1,721,022 research outputs found
One-dimensional bargaining with unanimity rule
Full text linkThe paper examines bargaining over a one--dimensional set of social states, with a unanimity acceptance rule. We consider a class of delta-equilibria, i.e. subgame perfect equilibria in stationary strategies that are free of coordination failures in the response stage.We show that along any sequence of delta-equilibria, as delta converges to one, the proposal of each player converges to the same limit. The limit, called the bargaining outcome, is uniquely determined by the set of players, the recognition probabilities, and the utility functions, and it is independent of the choice of the sequence. We characterize the bargaining outcome as a unique solution of a characteristic equation.mathematical economics;
A general structure theorem for the Nash equilibrium correspondence
No full textI consider n-person normal form games where the strategy set of each player is a non-empty compact convex subset of an Euclidean space, and the payoff function of player i is continuous in joint strategies and continuously differentiable and concave in the player i's strategy. No further restrictions (such as multilinearity of the payoff functions or the requirement that the strategy sets be polyhedral) are imposed. I demonstrate that the graph of the Nash equilibrium correspondence on this domain is homeomorphic to the space of games. This result generalizes a well-known structure theorem in [Kohlberg, E., Mertens, J.-F., 1986. On the strategic stability of equilibria. Econometrica 54, 1003-1037]. It is supplemented by an extension analogous to the unknottedness theorems in [Demichelis S., Germano, F., 2000. Some consequences of the unknottedness of the Walras correspondence. J. Math. Econ. 34, 537-545; Demichelis S., Germano, F., 2002. On (un)knots and dynamics in games. Games Econ. Behav. 41, 46-60]: the graph of the Nash equilibrium correspondence is ambient isotopic to a trivial copy of the space of games.Nash equilibrium correspondence
The Fuzzy Core and the (Π, β)- Balanced Core
Full text linkThis note provides a new proof of the non-emptiness of the fuzzy core in a pureexchange economy with finitely many agents. The proof is based on the concept of(Π, β)-balanced core for games without side payments due to Bonnisseau and Iehlé(2003).microeconomics ;
A General Structure Theorem for the Nash Equilibrium Correspondence
Full text linkWe consider n--person normal form games where the strategy set of each player is a non--empty compact convex subset of a Euclidean space, and the payoff function of player i is continuous in joint strategies and continuously differentiable and concave in player i''s strategy. No further restrictions (such as multilinearity of the payoff functions or the requirement that the strategy sets be polyhedral) are imposed. We demonstrate that the graph of the Nash equilibrium correspondence on this domain is homeomorphic to the space of games. This result generalizes a well--known structure theorem in Kohlberg and Mertens (On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria, Econometrica, 54, 1003--1037, 1986). It is supplemented by an extension analogous to the unknottedness theorems in Demichelis and Germano (On (Un)knots and Dynamics in Games, Games and Economic Behavior, 41, 46--60, 2002): the graph of the Nash equilibrium correspondence is ambient isotopic to a trivial copy of the space of games.mathematical economics;
On the asymptotic uniqueness of bargaining equilibria
Full text linkThe paper studies the model of multilateral bargaining over the alternatives representedby points in the mâdimensional Euclidean space. Proposers are chosen randomly and the acceptance of a proposal requires the unanimous approval of it by all the players. The focus of the paper is on the asymptotic behavior of subgame perfect equilibria in pure stationary strategies (called bargaining equilibria) as the breakdown probability tends to zero. Bargaining equilibria are said to be asymptotically unique if the limit of a sequence of bargaining equilibria as the breakdown probability tends to zero is independent of the choice of the sequence and is uniquely determined by the primitives of the model. We show that the limit of any sequence of bargaining equilibria is a zero point of the soâcalled linearization correspondence. The asymptotic uniqueness of bargaining equilibria is then deduced in each of the following cases: (1) m = n−1, where n is the number of players, (2) m = 1, and (3) in the case where the utility functions are quadratic, for each 1 ≤ m ≤ n−1. In each case the linearization correspondence is shown to have a unique zero. Result 1 hasbeen established earlier in Miyakawa and Laruelle and Valenciano. Result 2 is subsumed by the result in Predtetchinski. Result 3 is new.microeconomics ;
- …
