41 research outputs found

    Industry Concentration and Allocation of Resources to Basic Research

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    While the mainstream of Western economic thought believes in competitive markets, the Schumpeterian school considers concentrated industry to be the ideal vehicle for the advancement of industrial technology. Empirical evidence on the Schumpeterian hypothesis that a concentrated industry allocates relatively more resources to its research and development (R&D) activities has been inconclusive. We believe the reason is that the Schumpeterian hypothesis is too general and vague. The fact is that there are several dimensions of industrial concentration, for example, total number of firms in an industry, interfirm differences on a variety of characteristics such as sales, assets, resources, and so forth. Similarly, R&D activities are of several types such as long-term or short-term research, and basic research or applied research and development. Unfortunately, modeling efforts focusing on resource allocation by specific types of concentrated industries to specific types of R&D activities are almost nonexistent, with the exception of Joglekar and Hamburg (Joglekar, P., M. Hamburg. 1986. A homogeneous industry model of resource allocation to basic research and its policy implications. Management Sci. (February) 225--236; Joglekar, P., M. Hamburg. 1987. Industry resource allocation to basic research under normally distributed benefits. Decision Sci. (Winter) 1--24.) who showed that industries consisting of smaller numbers of firms allocate relatively greater amounts of resources to their basic research than industries consisting of larger numbers of firms. Extending Joglekar and Hamburg's models here we find that when two industries consist of the same number of firms, in most cases, a heterogeneous industry falls as short of its Pareto optimal investment in basic research as its comparable homogeneous counterpart. Numerical examples suggest that in some cases, concentrated (heterogeneous) industries may do worse. Policy implications of the results as well as directions for further research are discussed.industry concentration, resource allocation, inappropriable research, heterogeneous industry, individually rational equilibrium, Pareto optimal allocation

    Reply to: "Notes on Hofshi and Korsh 1972"

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    Reply to: "Notes on Hofshi and Korsh 1972" (Joglekar, Prafulla. Notes on Hofshi and Korsh 1972. Management Sci. 22 (6) 717-720).

    Notes on Hofshi and Korsh 1972

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    Rami Hofshi and James Korsh [Hofshi, Rami, James Korsh. 1972. A measure of an individual's power in a group. Management Sci. 19 (1, September)] (hereafter referred to as H & K) made an important attempt to define a measure of an individual's power in a group. Whereas the direction of their effort is significantly different from earlier efforts in assigning numerical weights to each individual of an organization, there are a number of logical flaws in their model. These comments are meant to identify the inadequacies of the H & K model.

    A Homogeneous Industry Model of Resource Allocation to Basic Research and Its Policy Implications

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    In a recent paper we showed that unaided industry allocation to basic (inappropriable) research is suboptimal and that in stimulating this allocation, provision of government seed money is generally counterproductive, while the provision of matching subsidies is not cost-efficient. Here we consider a special case of the model developed in the earlier paper (i.e., we now consider a homogeneous industry) and investigate the effects of several relevant factors upon an industry's allocation of resources to basic research. An extensive numerical example is presented that helps to verify and to interpret the model in realistic terms. Our findings question the validity of a number of popular beliefs about the need for government support of basic research in various types of industries. For example, contrary to popular belief, the greater the risk aversion displayed by member firms in an industry, the lesser may be the need for government support of its basic research. Also, the larger the number of firms in an industry the greater may be the need for government support of that industry's basic research.research and development, economics, government

    A group decision support framework for consensus ranking of technical manager candidates

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    In many developed countries, today\u27s socioeconomic environment has expanded the role of the technical manager. Organizations capable of recruiting technical managers with adequate management education and interpersonal skills, in addition to technical expertise, are more likely to be successful in managing their limited resources. A technical manager\u27s success is also dependent on the manager\u27s acceptance by his/her subordinates, peers, and superiors, and the decision to hire a technical manager should be made with their participation. Many of these individuals have little background or experience in hiring, and they need appropriate decision support. This paper presents a framework to help a group of decision makers define and articulate a hierarchy of hiring criteria and subcriteria and rate each of the candidates on that hierarchy. To improve consistency among group members, the proposed group decision support system (GDSS) combines the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) with the Delphi principles of anonymous feedback and iteration. Given the decision makers\u27 desire for a consensus choice, the framework deviates from the normal practice of AHP, and uses the Maximize Agreement Heuristic (MAH) to arrive at the final ranking of the candidates. An application to the ranking of nurse manager candidates at a hospital in the United States is presented

    An Evaluation of Federal Policies Concerning Joint Ventures for Applied Research and Development

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    Current federal policies toward interfirm cooperation in research and development are designed to maximize society's use of available technology. Models of industry resource allocation behavior demonstrate that these policies are detrimental to the formation of risk sharing consortia for the development of new technology. The reason is that current policies often deprive applied research and development activities of their appropriability. Analytical results suggest that, if appropriability is maintained, an underinvestment in applied research and development can be corrected, in most cases, simply by permitting firms to share the benefits and costs of projects in proportion to firms' investments. A permissive governmental posture may be particularly effective for industries consisting of a large number of firms with some firms relatively larger than others. Industries consisting of small numbers of relatively equal size firms may require government as a participant in consortia for applied research and development (appropriable but risky R&D activities).research and development, government, engineering, economics
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