1,721,029 research outputs found
Legal Reasons: Between Universalism and Particularism
No full textThe first part of this work analyses the universalist and the particularist conceptions of reasons. The second part projects this analysis to the legal domain. The author stresses that universalism and particularism regarding reasons are mutually exclusive theories linked to incompatible conceptions of norms, i.e. norms as strict universal conditionals and norms as defeasible conditionals. In giving an account of this tenet, different meanings of universality and defeasibility are explored. A parallel debate regarding reasons can be found in the legal domain, where two contrasting categories of norms are usually distinguished: rules and principles. On this issue the author argues that the conception of legal reasons depends on the way in which this contrast between different kinds of legal norms is shaped
A constructivist conception of legal norms
No full textIn this paper I analyze Bulygin’s conception of those legal statements asserting that a certain action is legally obligatory, prohibited or permitted. According to Bulygin, these statements are ambiguous. The can be external, empirical statements expressing the existence or validity of a legal norm, but the can also be internal, normative statements expressing a norm or an absolute, moral attitude. In the paper I attempt to defend that for a positivist theory, if law is conceived as a set of norms, this kind of statements do not report an empirical fact, but do not report an absolute moral attitude either. They surely assert a normative fact: the legal existence or validity of a normative entity, which is relative to a certain time and place. In my view, Bulygin’s failure to see this point is fundamentally due to the assumption of a false dichotomy between two ways in which an entity can exist: one empirical (relative), the other normative (absolute). In order to criticize this apparent dichotomy, I briefly sketch a constructivist conception in which we can say that legal norms exist. If my reasoning is correct, this conception is apt to explain those statements expressing the normative fact that a norm exists or is legally valid
La decisión judicial sobre los hechos y el derecho. Un argumento por analogía
No full textThis essay proposes an analogy between the decision on the facts at issue in a court case (the quaestio facti) and the decision on the law applicable to those facts (the quaestio iuris). Firstly, it identifies a number of relevant features that both decisions have in common. Secondly, on the basis of these common features, it attempts to show that some theses that are considered peacefully applicable to the former type of decision should also be accepted in relation to
the latter. In particular, it could be admitted that, in the context of a state that accepts
the principles of the rule of law, both decisions aim to truthfully record a preexisting fact and that, in this sense, the requirement to justify them refers to a requirement of epistemic justification. In this way, it is argued, the truth-value sought is not only an epistemic value, but also a political-moral value. Moreover, on the basis of the proposed analogy, it is argued that certain principles and institutions that are generally recognised in relation to quaestio facti decisions (such as the possibility of regulating the admissibility, the evaluation or the conditions of sufficiency of the evidence/arguments presented) could legitimately be applicable to quaestio iuris decisions as well
El positivismo jurídico interno: algunas ideas bajo la lupa
No full textEste ensayo ofrece un conjunto de respuestas a las preguntas, críticas y sugerencias presentadas en el seminario sobre el libro Positivismo jurídico “interno” (Revus, 2018) que se llevara a cabo en la Universidad Austral de Chile, en septiembre de 2018. Las consideraciones que se presentan aluden, en primer lugar, al trabajo de Marcos Andrade que discute el capítulo 1 sobre la existencia y conocimiento de normas. En segundo término, al comentario de Ernesto Riffo que reflexiona fundamentalmente sobre la propuesta de Fernando Atria tratada en el capítulo 4. Por último, al trabajo de Flavia Carbonell que se concentra especialmente el capítulo final del volumen sobre la posibilidad de un positivismo jurídico interno
- …
