110 research outputs found
Universality and normative systems
No full textEl presente trabajo discute un conjunto de ideas planteadas por Jorge Rodríguez en su libro Teoría analítica del derecho al analizar lasnormas jurídicas como razones para la acción. En primer lugar, presenta una crítica a las tesis sostenidas por Rodríguez respecto de aquello que significa asumir una concepción universalista de las razones que un sistema jurídico ofrece. En concreto, se critica la idea de que un sistema de normas universales ha de ser necesariamente consistente y establecer en cada caso un balance perfecto que determine qué se debe hacer considerando todos los factores relevantes. En segundo lugar, el trabajo presenta una crítica a la distinción que el autor propone entre problemas de derrotabilidad vinculados con la identificación y con la aplicación de las normas jurídicas en la medida en que ella no es coherente con la posición universalista que supuestamente él asume. Por último, se ofrecen algunos ejemplos que intentan mostrar en qué modo una concepción universalista de los sistemas jurídicos puede dar cuenta de la existencia de conflictos entre sus normas sin que ello signifique aceptar que sus normas son derrotables sobre la base de consideraciones extrasistemáticas al momento de su aplicación, i.e. sin renunciar a su tesis de que ellas ofrecen razones uniforme e invariablemente relevantes.This paper discusses a number of ideas put forward by Jorge Rodríguez in his book Teoría analítica del derecho in analyzing legal norms as reasons for action. First, I present a critique of Rodríguez's theses about what it means to adopt a universalist conception of the reasons that a legal system offers. In particular, I criticize the notion that a system of universal norms should necessarily be consistent and determine in each case a perfect balance between its norms that allows one to establish what should be done everything considered. Second, I criticize the distinction the author proposes between contestability problems related to the identification and application of legal norms as inconsistent with the universalist position he purports to advocate. Finally, some examples are given that attempt to show how a universalist conception of legal systems can explain the existence of conflicts between their universal norms without accepting that they are defeasible on the basis of extra-systematic considerations at the time of their application, that is, without abandoning the thesis that universal norms provide uniformly and invariably relevant reasons.Fil: Redondo, Maria Cristina. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba. Centro de Investigaciones Jurídicas y Sociales. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - Córdoba. Centro de Investigaciones Jurídicas y Sociales; Argentin
Legal Reasons: Between Universalism and Particularism
No full textThe first part of this work analyses the universalist and the particularist conceptions of reasons. The second part projects this analysis to the legal domain. The author stresses that universalism and particularism regarding reasons are mutually exclusive theories linked to incompatible conceptions of norms, i.e. norms as strict universal conditionals and norms as defeasible conditionals. In giving an account of this tenet, different meanings of universality and defeasibility are explored. A parallel debate regarding reasons can be found in the legal domain, where two contrasting categories of norms are usually distinguished: rules and principles. On this issue the author argues that the conception of legal reasons depends on the way in which this contrast between different kinds of legal norms is shaped
El positivismo jurídico analítico de Eugenio Bulygin
No full textEl presente trabajo analiza la posición de Eugenio Bulygin en el contexto de la filosofía y la teoría del derecho contemporáneas. En primer lugar, se detiene en el tipo de positivismo jurídico que Bulygin desarrolla, para poner énfasis en sus principales tesis metodológicas: su enfoque fundamentalmente analítico, el rol de la distinción entre normas y proposiciones y entre enunciados internos y externos. En la segunda parte del trabajo se analizan algunas tesis sustantivas del positivismo jurídico de Bulygin. En particular: sus tesis sobre la noción de validez jurídica, sobre la interpretación del derecho y sobre las normas regulativas y constitutivas. La idea del ensayo es no solo poner de relieve algunos de los aportes más importantes de la teoría jurídica de Eugenio Bulygin, sino también mostrar la coherencia interna de ese aporte y la forma en que sus propuestas sustantivas se relacionan con el enfoque metodológico analítico que está en el corazón de la teoría de este autor
Some Remarks on the Connection Between Law and Morality
No full textThis article is primarily focused on two interconnected discussions presented by John Gardner in Law as a Leap of Faith. The first one is related to the thesis which, according to Gardner, all positivists agree on; the second one is referred to the positivist’s position regarding the connection between law and morality. In order to address these issues I rely on the distinction between two kinds of criteria: the conceptual criteria and the validity criteria. On this basis, and against what Gardner asserts, I try to defend two main ideas. Firstly, that the thesis on which all positivists agree is not one about the validity criteria that norms must satisfy in order to belong to a legal system, but rather one concerning the conceptual criteria delimiting the concept of law. By the same token, I argue that, according to the positivist understanding of the concept of law, there is no necessary connection between law and morality.Fil: Redondo, Maria Cristina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Università degli Studi di Genova; Italia. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba; Argentin
Nota en memoria de Eugenio Bulygin
No full textThis publication is a tribute to the person and work of Professor Eugenio Bulygin, who died in May 2021
Sobre el positivismo juridico interno. Algunas respuestas
No full textThis paper contains a response to six comments on my book Positivismo jurídico ‘interno’. These comments were originally delivered in an online seminar organized as part of the
activities of the research group at Pompeu Fabra University in Barcelona and later published in Doxa, 45: pp. 495-627. The first response refers to the work of Alberto Carrió andfocuses on some ontological and epistemological distinctions on which my work is based. The second refers to the commentary of Alba Lojo, which aims mainly to discuss the form of reasoning imposed by legal norms. The third refers to Sebastián Agüero’s writing on the positivist theory of Eugenio Bulygin. The fourth refers to Osvaldo de la Fuente’s essay on the interpretative methodological proposal in general and of Fernando Atria in particular. The fifth refers to the critique formulated by Lorena Ramírez on the distinction between two meanings of the expressions «internal point of view» and «external point of view». The last one refers to the final commentary of José Juan Moreso, which essentially considers two ideas: the thesis that the law is an ideal, normative object that cannot be reduced to empirical data, and the thesis that its practical character can be explained by the form of reasoning that the law imposes when it proposes universal norms
A constructivist conception of legal norms
No full textIn this paper I analyze Bulygin’s conception of those legal statements asserting that a certain action is legally obligatory, prohibited or permitted. According to Bulygin, these statements are ambiguous. The can be external, empirical statements expressing the existence or validity of a legal norm, but the can also be internal, normative statements expressing a norm or an absolute, moral attitude. In the paper I attempt to defend that for a positivist theory, if law is conceived as a set of norms, this kind of statements do not report an empirical fact, but do not report an absolute moral attitude either. They surely assert a normative fact: the legal existence or validity of a normative entity, which is relative to a certain time and place. In my view, Bulygin’s failure to see this point is fundamentally due to the assumption of a false dichotomy between two ways in which an entity can exist: one empirical (relative), the other normative (absolute). In order to criticize this apparent dichotomy, I briefly sketch a constructivist conception in which we can say that legal norms exist. If my reasoning is correct, this conception is apt to explain those statements expressing the normative fact that a norm exists or is legally valid
La decisión judicial sobre los hechos y el derecho. Un argumento por analogía
No full textThis essay proposes an analogy between the decision on the facts at issue in a court case (the quaestio facti) and the decision on the law applicable to those facts (the quaestio iuris). Firstly, it identifies a number of relevant features that both decisions have in common. Secondly, on the basis of these common features, it attempts to show that some theses that are considered peacefully applicable to the former type of decision should also be accepted in relation to
the latter. In particular, it could be admitted that, in the context of a state that accepts
the principles of the rule of law, both decisions aim to truthfully record a preexisting fact and that, in this sense, the requirement to justify them refers to a requirement of epistemic justification. In this way, it is argued, the truth-value sought is not only an epistemic value, but also a political-moral value. Moreover, on the basis of the proposed analogy, it is argued that certain principles and institutions that are generally recognised in relation to quaestio facti decisions (such as the possibility of regulating the admissibility, the evaluation or the conditions of sufficiency of the evidence/arguments presented) could legitimately be applicable to quaestio iuris decisions as well
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