1,721,257 research outputs found
The Mothers of Srebrenica Case before the European Court of Human Rights. United Nations Immunity versus Right of Access to a Court
No full textIn its 11 June 2013 decision in Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica and Others v. the
Netherlands, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) unanimously declared
the application inadmissible, ruling that the Dutch court’s grant of immunity to the
United Nations (UN) did not constitute a violation by The Netherlands of the applicants’
right of access to a court. The author provides a critical overview of the case,
situating it within the jurisprudence of the ECtHR and the International Court of
Justice concerning immunities. The author concludes that the ECtHR should have
applied the presumption of consistency with human rights obligations to the interpretation
of the immunity rules of the UN. This could have led the Court to require
the availability of alternative dispute-settlement mechanisms as a prerequisite for
immunity
L’actio popularis nel sistema di risoluzione delle controversie dell’Organizzazione mondiale del commercio
No full textThe paper addresses the question if the remedies for violations of WTO obligations are also available to the member (s) whose individual rights have not been affected. The author does not consider that the obligations deriving from participation in the World Trade Organization are all either erga omnes partes or bilateral / reciprocal in nature. Instead, their qualification depend on the specific features and content of each obligation. According to the author, the Increasing economic inter-dependence between states implies that a breach of WTO obligations by one member is Likely to Affect, Directly or Indirectly, the economic interests of many, sometimes all, other WTO members. however, this does not signify that a form of actio popularis is provided to all WTO members for each and every breach of WTO rules
Il ruolo della corte costituzionale nella ricognizione del diritto internazionale generale esistente e nella promozione del suo sviluppo progressivo. osservazioni critiche a margine della sentenza n. 238/2014
Get PDFLa sentenza della Corte costituzionale n. 238 del 2014 offre lo spunto per riflettere sul ruolo del giudice costituzionale in ordine: a) all’identificazione delle consuetudini internazionali e b) alla loro creazione e/o modifica.
Con riguardo al primo profilo, la Corte si è ritenuta incompetente a sindacare la ricostruzione della portata del regime internazionale dell’immunità degli Stati stranieri dalla giurisdizione civile effettuata dalla Corte internazionale di giustizia nella sentenza del 2012 sulla controversia tra Germania e Italia. Secondo la Corte costituzionale, un nuovo accertamento del contenuto della rilevante norma consuetudinaria di diritto internazionale sarebbe precluso sia dalla formulazione del quesito di costituzionalità sia dal principio di conformità che imporrebbe di applicare le norme esterne “nell’osservanza dell’interpretazione che ne è data nell’ordinamento di origine”. Questo scritto prova a mettere in discussione entrambi gli argomenti.
Quanto invece al secondo profilo, la Corte costituzionale sembra aspirare a fornire alla Comunità internazionale un punto di avvio per la formazione in materia di una nuova consuetudine maggiormente in linea con le esigenze di tutela dei diritti fondamentali degli individui. Questa prospettiva si scontra però con le difficoltà di definizione del valore della sentenza ai fini della determinazione della prassi e dell’opinio iuris ascrivibile all’Italia, in quanto soggetto dell’ordinamento internazionale, in materia di immunità degli Stati in caso di crimini internazionali. Gli organi italiani hanno infatti fino ad oggi manifestato posizioni opposte in merito alla questione se la norma sull’immunità degli Stati sia applicabile anche in caso di gravi violazioni dei diritti umani. Questa ambivalenza, che è evidentemente aggravata dalla sentenza n. 238, è destinata a indebolire il possibile contributo dell’Italia allo sviluppo del diritto internazionale in materia.
La terza questione affrontata nello scritto attiene alla possibilità di risolvere l’incompatibilità tra immunità dello Stato e accesso al giudice direttamente a livello di diritto internazionale, così come suggerito dalle parti dei procedimenti principali. Questa prospettiva non sembra però idonea a garantire un’adeguata tutela per le vittime italiane dei crimini nazisti, vista l’incerta utilità in questo ambito della teoria della soddisfazione per equivalenti. Rimane comunque ancora un’altra strada da esplorare al fine di garantire le legittime pretese di risarcimento: la protezione diplomatica da parte del Governo italiano. Fino ad oggi, l’Italia non ha adottato significative iniziative nei confronti della Germania. Questa inerzia è assolutamente lecita per il diritto internazionale che concepisce la protezione diplomatica come oggetto di una mera facoltà dello Stato. Tuttavia, un obbligo di attivarsi in tal senso può trovare un fondamento nel diritto interno, come è dimostrato dall’esperienza di altri Stati. Alcuni recenti sviluppi nella giurisprudenza della Corte costituzionale potrebbero in futuro rivelarsi utili al fine di promuovere un analogo risultato anche nell’ordinamento italiano.The Constitutional Court’s judgment no. 238 of 22 October 2014 provides an opportunity to reflect on the role of the Court: a) in identifying customary international rules and b) contributing to their formation and evolution.
With respect to the first issue, the Constitutional Court did not call into question the ICJ’s interpretation of the international regime of State immunity from civil jurisdiction in its 2012 judgment in Germany v. Italy. According to the Constitutional Court, a reassessment of the relevant customary international rule was barred by both the wording of the constitutional question and the principle of conformity binding the government and the judges to apply external rules in accordance with the interpretation given in their original legal order. The author contends that both arguments are unpersuasive.
With regard to the second issue, the Constitutional Court seems to aspire to provide the international community with a starting point for the formation of a new customary rule more in line with the need to protect fundamental human rights. However, that aspiration has to overcome the difficulties involved in determining the value of the judgment as a manifestation of Italy’s practice and opinio iuris. Italian state organs have, in fact, expressed conflicting views on the question of whether States enjoy jurisdictional immunity in cases involving allegations of grave human rights violations. The author argues that this ambivalence, which is further aggravated by the judgment no. 238, may weaken Italy’s possible contribution to the development of customary international law in this field.
The third issue addressed in the article, which is in some way connected with the other two here discussed, concerns the possibility to settle the tension between State immunity and the right of access to courts directly on the international plane, as suggested by the parties to the original proceedings. While not considered by the Court, these arguments are carefully examined in the paper. The author maintains that this perspective is not likely to be helpful to the cause of the Italian victims of Nazi crimes, given that it is uncertain whether they can successfully rely on the alternative means test. Nevertheless, there is still another way to protect the victims’ legitimate expectations of obtaining compensation, namely diplomatic protection. Until now, Italy has not undertaken significant diplomatic steps to induce Germany to make reparation to Italian victims of German war crimes. But while Italy’s inaction is perfectly legitimate under international law, according to which the decision whether or not to exercise diplomatic protection is still a discretionary right of the State concerned, according to the internal law of some States the Government has a duty to espouse the claims of its citizens against foreign Governments, at least in the most serious cases. Some recent developments in the Constitutional Court’s case law may prove particularly useful in order to achieve a similar result in the Italian legal order
Protezione diplomatica, diritti umani e obblighi erga omnes
No full textThis paper discusses the recent trends affecting diplomatic protection. , with special regard to its suitability as a mechinaism of human rights protection. The author acknowledges that diplomatic protection is a valuable instrument in the field of human rights protection, but does not accept, as many scholars do, the idea of the international legal personality of individuals. On the contrary she discusses this evolution of diplomatic protection according the category of erga omnes obligations (i.e. obligations vis-à-vis the international community as a whole). The premise of this approach is that these obligations not necessarily determines an absolute equality of the rights of all States. This is true even as concerns human rights: in case of violations against foreigners, it is not only breached a collective interest towards all States, but also the individual interest of the national State to obtain compliance with international standards for the treatment of its citizens. This is why this State has a special (and then prior) entitlement to invoke the international responsibility of the responsible State. The central problem is then how to define the relationship between the reaction of the injured State and that of all other states. On the basis of the approach suggested, the paper scrutinizes the results of the codification of diplomatic protection by the international Law Commission . The main criticisms concern the following points: the inconsistency with the codification of Sate responsibility and the lack of a unique theoretical basis in order to justify those rules included in the draft articles which seem to favor a greater consideration of the humanitarian dimension of diplomatic protection
Le autorizzazioni del Consiglio di sicurezza davanti alla Corte europea dei diritti umani: dalla decisione sui casi Behrami e Saramati alla sentenza Al-Jedda
No full textA distanza di quattro anni dalla decisione assai controversa sui casi Behrami e Saramati, la Corte europea dei diritti umani è tornata ad occuparsi della questione dell’applicabilità della CEDU alle operazioni militari poste in essere dagli Stati membri sulla base di autorizzazioni all’uso della forza emanate dal Consiglio di sicurezza dell’ONU nel caso Al-Jedda c. Regno Unito. Il saggio esamina le principali implicazioni di queste pronunce mettendo a confronto le soluzione raggiunte nella decisione sui casi Behrami e Saramati e nella sentenza sul caso Al-Jedda in ordine a tre questioni principali: la natura giuridica delle autorizzazioni del Consiglio di sicurezza all’uso della forza; la questione dell’attribuzione delle condotte del personale militare in questo tipo di situazioni; i rapporti tra la CEDU e il sistema di sicurezza collettivo dell’ONU. L’analisi rivela che la sentenza Al-Jedda presenta diversi elementi di continuità rispetto alla giurisprudenza anteriore (con riguardo ad esempio alla distinzione tra diversi modelli di autorizzazioni del Consiglio), ma anche alcuni significativi sviluppi (relativamente alla possibilità della doppia imputabilità agli Stati e all’ONU della condotta dei contingenti nazionali inquadrati nelle missioni autorizzate dal Consiglio di sicurezza e all’introduzione di una presunzione in favore dell’interpretazione delle risoluzioni del Consiglio di sicurezza in conformità alle norme in materia di tutela dei diritti fondamentali).Four years after the highly criticized decision in Behrami and Saramati, on 7 July 2011 the European Court of Human Rights returned in Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom to the applicability of the European Convention on Human Rights to acts undertaken by military forces of Member States acting abroad under an authorization of the United Nations Security Council. The article examines the main implications of that case law by comparing how the Court addressed the following issues in Behrami and Saramati and in Al-Jedda: the legal nature of UNSC authorizations to states to use force; the attribu-tion of conduct of military personnel in this kind of situations and the relationship be-tween the European Convention and the UN collective security system. According to the author, the Al-Jedda judgment presents some elements of continuity with the Behrami and Saramati decision (such as the distinction among different models of UNSC authorization), but also significant developments (especially with re
I rapporti tra la Corte internazionale di giustizia e il Consiglio di sicurezza
No full textThe relationships between the International Court of Justice and the Security Council is one of the most sensitive and problematic concerning the UN system. The book consists of four parts. The analysis carried out in the first three parts of the monograph about the definition of the relationships between the SC and the ICJ aims at a description de lege lata of the functioning of the UN system. From such a reconstruction it has emerged that the relationships between those organs, lacking a detailed and comprehensive (if not with regards to few aspects which in any case remain very limited) regulation under the relevant normative instruments (UN Charter and ICJ Statute), are governed by some fundamental principles, such as the duty of mutual assistance, the reciprocal respect of their respective competences and activities, the protection of integrity of the judicial function, the efficiency of the World Organization in the maintenance of international peace and security or, more properly, the best combination between them, as those interests are equally essential (but potentially conflicting) for the correct and balanced functioning of the UN system. The reference to those criteria has lead us to identify two main configurations of the relationships at issue, respectively in terms of coordination of the functions assigned to the two organs, and of ex post control on the activity of the SC by the ICJ. As to the first, our position is that the SC and the ICJ are independent from each other in the exercise of their respective competences. The principles of lis pendens, connexity and res judicata are not applicable to the relationships between them. The distinction between ‘political’ and ‘legal’ issues and, consequently, between ‘justiciable’ and ‘non justiciable’ disputes has been strongly rejected, including by the Court itself. The relationship between the SC and the ICJ is hence mainly characterized by functional parallelism: in the exercise of their competences both organs must act in consideration of each other's interest, and not impede each other in their action. As far as the second model is concerned, there exists safer ground, though not devoid of controversy, for the ICJ to embark on judicial review either in consultative or in contentious cases: i.e. ‘in the exercise of its judicial function’. The proposed method of judicial review must however ensure both the legitimacy and the efficiency of the political organ and strengthen, not weaken, the United Nations’ role in the maintenance of international peace and security. The SC is certainly a political organ adopting decisions according to political criteria. However, its action would lose any credibility if it were arbitrary and totally deprived of a legal basis. To reinforce judicial review is thus to reinforce the UN’s effectiveness. That is why, in a perspective de lege ferenda, the international judicial review mechanism should be carefully developed and thoroughly regulated. Moreover, legal certainty would be essential in order to prevent other international courts and tribunals from adopting incompatible approaches with regard to matters concerning the legality of the SC’s coercive measures. The fourth part of the monograph is devoted to the assessment of the relationship between the two UN organs within the field of State responsibility, with special attention to the role that the Court and the Council are already entitled to carry out de lege lata as far as the reaction to the most serious violations of norms protecting the collective interests of the international community are concerned, and to the introduction (in a perspective of progressive development of international law) of new mechanisms and suitable procedures to take advantage of their respective competences and to better coordinate their activities within that field. In such a context, our main objective was to verify the existence of means of preventive legal control which would provide an authoritative and objective evaluation of the subsistence of all the factual and legal elements which may allow States to act or react, in the name and on behalf of the international community as a whole, for the protection of its fundamental values. At least for the moment, the original proposals made on those points inside the ILC in order to entrust the UN organs with the power of preventive legal control has been set aside, because of the complexity of the issues they would involve. However, on this point the debate, either in the ILC and in the doctrine, does not seem to have reached shared solutions. The issue, therefore, can be considered still substantially open and must be carefully considered. The analysis begins with the examination of the specific features of the legal regime protecting the collective interests of the international community and continues by scrutinizing the principal results which have been achieved on those aspects by the ILC during the codification of the matter relating to State responsibility (Chapter XII); it then addresses the debate concerning the involvement of UN organs in the questions concerning reactions to the most serious breaches by critically scrutinizing the proposals and the suggestions made by the Special rapporteurs of the ILC and the discussions they have raised; it confirms the current relevance of the topic by focusing on some proposals which advocate the involvement of the SC and the ICJ into the mechanism that triggers the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court on the crime of aggression (Chapter XIV); and in fine it verifies, on the basis of a careful review of its jurisprudence, the scope of ICJ potential jurisdiction in matters concerning the protection of the collective values of the international community as a whole and the limits which actually impede a more useful utilization of the Court within this field. The analysis carried out in this phase of the study has shown that neither the ICJ nor the SC, although they represent the most suitable organs to fulfil the function of controlling States reactions to international crimes, cannot effectively accomplish such tasks in an independent way. In this perspective, the Council seems to be the better interpreter of the views of the most powerful social forces in the international community, i.e. the only ones that can assume, because of their huge political, economic and military weight, the task to concretely defend the fundamental values of the international community. Nevertheless, it is well-known that its recent and unprecedented activism is widely criticized as too selective and too consistent with the priorities of the Big Powers. At the same time, the unwillingness and inability of the UN member states to agree on a reform of the Council's membership and voting procedures increasingly casts doubt upon the legitimacy of a body the UN Charter established as the primary guardian of international peace and security. For this reason it appears ineluctable, especially because of the progressive emergence of an unique hegemonic power in the position to influence and lead the entire globalization process, to confer to the ICJ, as guarantor of the legality within the international legal system, more incisive powers and functions in matters related to State responsibility for serious breaches undermining the essential interests of the international community in order to counterbalance the powers of the SC or, more precisely, of the powerful States which could (as recent practice clearly testifies) use surreptitiously the Council as an instrument for the realization of their own specific interests. The direct involvement of the Court in the management of those situations would concur to reduce the risk that serious violations of international law will remain without juridical consequences, at least in the hypotheses in which States holding a great political weight commit them, relying on an immunity that in more than a circumstance has revealed to be de facto absolute. The study carried out in the fourth part has allowed us to exemplify some models of concurrent action of the two organs within the field of the protection of the essential interests of the international community which, even if still in an imperfect way and with only partial consequences, tend to realize new collective forms of guarantees for States’ common interests, by organizing State reactions against the most serious breaches on behalf of the international community as a whole. These models are still incomplete and precarious and represents for the time being only some weak trends. Recourse to the Court has the obvious advantage to place the examination of the issues concerning the protection of collective interests at an appropriate legal level, and at the same time it provides a more objective and neutral treatment of the interests belonging to the concerned parties. Nevertheless, the problem is that the rules governing Court proceedings are conceived mainly to settle disputes of a strictly bilateral nature. Those rules raise many complex problems as regard to the possibility to profitably utilize jurisdictional means also to solve issues of general interest. At the beginning of the 21st century the dilemma faced by the United Nations Organization and the entire international community lies in the inability to reconcile the structural realities of power politics in a unipolar world within the requirements of the international rule of law. A revision of the UN system should not set aside the exigencies for a more active role of the ICJ and a greater balance and constructive cooperation between the latter and the political organs. On the contrary, it should take carefully into account the problem of finding a way to modify and enlarge the scope of the jurisdiction assigned to the primary judicial organ in order to improve its contribution to the protection of the values belonging to the whole international society
Interesse ad agire davanti alla Corte internazionale di giustizia e tutela di valori collettivi nella sentenza sul caso Belgio c. Senegal
No full textNella sentenza relativa alla controversia sulle Questioni concernenti l’obbligo di perseguire o estradare (Belgio c. Senegal) la Corte internazionale di giustizia per la prima volta ha riconosciuto espressamente lo jus standi del ricorrente sulla base della natura erga omnes degli obblighi invocati nel procedimento. Si tratta di un importante avanzamento nella giurisprudenza della Corte, la quale supera così la reticenza mostrata in passato a riconoscere la legittimazione ad agire in giudizio davanti ai tribunali internazionali di Stati non direttamente lesi dalla violazione di obblighi collettivi. Tuttavia il modus procedendi della Corte non convince del tutto. La soluzione accolta si basa essenzialmente sulla qualificazione degli obblighi della Convenzione contro la tortura alla stregua di obblighi erga omnes partes e sulla affermazione della generalizzazione del diritto di agire in giudizio in caso di invocazione di tali obblighi. Entrambi i postulati restano però in larga parte indimostrati. Ma più in generale, la Corte fa un’opera di semplificazione delle questioni giuridiche sollevate dal caso in discussione, che lascia aperti alcuni interrogativi su cui forse sarebbe stata opportuna una più attenta riflessione, in considerazione soprattutto della loro stretta attinenza rispetto al problema, attualmente al centro di un importante dibattito in dottrina, della definizione del ruolo della massima giurisdizione mondiale nell’ambito del processo di c.d. ‘costituzionalizzazione’ dell’ordinamento internazionale: dall’individuazione delle caratteristiche peculiari che consentano di qualificare determinati obblighi pattizi alla stregua di erga omnes partes; ai rapporti tra obblighi erga omnes partes e obblighi erga omnes; al tema dell’interesse ad agire in giudizio in presenza di violazioni di tali obblighi; ai rapporti tra injured States e States other than the injured States – secondo la terminologia utilizzata nella nota distinzione tracciata dalla Commissione di diritto in-ternazionale nell’articolato sulla responsabilità degli Stati – dal punto di vista del contenuto delle pretese che possano essere avanzate in giudizio. Su questi aspetti si concentrano essenzialmente le riflessioni sviluppate nel lavoro.The judgment in the case concerning Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal) marked the first occasion in which the International Court of Justice expressly upheld the jus standi of the claimant State on the basis of the erga omnes partes nature of the allegedly breached obligations. This is a major step forward in the ICJ case law, which overcomes the traditional view preventing a not directly injured State from instituting proceedings before an international tribunal.
While recognizing this remarkable development, the author argues that the way the Court reaches its conclusion is not totally convincing. This solution is mainly based on the characterization of the obligations under the UN Convention against Torture (CAT) as erga omnes partes obligations, and on the recognition of the generality of standing to make claims in the event of a breach of such obligations. However, both assumptions remain largely unproven
Evitare di pronunciarsi? Questioni di giurisdizione e propriety nell’ottica delle relazioni istituzionali tra gli organi delle Nazioni Unite
No full textThis contribution examines the treatment of preliminary questions of competence and propriety in the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory opinion. These aspects rises some important problems which concern the relationships among the principal organs of the United Nations: a) between General Assembly and Security Council as to the validity of the request according to article 12 of the Charter (and hence as to the competence of the Court to issue the opinion); and b) between the International Court of Justice and the Security Council as to the propriety of the exercise by the Court of its consultative function on a question which is also relevant for the Security Council's responsibility to maintain international peace and security. While some commentators note that the principle that the ICJ must participate in the work of the Organisation might sometimes conflict with its judicial character, the author argues that "the delivery of the advisory opinion by the court should be positively valued in the perspective of enhancing the main role of the ICJ's advisory function in clarifying the law and providing guidance for future action by the UN organs
Sui rapporti tra la Corte internazionale di giustizia e il Consiglio di sicurezza dell'ONU.
No full textLa giurisprudenza della corte internazionale di giustizia in materia di public interest litigation. luci ed ombre
No full textNella giurisprudenza internazionale le questioni attinenti alla tutela giudiziale degli interessi collettivi degli Stati sono state per lo più affrontate, sin dal riconoscimento dell’esistenza degli obblighi erga omnes contenuto nella sentenza della Corte internazionale di giustizia nell’affare della Barcelona Traction, in modo episodico, frammentario e talora contraddittorio (in alcuni casi in meri obiter dicta, o comunque nel contesto di affermazioni accessorie o almeno apparentemente marginali rispetto alla definizione della controversia di volta in volta in causa). Partendo da tale considerazione, lo scopo del lavoro consiste essenzialmente nel cercare di ricondurre in un quadro unitario e coerente le indicazioni ricavabili dalle pronunce più rilevanti in materia di public interest litigation, tenendo conto in particolare degli sviluppi recenti. Questo tentativo di ricostruire lo stato dell’arte della giurisprudenza in materia si articola in tre parti, volte ad illustrare le principali questioni che si pongono in tale ambito, distinguendo, nell’ordine, quelle che possono ritenersi ormai risolte, quelle in fase di definizione, e quelle ancora del tutto aperte. Per ragioni di sintesi, l’esame che segue si concentrerà sulla giurisprudenza della Corte internazionale di giustizia, la quale chiaramente, in considerazione della sua posizione speciale nel panorama delle giurisdizioni internazionali nonché della sua competenza generale ratione materiae, ha una vocazione per così dire «naturale» alla rilevazione e alla promozione delle norme sulla protezione dei c.d. «beni e interessi pubblici globali». Questa scelta si giustifica anche per il fatto che la nozione di obblighi erga omnes, oltre ad essere stata elaborata proprio dalla Corte internazionale di giustizia, è ampiamente consolidata nella sua giurisprudenza. La Corte, infatti, l’ha ripetutamente utilizzata per qualificare obblighi di importanza fondamentale per la Comunità internazionale, estendendo anche a nuove fattispecie l’elenco contenuto nella sentenza relativa all’affare della Barcelona Traction
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