1,721,033 research outputs found
Unobserved punishment supports cooperation
No full textCostly punishment can facilitate cooperation in public-goods games, as human subjects will incur costs to punish non-cooperators even in settings where it is unlikely that they will face the same opponents again. Understanding when and why it occurs is important both for the design of economic institutions and for modeling the evolution of cooperation. Our experiment shows that subjects will engage in costly punishment even when it will not be observed until the end of the session, which supports the view that agents enjoy punishment. Moreover, players continue to cooperate when punishment is unobserved, perhaps because they (correctly) anticipate that shirkers will be punished: Fear of punishment can be as effective at promoting contributions as punishment itself.National Science Foundation (U.S.) (Grant No. SES 0646816
Cooperation over Finite Horizons: A Theory and Experiments
No full textThis paper shows that the presence of different types of players { those who only care about
their own material payoffs and those who reciprocate others' contributions { can explain the robust
features of observed contribution patterns in public good contribution games, even without the
presence of asymmetric information. We show what conditions on reciprocity are sufficient for a
unique perfect equilibrium, in which contributions are decreasing. Under these conditions, selfish
players have enough future benefits to induce subsequent contributions by reciprocal players, and
this incentive diminishes as the end of the game approaches. The model explains the puzzling
restart effect and is consistent with various other empirical findings. We also report the results of a series of experiments, using a probabilistic continuation design in which after each set of 10-period games, the group is restarted with low probability. We find specfic support for the theory in our data, including that selfish players (identified exogenously) stop contributing earlier than reciprocal players, as directly implied by the model.National Science Foundation (U.S.)Harvard Business Schoo
Lotteries in student assignment: An equivalence result
Full text linkThis paper formally examines two competing methods of conducting a lottery in assigning students to schools, motivated by the design of the centralized high school student assignment system in New York City. The main result of the paper is that a single and multiple lottery mechanism are equivalent for the problem of allocating students to schools in which students have strict preferences and the schools are indifferent. In proving this result, a new approach is introduced, that simplifies and unifies all the known equivalence results in the house allocation literature. Along the way, two new mechanisms---Partitioned Random Priority and Partitioned Random Endowment---are introduced for the house allocation problem. These mechanisms generalize widely studied mechanisms for the house allocation problem and may be appropriate for the many-to-one setting such as the school choice problem.Matching, random assignment
Lotteries in Student Assignment: An Equivalence Result
Full text linkThis paper formally examines two competing methods of conducting a lottery in
assigning students to schools, motivated by the design of the centralized high school
student assignment system in New York City. The main result of the paper is that
a single and multiple lottery mechanism are equivalent for the problem of allocating
students to schools in which students have strict preferences and the schools are
indi fferent. In proving this result, a new approach is introduced, that simplifi es and
uni es all the known equivalence results in the house allocation literature. Along the
way, two new mechanisms|Partitioned Random Priority and Partitioned Random
Endowment|are introduced for the house allocation problem. These mechanisms
generalize widely studied mechanisms for the house allocation problem and may be
appropriate for the many-to-one setting such as the school choice problem.National Science Foundation (U.S.) (grant SES-0924555)National Science Foundation (U.S.) (grant CMMI-0916453
How individual preferences are aggregated in groups: An experimental study
No full textThis paper experimentally investigates how individual preferences, through unrestricted deliberation, are aggregated into a group decision in two contexts: reciprocating gifts and choosing between lotteries. In both contexts, we find that median group members have a significant impact on the group decision, but the median is not the only influential group member. Non-median members closer to the median tend to have more influence than other members. By investigating the same individual's influence in different groups, we find evidence for relative position in the group having a direct effect on influence. These results are consistent with predictions from spatial models of dynamic bargaining, for members with intermediate levels of patience. We also find that group deliberation involves bargaining and compromise as well as persuasion: preferences tend to shift towards the choice of the individual's previous group, especially for those with extreme individual preferences. Keywords: Group decision-making; Role of deliberation; Social influenc
The Mechanism Design Approach to Student Assignment
Full text linkThe mechanism design approach to student assignment involves the theoretical, empirical, and experimental study of systems used to allocate students into schools around the world. Recent practical experience designing systems for student assignment has raised new theoretical questions for the theory of matching and assignment. This article reviews some of this recent literature, highlighting how issues from the field motivated theoretical developments and emphasizing how the dialogue may be a road map for other areas of applied mechanism design. Finally, it concludes with some open questions.National Science Foundation (U.S.
Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets
No full textA number of labor markets and student placement systems can be modeled as many-to-one matching markets. We analyze the scope for manipulation in many-to-one matching markets under the student-optimal stable mechanism when the number of participants is large. Under some regularity conditions, we show that the fraction of participants with incentives to misrepresent their preferences when others are truthful approaches zero as the market becomes large. With an additional condition, truthful reporting by every participant is an approximate equilibrium under the student-optimal stable mechanism in large markets.National Science Foundation (U.S.)Spencer Foundatio
School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mechanisms by their Vulnerability to Manipulation
Full text linkIn Fall 2009, officials from Chicago Public Schools abandoned their assignment mechanism
for coveted spots at selective college preparatory high schools midstream. After
asking about 14,000 applicants to submit their preferences for schools under one mechanism,
the district asked them re-submit preferences under a new mechanism. Officials
were concerned that \high-scoring kids were being rejected simply because of the order
in which they listed their college prep preferences" under the abandoned mechanism.
What is somewhat puzzling is that the new mechanism is also manipulable. This paper
introduces a method to compare mechanisms based on their vulnerability to manipulation.
Under our notion, the old mechanism is more manipulable than the new Chicago
mechanism. Indeed, the old Chicago mechanism is at least as manipulable as any other
plausible mechanism. A number of similar transitions between mechanisms took place
in England after the widely popular Boston mechanism was ruled illegal in 2007. Our
approach provides support for these and other recent policy changes involving allocation
mechanisms.National Science Foundation (U.S.
Charters Without Lotteries: Testing Takeovers in New Orleans and Boston
Full text linkLottery estimates suggest oversubscribed urban charter schools boost student achievement markedly. But these estimates needn't capture treatment effects for students who haven't applied to charter schools or for students attending charters for which demand is weak. This paper reports estimates of the effects of charter school attendance on middle-schoolers in charter takeovers in New Orleans and Boston. Takeovers are traditional public schools that close and then re-open as charter schools. Students enrolled in schools designated for closure are eligible for "grandfathering" into the new schools; that is, they are guaranteed seats. We use this fact to construct instrumental variables estimates of the effects of passive charter attendance: the grandfathering instrument compares students at schools designated for takeover with students who appear similar at baseline and who were attending similar schools not yet closed, while adjusting for possible violations of the exclusion restriction in such comparisons. Estimates for a large sample of takeover schools in the New Orleans Recovery School District show substantial gains from takeover enrollment. In Boston, where we can compare grandfathering and lottery estimates for a middle school, grandfathered students see achievement gains at least as large as the gains for students assigned seats in lotteries. A non-charter Boston turnaround intervention that had much in common with the charter treatment generates gains as large as those seen for takeovers, but other more modest turnaround interventions produce much smaller effects
The Impact of Commissions on Home Sales in Greater Boston
No full textBuying or selling a residential property is
one of the most important financial decisions
for a large majority of households in the United
States. In 2007, 68 percent of households owned
their own home, more than a third of national
wealth was held in residential real estate, and
there were 6.4 million sales of existing homes
according to estimates from the Department of
Housing and Urban Development
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