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The reality of lies
Full text linkA lie is neither a false proposition, nor a mistake, nor a mere fiction; it is a type of fiction, an act, and precisely an intentional act. An act calls for a subject, and therefore a lie is inseparable from its subject. Together, they make up a real object: it has to be real, since a lie produces effects, and the cause-effect relationship only holds between real beings. Like every real object, a lie unfolds in a (phenomenological) context. But there is more: it identifies a (dialectical) context
What Makes a Thing What It Is? Aristotle and Hegel on Identity
Full text linkThe notion of identity is investigated through Aristotle and Hegel as supporters of two different ontological conceptions: pluralism of substances and relational holism. Through Aristotle, I examine both the thesis according to which the identity of an object is constituted by its properties and the difficulties which this thesis encounters (e.g., those raised by Max Black). Aristotle easily defines the identity in species, in genus, and in number; some problems arise regarding the identity of individuals: for these, it is not enough to indicate the definition and the proper qualities, but matter is needed. Matter cannot, however, be a criterion for identifying duplicate objects: in this case, it plays at most the role of a "weak individuator" A weak individuator involves relations with other entities. The use of relations in determining the identity of an entity is extensively treated by Hegel, according to whom, in order to define the identity of an object a multiplicity of particular objects is required and, therefore, relations among entities. I conclude by proposing a notion of the object understood not as an independent,
separate, and autonomous item, but as a portion of the world, which is given in a phenomenological context and identifies a dialectical context
Sul superamento dello psicologismo secondo Theodor Lipps: ovvero su contenuto e oggetto, psicologia e logica
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Language, thought and world in Aristotle. De Interpretatione 1 in the light of pseudomorphia
No full textAristotle’s theory of language is studied with regard to the possibility of saying what does not exist, either because one can express falsity, or because one can truthfully speak of nonexistent. According to Aristotle, symbol and sign are not the same: the symbol is a kind of sign, an articulated linguistic sign. Convention is, in a formal sense, the relation of significance from the meaning to the sign, in a material sense, it is the result of the Agreement between our experience of the world and the world itself. The relationship that links thought to things cannot be similarity, because if the object is not there, thought cannot look like anything, it should rather be a relation of representation. Πράγματα include entities, but do not exclude non-entities. Taking the example of τραγέλαφος, it may be argued that μὴ ὄντα are both extra-mental and different from absolute nothing
Kazimierz Twardowski: autobiografia e testimonianza
No full textWritten in the first person, the Selbstdarstellung (Self-portrait) offers a clear and lively presentation of Kazimierz Twardowski’s biographical and intellectual path, as well as a testimony of how modern Polish philosophy was born at the turn of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Twardowski emerges as a young philosopher and pupil of Brentano, a scrupulous teacher who was very attentive to the education and autonomy of his students, and a tireless organizer of philosophical life in Poland. Twardowski’s Selbstdarstellung is presented for the first time in Italian translation. It is preceded by a brief introduction which takes into consideration various historiographical interpretations
Zeichen, “schattenhafte” Ausdrücke und fiktionale Gegenstände. Meinongsche Überlegungen zu einer Semiotik des Fiktiven
No full textDiese Arbeit versucht Meinongs Zeichentheorie auf die Analyse von literarischen Texten anzuwenden. Dazu werden besonders Worte und Sätze in Betracht gezogen, die nach Meinong, sofern sie in literarischen Texten vorkommen, Phantasieerlebnisse ausdrücken, die er in ernstartige und schattenhafte trennt. Die ernstartigen Phantasieerlebnisse lassen sich aus dem fiktionalen Kontext lösen, sind also auch in anderen Kontexten verständlich; die schattenhaften finden dagegen nur in ihrem Kontext eine Erklärung; d.h. auch, daß die ernstartigen Erlebnisse bestimmter sind als die schattenhaften. Die von diesen Erlebnissen bzw. Ausdrücken präsentierten Gegenstände sind die Bedeutungen der Zeichen. Die Bestimmtheit des Erlebnisses steht in Relation zur Vollständigkeit des Gegenstandes; folglich entspricht einem schattenhaften Erlebnis ein unvollständiger Gegenstand. Außer als unvollständige Gegenstände lassen sich die fiktionalen Gegenstände schließlich als nicht-existierende, von der menschlichen Phantasie produzierte Gegenstände höherer Ordnung definieren, die zusammen mit dem sprachlichen Ausdruck zur Welt gekommen und mit dem Kontext, oder den Kontexten, verbunden sind, in die die Phantasietätigkeit sie gestellt hat
Mauro ANTONELLI, Alle radici del movimento fenomenologico. Psicologia e metafisica nel giovane Franz Brentano, Bologna: Pitagora, 1996
No full textLe vicende del contenuto attraverso Bolzano, Twardowski e Meinong
No full textDistinguishing between mental act and content of representations and propositions in themselves, Bolzano offers a logico-semantical notion of content. Twardowski opposes to it a psychological conception of the content of representations and identifies the content of judgment, in the case of existential judgments, with the existence of the object, in the case of judgments about a relation, with the subsistence of the relation. In opposition to Twardowski, Meinong does not confound logical and psychological content and shows, by means of the notion of presentation, that a content is present in all experiences, including emotions
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