13,024 research outputs found
Letter from Nicholas Henderson to Keith Price
A letter from Nicholas Henderson to Warden Keith Price telling about his life in Iowa
Nicholas Henderson Correspondence
A letter, with envelope, from Nicholas Henderson to Keith Price
Back of envelope from Nicholas Henderson
Back of an envelope with the return address of the sender, Nicholas Henderson
Interview with Nicholas Christopher, author of Somewhere in the Night: Film Noir and the American City
Interview with Nicholas Christopher, author of Somewhere in the Night: Film Noir and the American Cit
Resurrecting the Author
Presentation of Nicholas Wolterstorff\u27s Paper Resurrecting the Author with time after for questions beginning at 18:00
Front of envelope from Nicholas Henderson
Front of an envelope addressed to Warden Keith Price at the Darrington Unit, care of Mr. James Riley, the Deputy Director of the Texas Department of Corrections
Heritability and Linkage Analysis of Appendicitis Utilizing Age at Onset
Appendicitis usually afflicts the young, but there is a large tail in the distribution of onset age. The genetics of this disease are still not well understood. A heritability analysis and genome wide linkage analysis of a large twin dataset was undertaken. Treating age of onset of appendicitis as a censored survival trait revealed a heritability of 0.21, and found evidence of linkage to Chromosome 1p37.3. Author(s): Christopher Oldmeadow 1 * | Kerrie Mengersen 2 | Nicholas Martin 3 | David L. Duffy
Competition Policy in Network Industries: An Introduction
The author discusses issues of the application of antitrust law and regulatory rules to network industries. In assessing the application of antitrust in network industries, we analyze a number of relevant features of network industries and the way in which antitrust law and regulatory rules can affect them. These relevant features include (among others) network effects, market structure, market share and profits inequality, choice of technical standards, relationship between the number of active firms and social benefits, existence of market power, leveraging of market power in complementary markets, and innovation races. The author finds that there are often significant differences on the effects of application of antitrust law in network and non-network industries.
The Price of Democracy in Coalition Formation
Whenever rational agents form coalitions to execute tasks, doing so via a decentralized negotiation process—while more robust and democratic—may lead to a loss of efficiency compared to a centralized solution. To quantify this loss, we introduce the notion of the Price of Democracy (PoD), which measures the amount of resources needlessly committed to the task(s) at hand. After defining this concept for general coalitional games, we instantiate it in the setting of weighted voting games, a simple but expressive class of coalitional games that can be used to model resource allocation in multiagent scenarios. We approach the problem of forming winning coalitions in this setting from a non-cooperative perspective, and put forward an intuitive deterministic bargaining process, which exhibits no delay of agreement (i.e., the agents are guaranteed to form a winning coalition in round one) and allows for efficient computation of bargaining strategies. We show a tight bound of 3/2 on the PoD of our process if two rounds of bargaining are allowed, and demonstrate that this bound cannot improve with more rounds. We then generalize our bargaining process to settings where multiple coalitions are allowed to be formed, show that this generalization also exhibits no delay of agreement, and discuss the PoD in such settings
External interventions and the duration of civil wars
The authors combine an empirical model of external intervention, with a theoretical model of civil war duration. Their empirical model of intervention allows them to analyze civil war duration, using"expected"rather than"actual"external intervention as an explanatory variable in the duration model. Unlike previous studies, they find that external intervention is positively associated with the duration of civil war. They distinguish partial third-party interventions that extend the length of war, from multilateral"peace"operations, which have a mandate to restore peace without taking sides - and which typically take place at war's end, or at least when both sides have agreed to a cease-fire. In a future paper, the authors will examine whether partial third-party interventions - whatever their effect on a war's duration - increase the risk of war's recurrence. If that proves true, then even if interventions reduce the length of civil war, they may do so at the cost of further destabilizing the political system, and sowing the seeds of future rebellion.Children and Youth,Peace&Peacekeeping,Post Conflict Reconstruction,Post Conflict Reconstruction,International Affairs,Post Conflict Reconstruction,Social Conflict and Violence,Peace&Peacekeeping,Post Conflict Reconstruction,International Affairs
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