10 research outputs found
Essays on director connections in the mutual fund industry
No full textThe executives of publicly traded firms often sit on mutual fund boards. This dissertation explores the influence these executives exert on the investment, proxy voting and contracting decisions of the fund. It shows that funds concentrate their holdings in and trade informatively in the stock of the executive’s firm, and that fund proxy votes support the management of the executive’s firm. Furthermore, the dissertation presents evidence that these effects are interrelated, consistent with an exchange of favors occurring between the fund, firm and director. It finds that when funds trade informatively in the executive’s firm, the fund is more likely to retain the executive on its board, and more likely to cast proxy votes that support the firm’s management. These results are robust to controlling for fund and firm specific factors and suggest that the influence of fund directors extends beyond their formal monitoring responsibilities.Ph. D.Includes bibliographical referencesIncludes vitaby Paul Calluzz
Clustered shareholder activism
No full textResearch Question/Issue: This study examines activism campaigns where multiple activists simultaneously target the same firm—which we term clustered shareholder activism. Despite the growing influence of shareholder activism on corporate governance, the clustered activism phenomenon has previously only been addressed indirectly, anecdotally, or with limited data. We consider cost sharing motives for clustered activism and whether the phenomenon exerts a positive or negative impact on the performance of the target firm. Research Findings/Insights: Using a large dataset of shareholder activism events at U.S. firms, we find that clustered activism campaigns are more common at larger firms and among geographically proximate activists, which is consistent with our prediction that activists cluster to reduce the costs associated with activism campaigns. Furthermore, we find that clustered activism produces elevated profitability and abnormal returns, which is consistent with our prediction that activists cluster to address principal–agency costs. Theoretical/Academic Implications: Our study provides some of the first theoretical and empirical evidence on the clustered activism phenomenon. We contribute to the understanding of the role of shareholder activism by considering their effect on principal–agency and principal–principal problems. Our results also contribute to the literature that examines factors relating to the success of shareholder activism by documenting the effect of clustered activism on activism costs and target firm performance. Practitioner/Policy Implications: Our study adds to the debate among practitioners and regulators on the merits (or lack thereof) of clustered activism. Our findings suggest that a regulatory approach that encourages clustered activism can benefit shareholders. Video Abstract: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/page/journal/14678683/homepage/videoabstracts.html. youtube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=1&v=0_D-6Pw9sYo
A new breed of activism
No full textThis paper examines shareholder activism campaigns where multiple large activists concurrently target the same firm. We document that activists prefer to target firms that other activists are already targeting, and that the frequency of these campaigns has been stable over our sample period. This phenomenon is most prevalent within six months of the arrival of the initial activist, when the activists pursue similar strategies, and when the initial activist generates very low or high returns. These results help increase understanding of this new breed of activism.</p
Institute for Sustainable Finance White Paper: Sentiment and Sustainability:How the language of U.S. corporate filings reveals divergent paths for management priorities on DEI and Environment
No full textCorporations are quick to adjust their disclosures when political or regulatory shifts signal changing expectations from investors, regulators, and other stakeholders. This white paper summarizes the preliminary findings from analysing the language of mandatory annual corporate filings (Securitiesand Exchange Commission 10-Ks) in the United States before and after the recent re-election of U.S. President Donald Trump.Specifically, we examined the changes in sentiment toward two key themes: environment (climate change and environmental sustainability), and DEI (diversity, equity and inclusion). Both are themes that have been central to corporate strategy and stakeholder engagement in recent years. Shifts in priorities of the new administration — including efforts to scale back ESG frameworks, limit DEI programming, and reduce environmental incentives — have created a regulatory atmosphere in which firms are recalibrating how they present theseissues in mandatory disclosures.Our results reveal a stark decline in DEI-related disclosure language following the 2024 election, with average DEI keyword mentions across S&P 1500 firms’ filings falling by nearly 25 percent between 2024 and 2025.The decline is observed across industries, firm sizes, and both Republican (red) and Democratic (blue) states, though it is most pronounced among larger firms.In contrast, climate- and environment-related terminology remained largely stable over the same period, registering only a small and statistically insignificant decrease.These findings suggest that usage of DEI-themed language in 10-K filings is more sensitive and responsive to a changing regulatory environment. This contrasts our results related to usage of environment-themed language, which appears resilient to near-term political shifts, possibly indicating acceptance of this languageas a baseline across global capital markets. The divergent trajectories highlight how corporate disclosure priorities are impacted not only by federal policy, but also by other considerations possibly to do with risk assessment, public sentiment or investor expectations
Ballot order effects in independent director elections
No full textUsing a sample of individual mutual voting records, we examine ballot order effects in independent director elections. Our results show that down-ballot directors receive considerably less opposition from shareholders. This result holds in a sample where directors are positioned alphabetically on the proxy ballot, and, thus unrelated to the directors’ ability or position on the board. We find that the ballot order effect strengthens in settings where the ballot is more complex and shareholders are less attentive. These results suggest that investors, confronted with repeated decision making across multiple proxy votes, are subject to the choice fatigue bias that affects their voting patterns when electing directors. Furthermore, we find that the ballot order effect impacts director career concerns; although down-ballot directors are less likely to receive shareholder opposition, when they are opposed, they are more likely to leave the board. These findings, which document a systematic bias in the proxy voting process, are relevant to regulators and practitioners given the impact proxy voting has on firm governance
Determinants of LGBTQ Corporate Policies
No full textSub-sample data from year 2018 to 2019.
Stata code for generating summary stats, correlation, tables, figures and appendx
Determinants of LGBTQ+ Corporate Policies
No full textWe study the determinants of firms' LGBTQ+ policies and their relation to general CSR policies. Common factors explain LGBTQ+ policies related to firms' primary stakeholders and those aimed at public LGBTQ+ efforts: younger firms, those with more financial resources, more educated workforces, catering to retail customers, and located in liberal areas have more LGBTQ+-friendly policies. LGBTQ+ initiatives encounter less societal agreement than CSR initiatives. Illustrating the distinctiveness of LGBTQ+ issues in the CSR space, we find that firms' LGBTQ+ friendliness only weakly correlates with overall CSR performance. Lastly, we show that firms' LGBTQ+ policies respond to pressure from shareholder proposals. (JEL G32, G34, G38) Received February 12, 2021; editorial decision February 1, 2022 by Editor Camelia Kuhnen
