1,721,075 research outputs found
Replication Data for: "Buying Evidence? Policy Research as a Presidential Commodity"
No full textThe U.S. federal government routinely commissions policy research from the private sector and this research, in turn, often forms an evidence base for future policy decisions. Given its potential to influence the policymaking process, I argue that the procurement power over research production is a previously unappreciated tool in the president’s policy arsenal. Focusing on federally-funded policy research and using an original dataset of federal procurement from 2000-2019, I explore how government-funded research can enhance a president’s prospects for accomplishing political goals. The analysis shows that agencies that are prioritized by the president award larger research contracts. Further, new presidential administrations are more likely to discotinue research initiated by their predecessors. The implication is that policy research commissioned by the federal government is a commodity for the executive, harnessed in service of political agendas
Cold War
Full text linkThe chapter analyses the relationship between politics and literature during the cultural cold war
Agency Rulemaking in a Separation of Powers System
No full textRulemaking gives agencies significant power to change public policy, but agencies do not exercise this power in a vacuum. The separation of powers system practically guarantees that, at times, agencies will be pushed and pulled in different directions by Congress and the president. We argue that these forces critically affect the volume of rules produced by an agency. We develop an account of agency rulemaking in light of these factors and test our hypotheses on a dataset of agency rules from 1995 to 2007. Our results show that even after accounting for factors specific to each agency, agencies do, in fact, adjust the quantity of rules they produce in response to separation of powers oversight. Further analysis shows that the president’s influence is limited to those agencies that he has made a priority
Agency Rulemaking in a Separation of Powers System
No full textRulemaking gives agencies significant power to change public policy, but agencies do not exercise this power in a vacuum. The separation of powers system practically guarantees that, at times, agencies will be pushed and pulled in different directions by Congress and the president. We argue that these forces critically affect the volume of rules produced by an agency. We develop an account of agency rulemaking in light of these factors and test our hypotheses on a dataset of agency rules from 1995 to 2007. Our results show that even after accounting for factors specific to each agency, agencies do, in fact, adjust the quantity of rules they produce in response to separation of powers oversight. Further analysis shows that the president’s influence is limited to those agencies that he has made a priority
Replication Data for: Slow-Rolling, Fast-Tracking, and the Pace of Bureaucratic Decisions in Rulemaking
No full textData and code to replicate all results in the published paper
Replication Data for: Slow-Rolling, Fast-Tracking, and the Pace of Bureaucratic Decisions in Rulemaking
No full textData and code to replicate all results in the published paper
Replication Data for: Macro Outsourcing: Evaluating Government Reliance on the Private Sector
No full textThese files include the underlying data and the code to replicate all analyses in the paper and the Supporting Information (SI)
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