services?
No full textThere is limited trade in health services despite big differences in the price of health care across countries. Whether patients travel abroad for health care depends on the coverage of treatments by their health insurance plan. Under existing health insurance contracts, the gains from trade are not fully internalized by the consumer. The result is a strong"local-market bias"in the consumption of health care. A simple modification of existing insurance products can create sufficient incentives for consumers to travel. For just 15 highly tradable, low-risk treatments, the annual savings to the United States would be $1.4 billion even if only one in 10 patients who need these treatments went abroad. Half of these annual savings would accrue to the Medicare program alone. The authors examine how measures by destination countries to improve and credibly signal the quality of health care can enhance the scope for trade.
Does Health Insurance Impede Trade in Health Care Services?
No full textThere is limited trade in health services despite big differences in the price of health care across countries. Whether patients travel abroad for health care depends on the coverage of treatments by their health insurance plan. Under existing health insurance contracts, the gains from trade are not fully internalized by the consumer. The result is a strong "local-market bias" in the consumption of health care. A simple modification of existing insurance products can create sufficient incentives for consumers to travel. For just 15 highly tradable, low-risk treatments, the annual savings to the United States would be $1.4 billion even if only one in 10 patients who need these treatments went abroad. Half of these annual savings would accrue to the Medicare program alone. The authors examine how measures by destination countries to improve and credibly signal the quality of health care can enhance the scope for trade
Services reform and manufacturing performance : evidence from India
No full textThe growth of India's manufacturing sector since 1991 has been attributed mostly to trade liberalization and more permissive industrial licensing. This paper demonstrates the significant impact of a neglected factor: India's policy reforms in services. The authors examine the link between those reforms and the productivity of manufacturing firms using panel data for about 4,000 Indian firms from1993 to 2005. They find that banking, telecommunications, insurance and transport reforms all had significant, positive effects on the productivity of manufacturing firms. Services reforms benefited both foreign and locally-owned manufacturing firms, but the effects on foreign firms tended to be stronger. A one-standard-deviation increase in the aggregate index of services liberalization resulted in a productivity increase of 11.7 percent for domestic firms and 13.2 percent for foreign enterprises.Transport Economics Policy&Planning,Banks&Banking Reform,Emerging Markets,E-Business,Economic Theory&Research
Liberalizing basic telecommunications: The Asian experience
No full textThe liberalization of the basic telecommunications sector in Asian countries is examined in this paper with a view to identify the elements of good policy and examine how it can be promoted through multilateral negotiations. We find that despite the move away from traditional public monopolies, most Asian governments are still unwilling to allow unrestricted entry, eliminate limits on private and foreign ownership, and establish strong independent regulators. Where comprehensive reform including privatization, competition and regulation has been implemented, there are significantly higher levels of main line availability, service quality and labor productivity. Somewhat surprisingly, there has not been much unilateral liberalization since the last round of GATS telecommunications negotiations. The new round therefore faces the challenge of not merely harvesting unilateral liberalization as in the past, but of negotiating away existing restrictions. Furthermore, since quantitative restrictions on the number of suppliers are pervasive, deepened GATS rules could help ensure the transparent and non-discriminatory allocation of licenses. There may also be a need to sharpen the regulatory principles established in the last round, and to create rules that safeguard not only the rights of foreign suppliers but also those of consumers.In diesem Papier wird die Liberalisierung des Telekommunikationssektors in asiatischen Ländern mit dem Ziel untersucht, die Elemente guter Politik zu identifizieren und zu prüfen, wie diese Politik durch multilaterale Verhandlungen unterstützt werden kann. Trotz ihrer Abkehr von traditionellen staatlichen Monopolen sind die meisten asiatischen Regierungen weiterhin nicht geneigt, uneingeschränkten Marktzugang zu gewähren, Beschränkungen privaten und ausländischen Eigentums an Telekommunikationsunternehmen aufzuheben und starke unabhängige Regulierungsbehörden zu schaffen. Wir zeigen, dass dort, wo umfassende Reformen - Privatisierung, Wettbewerb und Regulierung - durchgeführt wurden, die Zahl der Anschlüsse, die Servicequalität und die Arbeitsproduktivität deutlich gestiegen sind. Etwas überraschend ist, dass es seit der letzten Runde der Telekommunikations-verhandlungen unter dem GATS (General Agreement on Trade in Services) kaum einseitige Liberalisierungen gegeben hat. Die neue Runde steht deshalb vor der Aufgabe, nicht nur - wie in der Vergangenheit - einseitige Liberalisierungen zu „ernten“, sondern existierende Beschränkungen in Verhandlungen zu beseitigen. Da die Zahl der Anbieter regelmäßig begrenzt ist, könnten vertiefte GATS-Regeln überdies dazu beitragen, die transparente und nicht-diskriminierende Zuteilung von Lizenzen zu gewährleisten. Außerdem könnte es notwendig sein, die in der letzten Runde beschlossenen Regulierungsgrundsätze zu schärfen und Regeln festzulegen, die nicht nur die Rechte ausländischer Anbieter sondern auch die der Verbraucher sichern
An Assessment of Telecommunications Reform in Developing Countries
No full textThe authors analyze the effect of policy
reform in basic telecommunications on sectoral performance
using a new panel data set for 86 developing countries
across Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America and
the Caribbean over the period 1985 to 1999. The authors
address three questions: 1) What impact do specific policy
changes-relating to ownership and competition-have on
sectoral performance? 2) How is the impact of change in any
one policy affected by the implementation of the other, and
by the overall regulatory framework? 3) Does the sequence in
which reforms are implemented affect performance? The
authors find that both privatization and competition lead to
significant improvements in performance. But a comprehensive
reform program, involving both policies and the support of
an independent regulator, produced the largest gains-an 8
percent higher level of mainlines and a 21 percent higher
level of productivity compared to years of partial and no
reform. Interestingly, the sequence of reform matters:
mainline penetration is lower if competition is introduced
after privatization, rather than at the same time. The
authors also find that autonomous factors, such as
technological progress, have a strong influence on
telecommunications performance, accounting for an increase
of 5 percent a year in teledensity and 9 percent in
productivity over the period 1985 to 1999
