271 research outputs found

    I Was Addicted to Sex With Married Women

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    As a young man, Akhil Sharma revelled in the most dangerous of liaisons, having sex with other men's wives – until the thrill began to pall

    Recollections of a Hindu Hedonist

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    Novelist Akhil Sharma grew up in a teetotaling Indian household. Here, he tells how discovering a passion for great wine helped him create a new identity out of a painful past

    Maldives Resorts: Eco-Friendly Vacations

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    Luxurious, exclusive and remote, the Maldives are the ultimate beach escape. They’re also a case study in the risks of global warming. Writer Akhil Sharma visits the country’s most eco-friendly resorts and discovers a remarkable cuisine worth protecting

    The Secret of my Success

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    "April 6, 2014

    Cosmopolitan

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    "January 1997

    If You Sing Like That For Me

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    "May 1995

    A Life of Adventure and Delight

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    Mother and Son

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    Appeared in special issue, Granta 97: Best of Young American Novelists 2, Essays & Memoir

    Owner-Intruder Contests with Information Asymmetry

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    Owner-Intruder Contests with Information Asymmetry Faheem Farooq, Depts. of Biology and Chemistry, Jay Bisen, Manaeil Hasan, and Akhil Patel, with Dr. Jan Rychtar, Dept. of Mathematics and Discrete Mathematics, and Dr. Dewey T. Taylor, Dept. of Mathematics and Discrete Mathematics We consider kleptoparasitic interactions between two individuals - Owner and Intruder - and model the situation as a sequential game in an extensive form. Owner is in a possession of a valuable resource when it spots Intruder. Owner has to decide whether to defend the resource; if the Owner defends, the Intruder has to decide whether to fight with the Owner. The individuals may value the resource differently and we distinguish three information cases: (a) both individuals know resource values to both of them, (b) individuals know only their own valuation, (c) individuals do not know the value at all. We solve the game in all three cases. We find that it is typically beneficial for the individuals to know as much information as possible. However, we identify several scenarios where knowing less seems better. We also show that an individual may or may not benefit from their opponent knowing less. Finally, we consider the same kind of interactions but with the reversed order of decisions. We find that typically the individual initiating the interaction has an advantage. However, when individuals know only their own valuation and not the valuations to their opponents, it is sometimes better when the opponent initiates.https://scholarscompass.vcu.edu/uresposters/1298/thumbnail.jp
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