1,721,161 research outputs found
Interest Groups, Government Spending and Italian Industrial Growth (1876-1913)
Full text linkIn the last two decades of the XIX century the Italian model of economic growth shifted from agricultural to industrial. Historians maintain that this process was affected by the action of some interest groups that pursued both state protection from competition and specific public expenditure programs. Starting from the economic literature of interest groups, this paper attempts to empirically investigate the role of the interest groups in public expenditure decisions in Italy from 1876 to 1913. We argue that a proper indicator of the role of interest groups is their output. The analysis suggests that government spending was sensitive to the preferences of heavy industry rather then those of textile and cereal cultivators. We therefore highlight the role of the political process in setting economic policy at the early stages of the Italian development.industrialization; special interests groups; public expenditure, Italian economic history.
Laws and Legislature Size in Italian Regions: Which Will be the Effect of an Increase in the Number of Legislators
No full textWe analyze the effect of different legislature size on the number of laws enacted in Italian regions and the relationship between regional public expenditure and laws. According to the theory, legislature size has an indefinite effect on these variables because logrolling and transaction costs may have canceling effects. We find a significantly negative effect of the number of legislators on laws. We also uncover a strong political-cycle effect, which increases legislation in voting years. We use these findings to forecast the effects of the increase in the number of legislators that is taking place in most regions
Legislature and constituency size in Italian regions: Forecasting the effects of a reform
No full textWe analyze the effect of different legislature size on per capita regional expenditure in Italy. According to the theory, legislature size has an indefinite effect on government spending because logrolling and transaction costs may have canceling effects. We find a large and significantly positive effect of the number of legislators. We use these findings to forecast the effects of the increase in the number of legislators that is taking place in some regions: a 10% increase in legislature size commands on average a 12% increase in per capita regional expenditure
Sulla political economy del deficit pubblico nell’Italia liberale
No full textIn questo lavoro si analizzano diverse determinanti della dimensione dei disavanzi nel Regno d’Italia durante il
periodo 1861-1914. In particolare, utilizziamo un modello di elettore mediano che include l’ipotesi di illusione
fiscale. L’analisi empirica, attraverso una metodologia VECM, da un lato conferma l’ipotesi di uno sfruttamento
da parte della classe politica dei contribuenti non aventi diritto al voto attraverso il ricorso alle imposte indirette,
dall’altro evidenzia l’esistenza di un limite di tollerabilità fiscale che richiede il ricorso ai disavanzi. Rileviamo
inoltre una relazione negativa di breve periodo tra spesa pubblica e prezzi dei beni privati laddove nel lungo
periodo emerge una relazione di sostituzione tra beni privati e beni pubblici. L’effetto positivo nel breve periodo
del reddito sulla spesa pubblica che caratterizza i paesi nelle fasi iniziali dello sviluppo economico, diventa
negativo nel lungo periodo dove si osserva uno spostamento della domanda verso i beni privati in un’ottica di
sostituibilità tra spesa pubblica e privata. In un contesto di spesa di tipo redistributivo assai limitata e di suffragio
ristretto l’impatto della disuguaglianza del reddito sulla spesa pubblica come pure quello del numero dei votanti
non appare significativo
LEGISLATURE AND CONSTITUENCY SIZE IN ITALIAN REGIONS: FORECASTING THE EFFECTS OF A REFORM
No full textSulla political economy del deficit pubblico nell'Italia liberale
No full textIn questo lavoro si analizzano diverse determinanti della dimensione dei disavanzi nel Regno d'Italia durante il periodo 1861-1914. In particolare, utilizziamo un modello di elettore mediano che include l'ipotesi di illusione fiscale. L'analisi empirica, attraverso una metodologia VECM, da un lato conferma l'ipotesi di uno sfruttamento da parte della classe politica dei contribuenti non aventi diritto al voto attraverso il ricorso alle imposte indirette, dall'altro evidenzia l'esistenza di un limite di tollerabilità fiscale che richiede il ricorso ai disavanzi. Rileviamo inoltre una relazione negativa di breve periodo tra spesa pubblica e prezzi dei beni privati laddove nel lungo periodo emerge una relazione di sostituzione tra beni privati e beni pubblici. L'effetto positivo nel breve periodo del reddito sulla spesa pubblica che caratterizza i paesi nelle fasi iniziali dello sviluppo economico, diventa negativo nel lungo periodo dove si osserva uno spostamento della domanda verso i beni privati in un'ottica di sostituibilità tra spesa pubblica e privata. In un contesto di spesa di tipo redistributivo assai limitata e di suffragio ristretto l'impatto della disuguaglianza del reddito sulla spesa pubblica come pure quello del numero dei votanti non appare significativo
Drift and Equilibrium Selection with Human and Virtual Players
No full textThe theory of drift (Binmore and Samuelson 1999) concerns equilibrium selection in which secondorder disturbances may have first-order effects in the emergence of one equilibrium over the other. We provided experimental evidence with human players supporting the model in Caminati, Innocenti and Ricciuti (2006). In this paper we test it with conditioning by computer players. When computers are removed and humans are matched against each other, the comparative static properties of the model are confirme
Non-self-centered inequity aversion matters. A model.
Full text linkThe model by Fehr and Schmidt introduces envy and altruism in the utility function of a representative agent. The aim of this paper is to provide two extensions - non linearity and non self-centredness - to this model. This extension turns out to be more consistent with experimental evidence than the original model.
Drift effect and timing without observability
No full textWe provide experimental evidence to Binmore and Samuelson’s (1999) insights for modeling the learning process through which equilibrium is selected. They proposed the concept of drift to describe the effect of perturbations on the dynamic process leading to equilibrium in evolutionary games with boundedly rational agents. We test within a random matched population two different versions of the Dalek game where the forward induction equilibrium weakly iterately dominates the other Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. We also assume that the first mover makes her decision first (“timing”) but the second mover is not informed of the first mover's choice (“lack of observability”). Both players are informed of their position in the sequence and of the fact that the second player will decide without knowing the decision of the first player. If the actual observed choices are only those made by other players in previous interactions, the role played by forward induction is replaced with the learning process taking place within the population. Our results support Binmore and Samuelson’s model because the frequency of the forward induction outcome is payoffsensitive: it strongly increases when we impose a slight change in the payoffs that does not change equilibrium predictions. This evidence reinforces the evolutionary nature of the drift effect
The Demand for Jiustice in Italy: Civil Litigation and the Judicial System
No full textThis study provides an interpretative scheme and an empirically testable model of the so-called demand for justice in Italy. Using a microeconomic model of the litigants' choice, the features of the judicial, legal and economic systems have been modeled as they influence two parties' decisions and may cause opportunistic behavior. The empirical analysys shoes that lengtht time-spans and raised costs of associated processes and high market rates have a disincentive effect on recouse to justice, prevailing on that connected to opportunistic behavior of the plaintiff. We do noto find evidence for the "pahological demand" hypothesis
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