1,721,348 research outputs found
Supplement for "Decomposing Modal Thought"
No full textThis repository contains the data, code, experimental materials, and technical write-up for the supplement to Phillips, J. & Kratzer, A. (under review). Decomposing Modal Thought
Replication Data for: Good Governance in Poor Places: Explaining Inclusive Politics in Emerging Subnational Democracies
No full textThe terms on which citizens of emerging democracies access public resources are often skewed by their economic vulnerability, making them dependent on clientelist relationships and suppressing their political autonomy. To what extent is this clientelist trap of selective exclusion an inevitable feature of democracy in poor places? This dissertation takes inspiration from three `least-likely' subnational cases of inclusive good governance amid extreme poverty. To explain why elites unexpectedly pursue impersonal, inclusive policies and how voters defy the clientelist trap to re-elect them, the analysis combines formal theory, multiple household surveys and subnational comparisons spanning Brazil, India and Nigeria. The evidence suggests that inclusive governance is an attractive strategy for `outsider' leaders with relatively weak clientelist networks who are threatened by competing clientelist elites. Using the state apparatus for inclusive rule enforcement prevents clientelist discretion, starving competitors of rents and support from clientelism, and helping to secure the outsider's political authority. These incentives are likely to arise even in poor clientelist places where outsiders are elevated to power by national actors seeking to bring to office local allies.
Whether voters can escape the clientelist trap to re-elect the outsider reformer depends on their ability to coordinate; on their collective confidence in the reformer's performance. Delivering large public benefits can provide a crucial coordinating device in anchoring expectations that other voters will reject clientelism. However, voters' ability to generate collective confidence may be impaired if resurgent clientelist competitors intensify their threats or use disinformation tactics such as rumours of corruption to undermine the reputation of the inclusive incumbent. Mitigating these threats relies on supportive national financing and the ability to monopolize the media or coopt clientelist elites. The consolidation of inclusive governance is also aided by national inclusive policies that constrain the supply of local clientelist goods and create a demand for inclusive governance by insulating voters' incomes from political interference. However, national policy may only be effective where it complements local reform.
These arguments demonstrate that inclusive governance does not depend on economic development or externally-mobilized parties. Even the poorest societies can extend full citizenship rights and equitable policy access to their members. The unpredictability and competition of subnational politics provides alternative motives for elites to introduce governance reform, and new opportunities for voters to rally against clientelism
Locating what comes to mind in empirically derived representational spaces
No full textThis repository contains the experiment files, data, preprocessing scripts, and analyses used to produce the paper, "Locating what comes to mind in empirically derived representational spaces" by Tracey Mills and Jonathan Phillips
Replication Data for: Good Governance in Poor Places: Explaining Inclusive Politics in Emerging Subnational Democracies
No full textThe terms on which citizens of emerging democracies access public resources are often skewed by their economic vulnerability, making them dependent on clientelist relationships and suppressing their political autonomy. To what extent is this clientelist trap of selective exclusion an inevitable feature of democracy in poor places? This dissertation takes inspiration from three `least-likely' subnational cases of inclusive good governance amid extreme poverty. To explain why elites unexpectedly pursue impersonal, inclusive policies and how voters defy the clientelist trap to re-elect them, the analysis combines formal theory, multiple household surveys and subnational comparisons spanning Brazil, India and Nigeria. The evidence suggests that inclusive governance is an attractive strategy for `outsider' leaders with relatively weak clientelist networks who are threatened by competing clientelist elites. Using the state apparatus for inclusive rule enforcement prevents clientelist discretion, starving competitors of rents and support from clientelism, and helping to secure the outsider's political authority. These incentives are likely to arise even in poor clientelist places where outsiders are elevated to power by national actors seeking to bring to office local allies.
Whether voters can escape the clientelist trap to re-elect the outsider reformer depends on their ability to coordinate; on their collective confidence in the reformer's performance. Delivering large public benefits can provide a crucial coordinating device in anchoring expectations that other voters will reject clientelism. However, voters' ability to generate collective confidence may be impaired if resurgent clientelist competitors intensify their threats or use disinformation tactics such as rumours of corruption to undermine the reputation of the inclusive incumbent. Mitigating these threats relies on supportive national financing and the ability to monopolize the media or coopt clientelist elites. The consolidation of inclusive governance is also aided by national inclusive policies that constrain the supply of local clientelist goods and create a demand for inclusive governance by insulating voters' incomes from political interference. However, national policy may only be effective where it complements local reform.
These arguments demonstrate that inclusive governance does not depend on economic development or externally-mobilized parties. Even the poorest societies can extend full citizenship rights and equitable policy access to their members. The unpredictability and competition of subnational politics provides alternative motives for elites to introduce governance reform, and new opportunities for voters to rally against clientelism
Repository for Domain-general modal cognition
No full textThis repository contains the data, code, experimental materials, and a technical write-up for Hecht, E. & Phillips, J. (under review). Domain-general modal cognition
Are There Really Any Dual-Character Concepts?
No full textThis is the repository with all of the materials, data, analysis code, and a technical summary of the experimental and analysis details for the paper "Are There Really Any Dual-Character Concepts?" by Jonathan Phillips and David Plunkett
Sticky situations: Force and quantifier domains
No full textWhen do we judge that someone was forced to do what they did? One relatively well-established finding is that subjects tend to judge that agents were not forced to do actions when those actions violate norms. A surprising discovery of Young & Phillips 2011 is that this effect seems to disappear when we frame the relevant ‘force’-claim in the active rather than passive voice (X forced Y to φ vs. Y was forced to φ by X). Young and Phillips found a similar contrast when the scenario itself shifts attention from Y (the forcee) to X (the forcer). We propose that these effects can be (at least partly) explained by way of the role of attention in the setting of quantifier domains which in turn play a role in the evaluation of ‘force’- claims. We argue for this hypothesis by way of an experiment which shows that sequences of active vs. passive ‘force’-claims display the characteristic “stickiness” of quantifier domain expansion, using a paradigm which we argue provides a useful general paradigm for testing quantifier domain hypotheses. Finally, we sketch a semantics for ‘force’ which we argue is suitable for capturing these effects
Do children believe immoral events are possible?
No full textPrevious research found that young children judge improbable events (e.g., counting all the hairs on a dog’s tail) to be impossible and to require magic. One possibility is that this effect occurs because young children are unable to simulate how they could occur. We argue here for an alternative, which is that these children have an undifferentiated representation of possibility, one that doesn’t distinguish between events that are statistically improbable, physically impossible, or morally prohibited. In two studies, we ask children about the possibility of immoral but otherwise ordinary events (e.g., taking a toy from another child). If children are relying on a capacity for simulation, they should judge them to be possible, but if children have an undifferentiated representation of possibility, they should not. We find that young children judge immoral events to be impossible, much like violations of physics (Study 1) and judge that immoral events would require magic to occur (Study 2). Both studies also find that children’s representation of possibility becomes more differentiated over the course of development
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