1,720,966 research outputs found
Litigating Vertical Mergers: Innovation Dynamics from \u3cem\u3eIllumina-Grail\u3c/em\u3e
Full text linkIllumina-Grail represents an important moment in antitrust litigation, reshaping the legal landscape for vertical mergers in innovation-driven markets. This Article analyzes the Federal Trade Commission’s uncommon achievement in blocking the Illumina-Grail merger—a ruling sustained by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals—emphasizing its significant ramifications for antitrust legislation. The case examines the complex dynamics of innovation competition and emerging market definition, challenging established doctrines regarding the inherently procompetitive nature of vertical mergers. This Article examines the changing criteria for defining relevant markets and evaluating competitive harm in research and development-oriented industries. It also discusses the Fifth Circuit’s support of the FTC’s strategy, including the controversial dismissal of Illumina’s suggested remedies and efficiencies. To be sure, Illumina-Grail highlights the increased scrutiny on vertical mergers, as they are instrumental in shaping a given innovation policy but also market dynamics and the burden-shifting framework in antitrust litigation
The Principle of Subsidiarity as Principle of Economic Efficiency
No full textThe principle of subsidiarity—whereby a power shared between the European Union and its Member States is exercised at the lowest appropriate level of governance—is a general principle of European Union law the justiciability of which has been widely discussed. The justiciability of the subsidiarity principle has been criticized for underlining its political relevance. However, this critique lacks the power to explain both the weight of the principle of subsidiarity in the E.U. Treaties and the case law regarding the subsidiarity principle. What is the principle of subsidiarity and what degree of justiciability does it have?
This paper argues that the principle of subsidiarity is better understood in its current form when its economic complexion is underlined. More precisely, the principle of subsidiarity contains, at its core, the principle of economic efficiency. The “subsidiarity- as-efficiency” model offers a better understanding of European Union law and reveals that the European case law on subsidiarity tends to promote economic efficiency.
The article shall introduce the basic notions of the E.U. principle of subsidiarity before (I) delving into the efficiency rationale of the subsidiarity principle. ext, (II) the article shall study the European case law and show that the principle of economic efficiency is clearly encapsulated in this jurisprudence, which renders the European case law on the principle of subsidiarity economically sound with respect to promotion of efficiency through subsidiarity. The article will be concluded in Part III
Navigating the skies of regulation and innovation: The case of civil drones
No full textThe deployment of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), colloquially known as civil drones, necessitates an in- depth analysis of regulatory frameworks to understand their impact on market competition and technological innovation. This study presents a comparative examination of the regulatory landscapes governing UAV operations in the European Union (EU) and the United States (US), focusing on the interplay between legal provisions and market dynamics within the drone industry. In the EU, the imminent introduction of UAV-based package delivery systems exemplifies a regulatory environment conducive to drone technology advancement. Governed by the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), the EU’s regulatory structure is characterised by its coherence and integrative nature, fostering a regulatory milieu that balances safety and privacy concerns with the promotion of technological development. The uniform regulatory guidelines across EU Member States serve as a catalyst for innovation, providing clarity and stability for UAV operators and manufacturers, thereby enhancing competitive dynamics within the market. Conversely, the US regulatory context, as illustrated by the legal confrontation between SZ DJI Technology Co. Ltd. and Autel Robotics USA LLC, highlights a multifaceted and litigious approach. Central to this is the role of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in navigating the intricate interplay between antitrust litigation and competitive practices in the UAV sector. The US framework’s reactive nature, often mired in judicial proceedings, introduces a degree of uncertainty and complexity for industry stakeholders, potentially impeding technological innovation and market diversification. The juxtaposition of the EU and US regulatory frameworks unveils contrasting methodologies in governing civil drone operations. The EU’s unified and innovation-centric approach markedly diverges from the litigious and segmented regulatory landscape in the US. These disparities exert considerable influence on the UAV industry, shaping the contours of market competition, technological advancement, and regulatory industry equilibrium. The disparate regulatory paradigms in the EU and US present distinct challenges and opportunities in the realm of UAV operations. The EU’s streamlined and proactive regulatory approach encourages innovation and market growth; while the US’s intricate and adversarial regulatory environment poses substantial hurdles for industry stakeholders. This comparative analysis is vital for policymakers, legal experts, and industry participants in navigating the complex and evolving domain of UAV technology and its regulatory governance
Part 1 Money Market Funds in the EU, 3 European Regulatory Framework of Money Market Funds
No full textBeyond antitrust populism: Towards robust antitrust
No full textThe populist use of competition policies is on the rise again, associated with the growth of big-tech companies in the era of digital platforms. This article sees antitrust populism as a re-emerging force in the United States and Europe via greater politicisation of competition law enforcement. It addresses the basic tenets of antitrust populism in order to expose the fundamental problems that populist use of competition law entails. I argue for a rethink of antitrust policy on the intellectual foundations laid down by what Mark Pennington describes as ‘robust political economy’. We need greater regulatory humility and antitrust enforcement which takes both innovation and welfare seriously
The Case for a Principled Approach to Law and Economics: Efficiency Analysis and General Principles of EU Law
No full textArche which in Ancient Greek means beginning or principle shows the common lineage between the study of principles and the beginning of a study: the enquiry into the nature of things starts, and should start, from the deciphering of the principles, be they of things or of law. This is also true for the general principles of law regarding the study of any legal order, and particularly of the EU legal order. Specifically, I shall demonstrate in this essay that the social influence those principles may have is to coherently formalise the EU judicial reasoning by the promotion of a notion of economic desirability when these principles are invoked. In other words, I shall argue that the principle of economic efficiency underpins each of the general principles of EU law analysed in this essay. For, the general principles of EU law as construed and interpreted by the EU judges are imbued with consequentialism rather moralism, with an analogical and practical reasoning rather than abstract reasoning, with an inductive rather than an deductive approach – in short, these principles are founded with pragmatism rather than with legalism.
Indeed, the analysis of the general principles of EU law understood in their legal abstraction is neither relevant nor conclusive for a better understanding of the EU judicial reasoning. These principles are a mere conceptualisation of the EU judicial review in order to trim down the legal outcomes preferred in terms of the social consequences they (are supposed to) generate. This conceptualisation allows for an a posteriori legal justification to a legal outcome decided a priori. In sharp contrast to Wechsler’s argument that general principles of law encapsulate “what surely are the main qualities of law, its generality and its neutrality”, one can agree with Holmes who said, regarding the Common law judge, that judges “decide the case first and determines the principles afterwards”.
Accordingly, after having delved into the plea that vouches for a more principled economic analysis of EU law (but also more generally of any legal orders) thatwould take place beyond the Dworkin-Posner dichotomy (1) and (2), I shall empirically scrutinize, through a casuistic analysis of the ECJ jurisprudence, the validity of the proposed approach of efficiency analysis of three general principles of EU law (3). I close the essay with some concluding remarks (4)
Principle of proportionality as principle of economic efficiency
No full textThe principle of proportionality is at the cornerstone of EU law, and precisely of the case-law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ).
In the law and economics literature, the general principles of law are commonly opposed to legal rules in terms of efficiency. On the one hand, the legal formalistic approach consists of apprehending the law as principled, whereby principles of law do not and should not encompass an efficiency rationale and should be self-sufficient. On the other hand, the legal nihilism denying the existence or relevance of the general principles of law favours legal rules that are said to incorporate an efficiency rationale. I intend to analyse the efficiency rationale of probably the most important general principles of EU law—the proportionality principle.
In this paper, I shall assert that not only does the EU proportionality principle encapsulate an efficiency rationale, but most importantly, it has been interpreted by the ECJ as such—hence, I propose the representation of the principle of proportionality as a principle of economic efficiency.
After having introduced the principle of proportionality (1), I shall decipher the proportionality principle both from a law and economics perspective, and from a comparative perspective (2). Then, I shall delve into the jurisprudence of the ECJ so that the judicial reasoning of the Court as this reasoning proves the relevance of the proposed representation (3). Finally, I conclude in light of the findings of this paper (4)
European Regulatory Framework for Money Market Funds
No full textMoney market funds are widely used by all types of investors, including households, corporate treasurers, pension funds, or insurance companies, who regard money market funds as a ‘safe’ short-term liquid asset class for investing cash. In this case they are proxies to cash deposits. Money market funds are themselves key lenders to issuers of short dated high quality money market instruments. They provide an important source of funding for a variety of institutions such as sovereigns, banks, and companies. Active trading by money market funds is vital to the liquidity of various high-quality markets for commercial paper, short-term bank debt, and sovereign debt. Increased liquidity is, in turn, beneficial to market efficiency and leads to a reduction in the cost of capital for businesses
The Case for an Innovation Principle: A Comparative Law and Economics Analysis
No full textAfter the rise of the precautionary principle (or approach) in the late 1990s in a number
of jurisdictions, the economic consequences of this newly created principle of law have unfolded.
Such consequences were either acclaimed – for providing a minimisation of a number of
externalities – or lambasted – for providing justificatory grounds for the prohibition of potentially
propitious innovations due to the existence of scientific uncertainties.
Whereas innovation has increasingly become of salient importance in today’s economies,
European economies face sluggish economic growth rates partly caused by a regulatory framework
where risk-aversion is incentivized. The precautionary principle induces and favours risk-aversion
at the expense of innovation.
This Article discusses the law and economic foundations and implications of the
precautionary principle in the WTO, the European Union, France and the United Kingdom. Having
introduced the importance of law in stifling innovation and discussed the current precautionary
principle, this Article vouches for an innovation principle to come to the fore in order to
counterbalance the innovation-costly precautionary principle. A number of recommendations are
proposed at the end of the article
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