261 research outputs found
Bargaining and Search: An Experimental Study
No full textWe study experimentally two versions of a model in which a buyer and a seller bargain over the price of a good; however, the buyer can choose to leave the negotiation table to search for other alternatives. Under one version, if the buyer chooses to search for a better price, the opportunity to purchase the good at the stated price is gone. Under the second version, the seller guarantees the same price if the buyer chooses to return immediately after a search (presumably because a better price could not be found). In both cases, the buyer has a fairly good idea about what to expect from the search, but because the search is costly, he has to weigh the potential benefits of the search against its cost. It turns out (theoretically) that adding search to a simple bargaining mechanism eliminates some unsatisfactory features of bargaining theory. Our experiment reveals that the model can account for some (but not all) of the behavioral regularities. In line with recent developments in behavioral decision theory and game theory, which assume bounded rationality and preferences over the relative division of a surplus, we find that subjects follow simple rules of thumb and distributional norms in choosing strategies, which are reflected in the behavioral consistencies observed in this study.Bargaining, search, outside option, ultimatum game
What Price Fairness? A Bargaining Study
No full textOur study concerns bargaining behavior in situations where one party is in a stronger position than the other. We investigate both the tradeoff the favored party makes between pursuing his strategic advantage and giving weight to other players' concern for fairness, and the tradeoff the disadvantaged player makes between pursuing a fair outcome from a disadvantaged position and the cost of that pursuit. In particular, we hypothesize that the degree to which strategically strong players attempt to exploit their strategic advantage depends on their potential costs for doing so. Similarly, the degree to which weak players persist in seeking "fairness" is also a function of how much it (potentially) costs them to do so. Students negotiated in pairs over the division of $HK50 using a finite horizon, fixed-cost (per rejection) alternating offer rule. Each pair consisted of a high-cost and a low-cost bargainer. In accordance with the hypothesis, the willingness of the high-cost bargainers to demand fairness and to persist in their demands was a function of how much it cost them to do so, and the degree to which the low-cost bargainers attempted to exploit their strategic advantage depended on their own cost of rejection. We conclude that "fairness" has a price such that the higher its price, the lower the "demand" for it. This suggests that demands for fairness are subject to cost- benefit evaluation, are in this sense deliberate, and are well thought out.Fairness, bargaining, fixed-cost
Poverty in Dictator Games: Awakening Solidarity
No full textThis paper investigates the effect of poverty and good intentions on dictator game giving. Previous experimental studies in which information was supplied to dictators about recipients have shown that dictator giving increases overall in this context. We develop a new design of standard informed dictator games with three main variants: 1) three recipients are used instead of one; 2) dictators are informed that their recipients are poor; 3) dictators give donations in the form of medicines instead of money. We have found that 46% of the experimental subjects (dictators) give the full amount of money (100% of the endowment) in the “poverty” treatment, while in the “medicines” treatment this percentage increases to 72%. Such extremely generous behavior has seldom been observed in the previous literature on dictator games.dictator giving, poverty effect, good intentions effect, medicines.
A comparison of the eigenvalue method and the geometric mean procedure for ratio scaling
No full textThis article evaluates and compares the performance
of two ratio scaling methods, the eigenvalue method
proposed by Saaty (1977, 1980) and the geometric
mean procedure advocated by Williams and Crawford
(1980), given random data. The two methods were examined
in a series of monte carlo simulations for two
response methods (direct estimation and constant sum)
and various numbers of stimuli and response scales.
The sampling distributions of the measures of consistency
of the two methods were tabulated, rules for detecting
and rejecting inconsistent respondents are outlined,
and approximation formulas for other designs
are derived. Overall, there was a high level of agreement
and correspondence between the results from the
two scaling techniques even when the data were random.Budescu, David V.; Zwick, Rami; Rapoport, Amnon. (1986). A comparison of the eigenvalue method and the geometric mean procedure for ratio scaling. Retrieved from the University Digital Conservancy, https://hdl.handle.net/11299/102274
Notes on Plecoptera (14). Neoperla occipitalis (Pictet, 1841)
No full textWhen the only available syntype of Perla occipitalis , a female from Philadelphia, was designated as lectotype (Zwick 1972: Rev. su isse de Zool. 78 (1971): 1176) the author, like previous authors, believed it to be conspecific with Chloroperla clymene Newman, 1839. In view of the recently discovered diversity of Nearctic Neoperla , clarification of the species' identity was suggested by Dr. B. P. Stark (Clinton, Miss.)
Computer Assisted Proof of Optimal Approximability Results
No full textWe obtain computer assisted proofs of several spherical volume inequalities that appear in the analysis of semidefinite programming based approximation algorithms for Boolean constraint satisfaction problems. These inequalities imply, in particular, that the performance ratio achieved by the MAX 3-SAT approximation algorithm of Karloff and Zwick is indeed 7/8, as conjectured by them, and that the performance ratio of the MAX 3-CSP algorithm of the author is indeed ½. Other results are also implied. The computer assisted proofs are obtained using a system called REALSEARCH written by the author. This system uses interval arithmetic to produce rigorous proofs that certain collections of constraints in real variables have no real solution
Ypsiloncyphon Klausnitzer 2009
No full textGenus <i>Ypsiloncyphon</i> Klausnitzer, 2009a <p>(Table 1)</p> <p> <b>Type species:</b> <i>Cyphon chlorizans</i> Klausnitzer, 1973.</p> <p> The Australasian species of the genus <i>Ypsiloncyphon</i> were recently revised (Zwick 2014) but their affinities within the large genus were not clarified. Presently, <i>Ypsiloncyphon</i> includes over 50 Asian and about a dozen Australasian species (Table 1, which contains all author names). The genus was established for species with, among other characteristics, a Y-shaped tegmen and a male T9 with apodemes longer than those of T8. Other elements of the male terminalia can take very different forms which made me question the monophyly of the genus (Zwick 2014). Today, various species are known in other Australian marsh beetle genera that are only distantly related but also present the name-giving Y-shaped tegmen (e.g., several <i>Austrocyphon</i> spp., <i>Calvarium (Calvariellum)</i> spp.: Zwick 2013d, 2014).</p> <p> Presently, four informal species groups within <i>Ypsiloncyphon</i> are separated by diagnostic characters. The definitions of groups 2 and 3 (the latter contains the Australasian species) partly rely on apomorphic characters (Ruta 2007; Klausnitzer 2009) while the definition of group 1 admits a variety of character expressions and is less helpful. The two species in the recently proposed group 4 have asymmetrical penes with setae or spines (Yoshitomi 2015). Unfortunately, many Asian species, also the type species, are incompletely known, with only the habitus and selected details of the male genitalia described.</p> <p>The description of the type species is supplemented and partly corrected. A new understanding of the groundplan of male terminalia of Scirtinae (Zwick 2015c) is helpful in definitions of monophyla within the genus, in order to determine the relations of the Australasian fauna to the other species. A comprehensive analysis of the Asian fauna is not intended in the present study.</p>Published as part of <i>Zwick, Peter, 2016, Australian Marsh Beetles (Coleoptera: Scirtidae). 9. The relations of Australasian Ypsiloncyphon species to their Asian congeners, additions, mainly to Petrocyphon and Prionocyphon, and a key to Australian genera of Scirtinae, pp. 151-198 in Zootaxa 4085 (2)</i> on page 153, DOI: 10.11646/zootaxa.4085.2.1, <a href="http://zenodo.org/record/1052535">http://zenodo.org/record/1052535</a>
Cognitive Hierarchy: A Limited Thinking Theory in Games
No full textStrategic thinking, best-response, and mutual consistency (equilibrium) are three key
modeling principles in non-cooperative game theory. Camerer, Ho and Chong (2004)
relax mutual consistency to predict how players are likely to behave in one-shot
games before they can learn to equilibrate. They introduce a one-parameter cognitive
hierarchy (CH) model to predict behavior in one-shot games, and initial conditions
in repeated games. The CH approach assumes that players use k steps of reasoning
with frequency f(k). Camerer, Ho and Chong (2004) assume f(k) to be a one-parameter
Poisson distribution.
This paper investigates and lends support to the generality and precision of this
Poisson CH model in three ways: 1. an unconstrained general distribution CH model
is found to offer only marginal improvement in fit over its Poisson cousin and hence
this suggests that the Poisson approximation is reasonable; 2. the steps of thinking
players used in games are found to correlate with response time and schools they
attend which suggests that cognitive hierarchy captures realistically a reasoning
mechanism that goes on in the brain of these players; and 3. several classes of
interesting economic problems, including asset pricing and business entry can be
explained by the iterated reasoning of the Poisson CH model. When compared to the
Quantal Response Equilibrium model which relaxes the best-response assumption of
equilibrium theory, the better fit of Poisson CH model seem to suggest that mutual
consistency is a more plausible assumption to relax in explaining deviation from
equilibrium theory
Experience-Weighted Attraction Learning in Games: Estimates From Weak-Link Games
No full textHow does an equilibrium arise in a game? For decades, the implicit answer to
this question was that players reasoned their way to an equilibrium, or adapted
and evolved toward it in some unspecified way. Theorists have become
interested in the specific details of how adaptation and evolution work. Much of
this interest revolves around models in which players change their strategies or
learn, and what equilibria might result under various learning rules. Our research
is motivated by a different question: Which learning models describe human
behavior best? This chapter proposes a general experience-weighed attraction
(EWA) model and estimates the model parametrically using a small set of
experimental data
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