1,721,021 research outputs found
Uncovering unknown unknowns: Towards a Baconian approach to management decision-making
Get PDFBayesian decision theory and inference have left a deep and indelible mark on the literature on management decision-making. There is however an important issue that the machinery of classical Bayesianism is ill equipped to deal with, that of “unknown unknowns” or, in the cases in which they are actualised, what are sometimes called “Black Swans”. This issue is closely related to the problems of constructing an appropriate state space under conditions of deficient foresight about what the future might hold, and our aim is to develop a theory and some of the practicalities of state space elaboration that addresses these problems. Building on ideas originally put forward by Bacon (1620), we show how our approach can be used to build and explore the state space, how it may reduce the extent to which organisations are blindsided by Black Swans, and how it ameliorates various well-known cognitive biases
Probability and uncertainty in Keynes's The General Theory
No full textBook description: John Maynard Keynes is undoubtedly the most influential Western economist of the twentieth century. His emphasis on the nature and role of uncertainty in economic thought is a dominant theme in his writings.
This book brings together a wide array of experts on Keynes' thought such as Gay Tulip Meeks, Sheila Dow and John Davis who discuss, analyse and criticise such themes as Keynesian probability and uncertainty, the foundations of Keynes' economics and the relationship between Keynes' earlier and later thought. The Philosophy of Keynes' Economics is a readable and comprehensive book that will interest students and academics interested in the man and his thought
De Finetti and Savage on the normative relevance of imprecise reasoning: A reply to arthmar and brady
No full textThis paper examines the claim that de Fined and Savage totally rejected the notion of indeterminate, as distinct from imprecise, probabilities. It argues that their examination of imprecise reasoning refers both to descriptive and normative issues, and that the inability for a decision-maker to commit to a single prior cannot be limited to measurement problems, as argued by Arthmar and Brady in a recent contribution to this Journal. The paper shows that de Finetti and Savage admitted that having an interval of initial probabilities may sometimes have normative relevance, thereby leaving an opening for indeterminate probabilities
De Finetti on uncertainty
Get PDFThe well-known Knightian distinction between quantifiable risk and unquantifiable uncertainty is at odds with the dominant subjectivist conception of probability associated with de Finetti, Ramsey and Savage. Risk and uncertainty are rendered indistinguishable on the subjectivist approach insofar as an individual’s subjective estimate of the probability of any event can be elicited from the odds at which she would be prepared to bet for or against that event. The risk/uncertainty distinction has however never quite gone away and is currently under renewed theoretical scrutiny. The purpose of this article is to show that de Finetti’s understanding of the distinction is more nuanced than is usually admitted. Relying on usually overlooked excerpts of de Finetti’s works commenting on Keynes, Knight and interval valued
probabilities, we argue that de Finetti suggested a relevant theoretical case for uncertainty to hold even when individuals are endowed with subjective probabilities. Indeed, de Finetti admitted that the distinction between risk and uncertainty is relevant when different individuals sensibly disagree about the probability of the occurrence of an event. We conclude that the received interpretation of de Finetti’s understanding of subjective probability needs to be qualified on this front
De Finetti on the Insurance of Risks and Uncertainties
Get PDFIn the insurance literature, it is often argued that private markets can provide insurance against ‘risks’ but not against ‘uncertainties’ in the sense of Knight or Keynes. This claim is at odds with the standard economic model of risk exchange which, in assuming that decision-makers are always guided by point-valued subjective probabilities, predicts that all uncertainties can, in theory, be insured. Supporters of the standard model argue that the insuring of highly idiosyncratic risks by Lloyd's of London proves that this is so even in practice. The purpose of this article is to show that Bruno de Finetti, famous as one of the three founding fathers of the subjective approach to probability assumed by the standard model, actually made a theoretical case for uncertainty within the subjectivist approach. We draw on empirical evidence from the practice of underwriters to show how this case may help explain the reluctance of insurers to cover highly uncertain contingencies
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