245 research outputs found
Super Efficiency Evaluations Based on Potential Slack
No full textSuper efficiency evaluations are introduced along the lines of the potential improvements approach in Bogetoft and Hougaard (1999). Both a reference selection and a related super efficiency index is defined. The new (potential slack) super efficiency index is compared to a Farrell-based super efficiency index (as in Andersen and Petersen 1993) with respect to convex envelopment technologies
DEA-Based Incentive Regimes in Health-Care Provision
No full textA major challenge to legislators, insurance providers and municipalities will be how to manage the reimbursement of health-care on partially open markets under increasing fiscal pressure and an aging population. Although efficiency theoretically can be obtained by private solutions using fixed-payment schemes, the informational rents and production distortions may limit their implementation. The healthcare agency problem is characterized by (i) a complex multi-input multi-output technology, (ii) information uncertainty and asymmetry, and (iii) fuzzy social preferences. First, the technology, inherently nonlinear and with externalities between factors, yield parametric estimation difficult. However, the flexible production structure in Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) offers a solution that allows for the gradual and successive refinement of potentially nonconvex technologies. Second, the information structure of healthcare suggests a context of considerable asymmetric information and considerable uncertainty about the underlying technology, but limited uncertainty or noise in the registration of the outcome. Again, we shall argue that the DEA dynamic yardsticks (Bogetoft, 1994, 1997, Agrell and Bogetoft, 2001) are suitable for such contexts. A third important characteristic of the health sector is the somewhat fuzzy social priorities and the numerous potential conflicts between the stakeholders in the health system. Social preferences are likely dynamic and contingent on the disclosed information. Similarly, there are several potential hidden action (moral hazard) and hidden information (adverse selection) conflicts between the different agents in the health system. The flexible and transparent response to preferential ambiguity is one of the strongest justifications for a DEA-approach. DEA yardstick regimes have been successfully implemented in other sectors (electricity distribution) and we present an
operalization of the power-parameter p in an pseudo-competitive setting that both limits the informational rents and incites the truthful revelation of information. Recent work (Agrell and Bogetoft, 2002) on strategic implementation of DEA yardsticks is commented in the healthcare context, where social priorities change the tradeoff between the motivation and coordination functions of the yardstick. The paper is closed with policy recommendations and some areas of further work
Super Efficiency Evaluations Based on Potential Slack
No full textSuper efficiency evaluations are introduced along the lines of the potential improvements approach in Bogetoft and Hougaard (1999). Both a reference selection and a related super efficiency index is defined. The new (potential slack) super efficiency index is compared to a Farrell-based super efficiency index (as in Andersen and Petersen 1993) with respect to convex envelopment technologies.super efficiency, potential slack, reference selection, efficiency index, DEA, Research Methods/ Statistical Methods,
Estimating the Potential Gains from Mergers: The Danish Agricultural Extension Services
No full textWe introduce simple non-parametric models to estimate the potential gains from merging production units. Three effects are distinguished. A merger may affect technical efficiency. It also affects the size of the operation which may or may not be advantageous depending on the return to scale properties of the underlying technologies. Lastly, it affects the mix of inputs available and the mix of outputs demanded. A merged unit face more "balanced" or "harmonic" input and output profiles which is typically advantageous. We use the model to estimate the potential gains from merging agricultural extension offices in Denmark.Teaching/Communication/Extension/Profession,
Allocative Efficiency of Technically Inefficient Production Units
No full textWe discuss how to measure allocative efficiency without presuming technical efficiency. This is relevant when it is easier to introduce reallocations than improvements of technical efficiency. We compare the approach to the traditional one of assuming technical efficiency before measuring allocative efficiency. In particular, we develop necessary and sufficient conditions on the technology to ensure consistent measures and we give dual organizational interpretations of the approaches.technical efficiency, allocative efficiency, homethetic technologies, slack consumption, Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies,
Estimating the Potential Gains from Mergers
No full textWe introduce simple production economic models to estimate the potential gains from mergers. We decompose the gains into technical efficiency, size (scale) and harmony (mix) gains, and we discuss alternative ways to capture these gains. We propose to approximate the production processes using the non-parametric Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) approach, and we use the resulting operational approach to estimate the potential gains from merging agricultural extension offices in Denmark. Contents: 1. Introduction, 2. Literature, 3. Production Models, 4. Measures of Merger Gains, 5. Decomposing Merger Gains, 6. Alternative Decompositions, 7. The Danish Agricultural Extension Services, 8. Final Remarks, References. Key Words: Data Envelopment Analysis, management, organization, mergersData Envelopment Analysis, management, organization, mergers, Teaching/Communication/Extension/Profession,
Multi-Period Dea Incentive Regulation in Electricity Distribution.
No full textMulti-period multi-product regulatory schemes for electricity distributors are presented, based on cost information from a productivity analysis model and an agency theoretical decision model. The proposed schemes are operational and demonstrate considerable advantages compared to the popular CPI-X revenue cap regulation. The schemes avoid arbitrariness, too high or negative informational rents as well as ratchet effects and they promote rapid productivity catch-up by making full use of available data. More generally, the paper contributes to the theoretical unification between firm-based Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) productivity models and micro-economic reimbursement theories.Regulation; Efficiency analysis; Incentive systems
DEA-Based Incentive Regimes in Health-Care Provision
No full textA major challenge to legislators, insurance providers and municipalities will be how to manage the reimbursement of health-care on partially open markets under increasing fiscal pressure and an aging population. Although efficiency theoretically can be obtained by private solutions using fixed-payment schemes, the informational rents and production distortions may limit their implementation. The healthcare agency problem is characterized by (i) a complex multi-input multi-output technology, (ii) information uncertainty and asymmetry, and (iii) fuzzy social preferences. First, the technology, inherently nonlinear and with externalities between factors, yield parametric estimation difficult. However, the flexible production structure in Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) offers a solution that allows for the gradual and successive refinement of potentially nonconvex technologies. Second, the information structure of healthcare suggests a context of considerable asymmetric information and considerable uncertainty about the underlying technology, but limited uncertainty or noise in the registration of the outcome. Again, we shall argue that the DEA dynamic yardsticks (Bogetoft, 1994, 1997, Agrell and Bogetoft, 2001) are suitable for such contexts. A third important characteristic of the health sector is the somewhat fuzzy social priorities and the numerous potential conflicts between the stakeholders in the health system. Social preferences are likely dynamic and contingent on the disclosed information. Similarly, there are several potential hidden action (moral hazard) and hidden information (adverse selection) conflicts between the different agents in the health system. The flexible and transparent response to preferential ambiguity is one of the strongest justifications for a DEA-approach. DEA yardstick regimes have been successfully implemented in other sectors (electricity distribution) and we present an operalization of the power-parameter p in an pseudo-competitive setting that both limits the informational rents and incites the truthful revelation of information. Recent work (Agrell and Bogetoft, 2002) on strategic implementation of DEA yardsticks is commented in the healthcare context, where social priorities change the tradeoff between the motivation and coordination functions of the yardstick. The paper is closed with policy recommendations and some areas of further work.Data Envelopment Analysis, regulation, health care systems, efficiency, Health Economics and Policy,
Rational Inefficiencies
No full textIn this paper, we suggest that inefficiency may be an indirect, on-the-job compensation to agents in an organization. We show how to use actual production data to reveal the trade-offs between different inefficiencies (slacks). Moreover, we discuss how to use this to improve productivity analysis as well as decision making and incentive provisions in organizations.efficiency, preferences, incentives, bargaining, planning, Productivity Analysis,
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