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Dyadic Conflict: Elites, Citizens, and War
No full textThis dataset is used to test the effect of regime types in international dyads and the presence of resources on conflict. The data runs from 1816 -2001. The data in the file is merged from a few sources, including the Issue Correlates of War, Polity, and Jessica Week's data on regimes and conflict. The do file replicates the analysis in the article
Third party intervention and strategic militarization
Get PDFCodified at the 2005 United Nations World Summit, the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect articulates an ideal of international interventions motivated by compassion for victims and a desire to bring stability to hot-spots around the world. Despite this consensus, practitioners and scholars have debated the importance of unintended consequences stemming from the expectation of third-party intervention. We analyze how third-party intervention shapes the incentives to arm, negotiate settlements, and fight wars in a parsimonious game theoretic model. Among the unintended consequences we find: interventions that indiscriminately lower the destructiveness of war increase the probability of conflict and increasing the cost of arming makes destructive wars more likely. Other interventions, however, can have much more beneficial effects and our analysis highlights peace-enhancing forms of third-party intervention. From a welfare perspective, most interventions do not change the ex-ante loss from war, but do have distributional effects on the terms of peace. As a result R2P principles are hard to implement because natural forms of intervention create incentives that make them largely self-defeating
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Dispute resolution institutions and strategic militarization
Get PDFEngagement in a costly and destructive war can be understood as the punishment for entering into a dispute. Institutions that reduce the chance that disputes lead to war make this punishment less severe. This may incentivize hawkish political choices like militarization, and potentially offset the benefits of peace-brokering institutions. We analyze a simple model in which unmediated peace talks are effective at improving the chances of peace for a given distribution of military strength. But, once the effects on militarization are considered the presence of unmediated talks leads to a higher incidence of war. Not all conflict resolution institutions suffer from this drawback. We identify a form of third-party mediation, inspired by the work of Myerson, and show that it can effectively broker peace in disputes once they emerge, and also minimize the level of equilibrium militarization
LOBBYING AND LICENSING: INVESTIGATING THE EFFECTS OF TRANSPARENCY ON OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING
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UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING: Assessing the UN¿s Success at Peacebuilding in the Post-Cold War Era
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THE ESCALATION OF TERRORISM IN WEST AFRICA: NATURAL RESOURCES AND STRATEGIES OF TERRITORIAL CONTROL
No full textTERRORISM AND POLITICAL ACCESSIBILITY: DECONSTRUCTING THE DEMOCRATIC CURE TO POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST
No full textCrossing the Line: When Neighbors Fight Rebels Across Borders
No full textMany rebels operate across borders, frustrating states which typically cannot cross borders in response. Yet states sometimes do fight rebels across borders, either with or without the consent of the crossed neighbor. When do states cross borders to fight rebels, and when do their neighbors accept this intervention? I develop a simple strategic model to answer these questions, drawing on insights from scholarship on borders and conflict as well as interviews with Ugandan border security officials. I test the empirical implications of the model using originally collected cross-national data on interventions and responses between 1989-2009. The results indicate that consent for intervention depends on neighbors' histories, rebel violence, and border geography. The results also cast doubt on the premise that states simply su er intervention when they must, as relative power plays a less consistent role in explaining intervention acceptance. I find evidence that the threat of resistance deters many cross-border interventions, but states' incentive and capacity to intervene provides an equal if not greater constraint
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