1,720,981 research outputs found
Un delicato equilibrio: motivazioni intrinseche e politicheretributive nelle imprese sociali.
Il saggio discute il doppio problema di adverse selection a cui si trovano di fronte le imprese sociali quando determinano la retribuzione dei lavoratori: se la abbassano troppo la composizione dei lavoratori per abilità può diventare critica, mentre se la alzano troppo rischiano di avere una quota di lavoratori privi di motivazioni intrinseche per il tipo di servizio svolto
Un semplice modello del mercato del lavoro con imprese sociali e agenti intrinsecamente motivati
Il capitolo affronta il nodo delle politiche retributive e dei possibili
effetti, sia positivi che negativi, che esse possono esercitare sull'autoselezione dei lavoratori. L’idea di fondo è che le imprese sociali, in virtù della loro mission pubblica, riescano ad attirare
lavoratori che sono interessati non solo ai benefici strumentali che da essi traggono dal lavoro (il salario, la formazione o l’esperienza, per esempio), ma che derivano soddisfazione intrinseca dal tipo di lavoro e che sono, per così dire, interessati all’impatto sociale dell’attività dell’organizzazione in cui operano. Questi lavoratori rappresentano per l’organizzazione una risorsa particolarmente preziosa, per questo ogni impresa cerca di attrarne il maggior numero possibile. Le politiche retributive standard, incentrate sul salario, non offrono garanzie circa la tipologia di lavoratore, motivato o non motivato, che si riesce a selezionare. Alcuni autori suggeriscono che per selezionare lavoratori motivati sia sufficiente offrire un salario inferiore a quello di equilibrio. Altri, invece, contestano questa posizione sostenendo che una paga troppo bassa determinerebbe l’esclusione di lavoratori motivati che hanno nel reddito da lavoro l’unica fonte di sostentamento. Gli autori discutono un modello che spiega entrambi gli effetti prendendo in considerazione in maniera originale la complessità motivazionale dei lavoratori. Gli autori, infatti, sostengono che le motivazioni intrinseche dei lavoratori non sono immediatamente disponibili all’impresa ma devono essere, da quest’ultima, attivate, per esempio, attraverso scelte e comportamenti socialmente responsabili, che
implicano maggiori costi per l’impresa. Si instaura quindi un rapporto di reciprocità tra impresa e lavoratori; se la prima si comporta coerentemente con la propria mission, i secondi saranno disposti a far fruttare la loro dotazione di motivazioni intrinseche
The corporate legality game a lab experiment on the impact of policies, frames and information
A company engaging in illicit practices can undermine competitors operating within legal boundaries, ultimately eroding the public good of legality and integrity. Recently established institutional legality ratings aim to address this issue. We investigate the impact of these ratings through a randomized experiment simulating redistributive policies. These policies tax "defectors" (buyers of unrated products) and benefit "co-operators" (buyers of legality-rated products) to promote legality and combat corruption. Our findings show that redistribution mechanisms, the legality frame, and conformity information design significantly mitigate the Prisoner's Dilemma, leading to notable deviations from the Nash Equilibrium. Concerning anti-corruption strategies, our results suggest that consumer willingness to pay for legality can be substantially boosted by redistribution policies and cultural processes inducing conformity to legality norms. This study highlights how legality ratings issued by institutions, when effectively communicated to consumers and combined with redistribution actions, can increase demand for legal products
Testing for heterogeneity of preferences in randomized experiments: a satisfaction-based approach applied to multiplayer prisoners’ dilemmas
We use experimental data from the ‘vote with the wallet’ multiplayer prisoner’s dilemma to investigate with a finite mixture approach the effect of a responsible purchase on players’ satisfaction. We find clear-cut evidence of heterogeneity of preferences with two groups of players that differ significantly in terms of effects of the responsible choice on satisfaction
Happiness and Preferences in a Legality Social Dilemma:Comparing the Direct and Indirect Approach
We investigate players’ preferences in a multiplayer prisoner’s dilemma by comparing
results from a direct (satisfaction based) and an indirect (choice based) approach. Both
approaches provide strong evidence of preference heterogeneity, with players who
cooperate above median being less affected in their choice by monetary payoffs vis-à-vis
the public good component. The combination of a legality frame plus a conformity
information design reduces further the relative preference (satisfaction) for the noncooperative
choice for such players. Our findings support the hypothesis that (part of the)
players have, in addition to the standard self-interest component, an other-regarding
preference argument that is further satisfied in the legality frame plus conformity design
The impact of redistribution mechanisms in the vote with the wallet game: experimental results
We use the Vote-with-the-Wallet game (VWG) to model socially or environmentally responsible consumption, an increasingly relevant but still under-researched phenomenon. Based on a theoretical model outlining game equilibria and the parametric interval of the related multiplayer prisoners’ dilemma (PD) we evaluate with a controlled lab experiment players’ behavior in the game and test the effects of an ex post redistribution mechanism between defectors and cooperators. Our findings document that the redistribution mechanism interrupts cooperation decay and stabilizes the share of cooperators at a level significantly higher, even though inferior to the Nash equilibrium
SOCIAL PRFERENCES AND PERCEIVED INTENTIONS. AN EXPERIMENT WITH NORMALLY DEVELOPING AND AUTISTIC SPECTRUM DISORDER SUBJECTS
Models of social preferences explain departures from pure self-interest as a
consequence of either outcome-based or intention-based other-regarding motives.
Various experimental studies lend support to the conclusion that subjects behave as
if they conditioned their behaviour on the perceived intentions of others. We
present a new experiment that explores this as if clause by making the ability to
detect intentions a treatment variable. We compare normally developing children
with autistic children – typically unable to perceive intentions – and find differences
consistent with the hypothesis that behaviour responds to intentions, especially if
unkind
Gender differences in socially responsible consumption. An experimental investigation
We report on a simple experimental study designed to investigate the different gender attitudes towards socially responsible consumption. We use the Vote-with-the-Wallet Game, (VWG), a version of a repeated multiplayer prisoner’s dilemma that mimics the characteristics of the choice between a conventional and a socially responsible product. More precisely we test the effect of three factors: two different frames and an ex-post redistribution mechanism that transfers resources from purely self-interested consumers to responsible ones. We find that women remain significantly more cooperative (choosing more often the responsible good) when the redistribution mechanism is interrupted and are significantly less satisfied about the behaviour of the other players in that treatment
Information, Belief Elicitation and Threshold Effects in the 5X1000 Tax Scheme: A Framed Field Experiment
In this paper, we study by means of a framed field experiment on a representative sample of the population the effect on people’s charitable giving of three, substantial and procedural, elements: information provision, belief elicitation and threshold on distribution. We frame this investigation within the 5X1000 tax scheme, a mechanism through which Italian taxpayers may choose to give a small proportion (0.5%) of their income tax to a voluntary organization to fund its activities. We find two main results: (i) providing information or eliciting beliefs about previous donations increases the likelihood of a donation, while thresholds have no effect; (ii) information about previous funding increases donations to organizations that received fewer donations in the past, while belief elicitation also increases donations to organizations that received most donations in the past, since individuals are more likely to donate to the organizations they rank first
Testing for heterogeneity of preferences in randomized experiments: a satisfaction-based approach applied to multiplayer prisoners’ dilemmas
We use experimental data from the ‘vote with the wallet’ multiplayer prisoner’s dilemma to investigate with a finite mixture approach the effect of a responsible purchase on players’ satisfaction. We find clear-cut evidence of heterogeneity of preferences with two groups of players that differ significantly in terms of effects of the responsible choice on satisfactio
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