219,257 research outputs found
George W. Tibbles and George T. Poor letter to Warren G. Harding, February 21, 1920
This official letter from George W. Tibbles and George T. Poor, members of the Advisory Committee of the Hamilton County Republican Central Committee, to Senator Warren G. Harding provides notice that their committee will endorse Harding as the party's presidential candidate at the Republican National Convention in Chicago in June. The letter also includes the names of the districts' delegates and alternatives.
This letter is part of the Warren G. Harding Papers (MSS 345). This collection includes correspondence, business records, and other materials documenting Harding’s business career as owner and editor-in-chief of The Daily Marion Star, as well as the various stages of his political career. A significant portion of the collection, and what’s available on Ohio Memory, highlights his 1920 presidential campaign, spanning just before publicly announcing his candidacy to handily defeating Ohio Governor James M. Cox in the election. Correspondents include both Ohio and national businessmen, political figures, and ordinary citizens writing with questions, support, congratulatory notes, and campaign advice. Some of the most interesting insights into the tumultuous political climate in the U.S., the extreme factionalism within the Republican Party in Ohio, and Harding’s campaign strategies are described in letters between Harding and his campaign manager, Harry M. Daugherty. Some of the topics addressed include women’s suffrage, Prohibition, the League of Nations, African American representation and issues, and lingering peace negotiations following World War I
Game-theoretic power control in impulse radio UWB wireless networks
In this paper, a game-theoretic model for studying power control for wireless data networks in frequency-selective multipath environments is analyzed. The uplink of an impulse-radio ultrawide band systems is considered. The effects of self-interference and multiple-access interference on the performance of Rake receivers are investigated for synchronous systems. Focusing on energy efficiency, a noncooperative game is proposed in which users in the network are allowed to choose their transmit powers to maximize their own utilities, and the Nash equilibrium for the proposed game is derived. It is shown that, due to the frequency selective multipath, the noncooperative solution is achieved at different signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratios, respectively of the channel realization. A large-system analysis is performed to derive explicit expressions for the achieved utilities. The Pareto-optimal (cooperative) solution is also discussed and compared with the noncooperative approach
Privacy-cost trade-offs in smart electricity metering systems
Trade-offs between privacy and cost are studied for a smart grid consumer, whose electricity consumption is monitoredin almost real time by the utility provider (UP) through smart meter (SM) readings. It is assumed that an electrical battery isavailable to the consumer, which can be utilized both to achieve privacy and to reduce the energy cost by demand shaping.Privacy is measured via the mean squared distance between the SM readings and a target load profile, while time-of-use (ToU)pricing is considered to compute the cost incurred. The consumer can also sell electricity back to the UP to further improve theprivacy-cost trade-off. Two privacy-preserving energy management policies (EMPs) are proposed, which differ in the way the targetload profile is characterized. A more practical EMP, which optimizes the energy management less frequently, is also considered.Numerical results are presented to compare the privacy-cost trade-off of these EMPs, considering various privacy indicators
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Smart Meter Privacy with an Energy Harvesting Device and Instantaneous Power Constraints
A smart meter (SM) periodically measures end-user electricity consumption and reports it to a utility provider (UP). Despite the advantages of SMs, their use leads to serious concerns about consumer privacy. In this paper, SM privacy is studied by considering the presence of an energy harvesting device (EHD) as a means of masking the user's input load. The user can satisfy part or all of his/her energy needs from the EHD, and hence, less information can be leaked to the UP via the SM. The EHD is typically equipped with a rechargeable energy storage device, i.e., a battery, whose instantaneous energy content limits the user's capability in covering his/her energy usage. Privacy is measured by the information leaked about the user's real energy consumption when the UP observes the energy requested from the grid, which the SM reads and reports to the UP. The minimum information leakage rate is characterized as a computable information theoretic single-letter expression when the EHD battery capacity is either infinite or zero. Numerical results are presented for a discrete binary input load to illustrate the potential privacy gains from the existence of a storage device
Energy-Efficient Contention-Based Synchronization in OFDMA Systems with Discrete Powers and Limited Feedback
In this work, a distributed and iterative algorithm for uplink power control in the initial contention-based synchronization procedure of orthogonal frequency-division multiple access networks is derived. This is achieved by letting the mobile terminals maximize their own energy efficiency in terms of power consumption and average synchronization time exploiting a quantized feedback from the base station. The problem is formulated as a constrained finite noncooperative game in which the transmit powers are chosen from a discrete set. The theoretical solution is investigated and compared to the case of continuous powers. In addition, comparisons with existing alternatives (with or without perfect feedback) are made in terms of power expenditure, average synchronization time, and estimation accuracy
What is "Pro-Poor"?
Assessing whether distributional changes are "pro-poor" has become increasingly widespread in academic and policy circles. Starting from relatively general ethical axioms, this paper proposes simple graphical methods to test whether distributional changes are indeed pro-poor. Pro-poor standards are first defined. An important issue is whether these standards should be absolute or relative. Another issue is whether pro-poor judgements should put relatively more emphasis on the impact of growth upon the poorer of the poor. Having formalized the treatment of these issues, the paper describes various ways for checking whether broad classes of ethical judgements will declare a distributional change to be pro-poor.Poverty, Inequality, Pro-poor growth
Concepts and Operationalization of Pro-Poor Growth
Growth that reduces poverty is often considered pro-poor regardless of whether the poor benefit from it more than the non-poor. Such growth could simply be termed poverty-reducing growth. This paper argues that for growth to be pro-poor it should dispropopro-poor, growth, income, inequality, poverty decomposition, Honduras
Energy-efficient power control in impulse radio UWB wireless networks
Abstract
In this paper, a game-theoretic model for studying power control for wireless data networks in frequency-selective multipath environments is analyzed. The uplink of an impulse-radio ultrawideband system is considered. The effects of self-interference and multiple-access interference on the performance of generic Rake receivers are investigated for synchronous systems. Focusing on energy efficiency, a noncooperative game is proposed in which users in the network are allowed to choose their transmit powers to maximize their own utilities, and the Nash equilibrium for the proposed game is derived. It is shown that, due to the frequency selective multipath, the noncooperative solution is achieved at different signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratios, depending on the channel realization and the type of Rake receiver employed. A large-system analysis is performed to derive explicit expressions for the achieved utilities. The Pareto-optimal (cooperative) solution is also discussed and compared with the noncooperative approach
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