142 research outputs found
Replies to Bacon, Eklund, and Greenough on Replacing Truth
No full textAndrew Bacon, Matti Eklund, and Patrick Greenough have individually proposed objections to the project in my book, Replacing Truth. Briefly, the book outlines a conceptual engineering project – our defective concept of truth is replaced for certain purposes with a team of concepts that can do some of the jobs we thought truth could do. Here, I respond to their objections and develop the views expressed in Replacing Truth in various ways.Non peer reviewe
Living on the slippery slope : the nature, sources and logic of vagueness
No full textAccording to the dominant approach in the theory of vagueness, the nature of the vagueness of an expression ‘F’ consists in its presenting borderline cases in an appropriately ordered series: objects which are neither definitely F nor definitely not F (where the notion of definiteness can be semantic, ontic, epistemic, psychological or primitive). In view of the various problems faced by theories of vagueness adopting the dominant approach, the thesis proposes to reconsider the naive theory of vagueness, according to which the nature of the vagueness of an expression consists in its not drawing boundaries between any neighbouring objects in an appropriately ordered series. It is argued that expressions and concepts which do present this feature play an essential role in our cognitive and practical life, allowing us to conceptualize—in a way which would otherwise be impossible—the typically coarse-grained distinctions we encounter in reality. Despite its strong initial plausibility and ability to explain many phenomena of vagueness, the naive theory is widely rejected because thought to be shown inconsistent by the sorites paradox. In reply, it is first argued that accounts of vagueness based on the dominant approach are themselves subject to higher-order sorites paradoxes. The paradox is then
solved on behalf of the naive theory by rejecting the unrestricted transitivity of the consequence relation on a vague language; a family of logics apt for reasoning with vague expressions is proposed and studied (using models
with partially ordered values). The characteristic philosophical and logical consequences of this novel solution are developed and defended in detail. In particular, it is shown how the analysis of what happens in the attempt of surveying a sorites series and deciding each case allows the naive theory to recover a "thin" notion of a borderline case.Funding provided by an AHRC Fellowship and a Jacobsen Fellowship from The Royal Institute of Philosoph
Knowledge, chance, and contrast
No full textThe late 1980s and early 1990s saw the rise of contextualist theories of knowledge
ascriptions (and denials). Contextualists about ‘knows’ maintain that utterances of the
form ‘S knows p’ and ‘S doesn’t know p’ resemble utterances such as ‘Peter is here’
and ‘Peter is not here’, in the sense that their truth-conditions vary depending upon
features of the context in which they are uttered. In recent years, contextualism about
‘knows’ has come under heavy attack. This has been associated with a proliferation of
defences of so-called invariantist accounts of knowledge ascriptions, which stand
united in their rejection of contextualism.
The central goal of the present work is two-fold. In the first instance, it is to bring out
the serious pitfalls in many of those recent defences of invariantism. In the second
instance, it is to establish that the most plausible form of invariantism is one that is
sceptical in character. Of course, the prevailing preference in epistemology is for non-
sceptical accounts. The central conclusions of the thesis might therefore be taken to
show that – despite recent attacks on its plausibility – some form of contextualism
about ‘knows’ must be correct. However, this project is not undertaken without at
least the suspicion that embracing (a particular form of) sceptical invariantism is to be
preferred to embracing contextualism. In the course of the discussion, I therefore not
only attempt to rebut some standard objections to sceptical invariantism, but also to
reveal – in at least a preliminary way – how the sceptical invariantist might best argue
for the superiority of her account to that of the contextualist
Reality Engineering and social kinds
No full textConceptual Engineering is a new and interesting trend in Philosophy. However, it is not free from problems. The most relevant issue is that, at least following a Cappelen-like account, we are forced to commit to the controversial metaphysical view that the world has a linguistic structure. Under such view, a modification in the semantics of a term implies a modification in nature of the thing which is referred by that word. I propose to explore the implications of the reversal of such principle, thereby committing to the idea that a modification in the nature of things implies a modification of the semantics of the terms that refer to them, and not the other way around. Following this new principle, I am interested in developing an alternative account to Conceptual Engineering, which I call (following Greenough) Reality Engineering.
In this dissertation, I will focus on the analysis of two major points about Reality Engineering, trying to define what it is about and how to perform it. I will argue that Reality Engineering has kinds as its scope and I will restrict the focus of the present enquiry to social kinds only. I will proceed by providing a taxonomy of the most popular views about the metaphysics of social kinds, since in order to modify something properly, first we have to be clear on what that something is. Out of this taxonomy, I will generate two general theories on social kinds. The first one is what we can call a Top-down view, and it says that a social kind is generated via the acceptance of constitutive rules by some group of authorities and the successful application of those rules in ordinary practice. The second one is what we can call a Bottom-up view, according to which social kinds are nothing but the reification of social external norms, where social external norms are to be intended as the set of attitudes/behaviours/treatments/practices that people who are not members of the kind have towards the members of such kind (trivially, if the kind in question, like money, does not include people as its members, then everyone is external to such kind). After presenting these two views, I will explore the possibility of engineering kinds within them, focusing on some case studies and examples. I will highlight various ways in which social kinds can be defective and propose solutions for all kinds of defectiveness.
In conclusion, I will briefly discuss how typical worries concerning Conceptual Engineering projects translate to my framework, focusing on the problems of Feasibility and Control
The answering machine paradox
No full textThe answering machine paradox has relatively recently sparked some debate
regarding Kaplan’s Demonstrative (1977). A popular approach to solve the
answering machine paradox has been to reject Kaplan’s proper context thesis whilst
largely maintaining his framework for indexicals. In this thesis I will firstly present
two new answering machine type cases and argue that the existing solutions to the
answering machine paradox cannot deal with these cases. Then, I will propose a
near-side pragmatic solution to the answering machine paradox that adequately deals
with these new answering machine cases in a way that adheres with our pre-theoretical intuitions
The routes of sense : thought, semantic underdeterminacy and compositionality
No full textWhat does it mean to be a rational language user? What is it to obey
linguistic rules? What is the proper account of linguistic competence?
A Fregean answer to these questions would make essential appeal
to the notion of sense: we are masters of a language to the extent
that we are able to recognise the cognitive value of its expressions; we
are rational judges regarding truth-value assignments to the extent
that we are sensitive to the ways in which the sense of an expression
guides us in the semantic evaluation process; and as for obeying rules,
it is our ability to respond to how sense directs us, for a particular
assertion of a sentence, towards the determination of its truth-value
that best exemplifies what it is like to follow a linguistic rule.
My thesis explores a cluster of closely interrelated issues arising
from these questions (whether or not considered from a Fregean perspective).
Accordingly, in tracing the routes of sense my dissertation places
itself at the intersection of the philosophy of language, linguistics,
philosophy of logic, and meta-ethics—and indeed, I end up agreeing
with Allan Gibbard that the theory of meaning really belongs to
meta-ethical reflection.
Chapter 1 introduces some of the main research questions that I try
to address in the rest of the thesis.
In chapter 2 I state a number of theses which I take to be the defining
ones for semanticism. I show that they form a class of jointly
incompatible commitments. I choose nonsense as a problem case for
compositionality and I argue that it forces the semanticist to abandon
either the learnability or the compositionality constraint. The
escape route I adopt, going radically minimalist about content, is incompatible
with another key semanticist thesis, namely, that grasp of
meaning is grasp of truth-conditions (robustly conceived).
In chapter 3, I consider the account of atomic meanings given by
both the semanticist and the pragmaticist and I conclude that on neither
account does interpretation come out as a process of rational choice between candidate bearers of content. Again, I suggest the lesson
from indeterminacy is that we ought to embrace an ineradicably
minimal conception of content.
In chapter 4 I turn my attention to the meaning of the logical constants
and I argue that indeterminacy worries extend to the very heart
of the compositional machinery.
Chapter 5 examines the view that logic is the science of reasoning.
Unsurprisingly, I conclude that a defence of this claim requires endorsing
content-minimalism.
In chapter 6 I conclude my dissertation by sketching a radical view
of content minimalism and I try to show how it can solve the puzzles
I had been considering over the course of the previous chapters
Analogy, rule-following and meaning
No full textIn this thesis, I argue that meaning something by a linguistic expression should be thought to consist,
not in following a rule, but in drawing an analogy. I argue that using a linguistic expression meaningfully
involves analogically extrapolating from our past experience of that expression, by observing a similarity
between the present instance (that which the expression is being applied to) and previous instances (our
past experiences involving the use of that expression). This is in opposition to the classical account of
meaning, according to which meaning something by a linguistic expression involves following a rule – a
rule stating necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for the expression to apply. I argue that there is no
one thing that all meaningful instances of many linguistic expressions have in common, such that its
meaning could be captured in the form of a rule. I claim that the categories corresponding to our
linguistic expressions (containing the objects that any given expression is true of), are defined not in
terms of necessary and jointly sufficient conditions, but in terms of family resemblance relationships
between particular instances, such that analogy plays an essential role in every meaningful application of
a linguistic expression. I argue that metaphorical uses of linguistic expressions are clearly dependent on
analogy, and that as we are unable to uphold a principled distinction between the literal and the
metaphorical, that all meaningful uses of language should be thought to depend on analogy. I argue that
conceiving of meaning as governed by analogy, rather than rules, helps to diffuse the rule-following
paradox, laid out by Saul Kripke. I claim that the meaning of every linguistic expression is governed by
analogy, including the word ‘rule’, such that there may be scope to speak of ‘rules’ of meaning, after all
Truth-Relativism, Norm-Relativism, and Assertion
No full textThe main goal in this paper is to outline and defend a form of Relativism, under which truth is absolute but assertibility is not. I dub such a view Norm-Relativism in contrast to the more familiar forms of Truth-Relativism. The key feature of this view is that just what norm of assertion, belief, and action is in play in some context is itself relative to a perspective. In slogan form: there is no fixed, single norm for assertion, belief, and action. Upshot: 'knows' is neither context-sensitive nor perspectival
Conceptual Marxism and truth : Inquiry symposium on Kevin Scharp’s Replacing Truth
No full textWork on this article has received funding from the project FFI2013-45968-P, financed by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competition (MINECO).In Replacing Truth (2013), Scharp takes the concept of truth to be fundamentally incoherent. As such, Scharp reckons it to be unsuited for systematic philosophical theorising and in need of replacement – at least for regions of thought and talk which permit liar sentences and their ilk to be formulated. This replacement methodology is radical because it not only recommends that the concept of truth be replaced (in troublesome domains), but that the word ‘true’ be replaced too. Only Tarski has attempted anything like it before. I dub such a view Conceptual Marxism. In assessing this view, my goals are fourfold: to summarise the many components of Scharp’s theory of truth; to highlight what I take to be some of the excess baggage carried by the view; to assess whether, and to what extent, the extreme methodology on offer is at all called for; finally, to briefly propose a less radical replacement strategy for resolving the liar paradox.Peer reviewe
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