1,721,015 research outputs found
Trends in corruptions around the world
No full textThe problem of measuring changes in corruption internationally is significantly
more daunting than that of estimating their levels. We compute trends in corruption for groups
of geographically proximate countries, based on the geographic distribution of cases of cross-
border bribes, and confirm that geographic variations in corruption are greater than time
variations. They are then compared with changes in perceived corruption, as measured by
Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index. We find that these alternative
measures are not significantly correlated with each other. Using a panel data estimation
technique, we attempt to explain trends in corruption. We only partially confirm results that
are obtained when the purpose is to account for their levels in the context of a cross-sectional
study. Overall, we conclude that the study of changes in levels of corruption is still in its
infancy
A New Cross-National Measure of Corruption
Full text linkA new measure of cross-national corruption is constructed based on the geographic distribution of public officials involved in cross-border corruption cases. A comparison is made between the Public Administration Corruption Index (PACI) and perception-based measures, considers the extent to which differences between them are driven by systematic factors, and concludes that they are not. As more data on cases of cross-border bribery incidents become available, the PACI will provide an increasingly valid cross-national measure of corruption
Redistribution and Reelection under Proportional Representation: The Postwar Italian Chamber of Deputies
Full text linkWe study incumbency advantage and the electoral returns to pork and patronage over ten legislative periods from 1948 to 1992 for two political parties — the Christian Democrats (DC) and the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) — in Italy’s lower house of representatives, the Chamber of Deputies. Adapting a regression discontinuity design to Italy’s open-list system of proportional representation, we show that parliament comprised two groups: a small elite, whose members enjoyed an incumbency advantage, and the average deputy, who benefitted from no such incumbency advantage. Elite legislators affiliated with Italy’s two main parties of government received significantly more preference votes when pork and patronage were steered to their districts, although the effect is small. We interpret this to indicate that their incumbency advantage was linked to their ability to claim credit for these allocations. We also show that the two parties won more list votes when districts received more resources and that when districts received more resources, the abilities of these parties to persuade their electors to use preference votes improved. This form of electoral mobilization, in turn, enlarged the number of ministerial positions secured by the district. Our analysis depicts a political environment severely segmented between a small, powerful elite group of deputies and backbenchers.incumbency effect, distributive politics, patronage, proportional representation, Italy, regression discontinuity
Measurement of corruption
No full textMeasures of corruption started to emerge in the 1990s, as interest shifted to the study of its determinants and consequences using quantitative methods, also with the aim of addressing the public demand to curb it. The most popular measures are based on perceptions of the degree of corruption and, as such, are subjective. Other approaches have an objective character, in the sense that they are based on hard data of some type—such as judicial statistics, recorded prices of public purchases, or other characteristics emerging from large datasets of publicly procured goods and services. Overall, the available measures have their respective shortcomings. They reflect a narrow view of corruption which tends to coincide with bribes. Measures of broader definitions of corruption, such as forms of “legal corruption”, are almost absent
Incumbency Effects under Proportional Representation: Leaders and Backbenchers in the Postwar Italian Chamber of Deputies
Full text linkWe study incumbency effects for individual legislators from two political parties (Christian Democracy and the Italian Socialist Party) in Italy’s lower house of representatives over ten
legislatures (1948–1992) elected using open-list proportional representation. Our analysis finds no reelection advantage for the average incumbent legislator. Only a tiny elite in each party
successfully creates an incumbency advantage. We find incumbents advantaged for reselection by their political party. We interpret reselection advantage as a party loyalty premium. Our study
depicts a political environment monopolized by party leaders who reward party loyalty but hamper legislators in appealing directly to voters
Lo Zen e l'arte della lotta alla corruzione
No full textGli autori affrontano da un punto di vista sorprendente ed eclettico il tema della corruzione. In che cosa consiste esattamente,
come si manifesta in concreto, quali dimensioni ha in Italia e quanto ci costa? Ma soprattutto, come contrastarla in modo
efficace? In modo convincente, gli autori argomentano che sono indispensabili uno spirito “Zen” e il giusto distacco.
È necessario “guardare altrove”, riflettendo sul funzionamento complessivo della cosa pubblica e creando le condizioni perché
sia non solo trasparente, ma anche “leggibile”. È necessario ragionare sullo stato di salute dei mass media, dell’istruzione e
sulla partecipazione dei cittadini, che necessita, tra l’altro, di un contesto culturale appropriato, da promuovere con saggezza e
buon senso. Gli autori disegnano un quadro articolato e coerente di interventi necessari per spezzare i circoli viziosi e gli equilibri tenaci che la corruzione al tempo stesso genera e dai quali si alimenta.
Un libro rivolto “alle italiane e agli italiani”, che hanno diritto alla trasparenza e ad una buona amministrazione, e il dovere di essere cittadini partecipi e - possibilmente - con la schiena dritta
The ‘inventor balance’ and the functional specialization in global inventive activities
Full text linkInventors and organizational assets are inputs of inventive activities which are often provided at a global scale, where countries might specialize in the provision of one or the other type of inputs. We introduce a new patent-based metric, the 'inventor balance', to quantify this type of functional specialization, which we discover to be considerable, and we propose a conceptual framework to explain it. We observe a progressive 'decoupling' of national sub-systems providing respectively inventors and organizational assets. Moreover, we find that countries with a high level of innovativeness relative to their economic development, high technological specialization, and strong individualistic cultural traits, contribute relatively more inventors than organizations to the global production of inventions.Peer reviewe
The technological specialization of countries : an analysis of patent data
Full text linkNew methods of analysis of patent statistics allow assessing country profiles of technological specialization for the period 1990-2006. We witness a modest decrease in levels of specialization, which we show to be negatively influenced by country size and degree of internationalization of inventive activities
Reputation-based Governance
No full textThis book melds concepts from businesses like eBay with politics. Interdisciplinary tools are used to argue that the intelligent use of widely available Internet technologies can strengthen reputational mechanisms and significantly improve public governance. Based on this notion, the book proposes a governance model that leans on the concept of reputational incentives while discussing the pivotal role of reputation in politics today. It is argued that a continuous, distributed process of assessing policy outcomes, enabled by an appropriate information system, would contribute to a governance model characterized by effectiveness, efficiency, and a minimum amount of rent-seeking activity. Moreover, if citizens were also allowed to express their views on prospective policies, then reputation-based governance would provide a platform on which to develop advanced forms of participative democracy.JRC.DDG.J.4 - Information Societ
Reputation-based Governance
No full textAlthough many have studied various incarnations of Internet�based reputation systems, past analyses have mostly been piecemeal in method and have focused only on market applications. I propose a general �reputation�based governance� framework that has interesting properties and implications. The concept also provides useful insights on the issues of openness (as in �open source� software) and of participative forms of design and production.JRC.J.4 - Information Societ
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