1,721,174 research outputs found
“Table Ronde: Regards Communautaires sur les enjeux de la politique économique er financière européenne”
No full text
Green Public Procurement (GPP) e formazione ad hoc come strumento strategico per il rilancio di un’economia sostenibile
No full textIl Green Public Procurement (GPP), ovvero gli Acquisti Verdi nella Pubblica
Amministrazione, è uno strumento di politica ambientale che intende favorire lo
sviluppo di un mercato di prodotti e servizi a ridotto impatto ambientale attraverso
la leva della domanda pubblica, contribuendo in tal modo al raggiungimento degli
obiettivi delle principali strategie europee, come quella sull’uso efficiente delle
risorse o quella sull’Economia Circolare. Il GPP si qualifica come il principale
strumento della strategia europea su “Consumo e Produzione Sostenibile” (COM
2008/397 “Piano d’azione per il Consumo, la Produzione Sostenibili e la Politica
Industriale Sostenibile”). L’Unione Europea, nel documento sul Green Deal, prevede
di estendere l’obbligatorietà del GPP a tutti i Paesi membri, così come ha già fatto,
unica in Europa, l’Italia (Articolo 34 del Codice dei Contratti Pubblici)
Exit Strategy from the Stimulus: Will the ECB be Responsible for a Protracted, W-Shaped Recession in the Euro Area?
No full textON THE SOURCES OF THE INFLATION BIAS AND OUTPUT VARIABILITY
No full textWhy do dynamic inconsistencies in monetary policy exist? In this paper, a traditional model with output inefficiencies is introduced, but monetary policy is allowed to be influenced by the various constituencies in the economy that pressure Congress in turn to pressure the Central Bank to adopt a particular policy stance. This paper shows that in this economy an inflation bias arises because of the lobbying pressures of outsiders. Furthermore, it shows that if lobbying pressures are high enough, an inflation bias cannot be avoided for any finite level of Central Bank independence. It also shows that introducing the realistic feature of lobbying pressures has an impact on the stabilization properties of monetary policy. When a supply shock occurs, the shock is totally absorbed by a non-myopic trade union, which has no lobbying costs. This is independent of any finite degree of conservativeness of the central banker, who has to accept an extreme increase in price instability. It is shown that monetary policy delegation is therefore sub-optimal in achieving price stability compared with labor-market reforms meant to remove monopsonistic elements. However, the same structural policies will induce greater output instability by strengthening the power of conservative central bankers. Copyright (c) Scottish Economic Society 2005.
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