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Flessibilità processuale e regime solonico del furto. A margine di Dem. 22.26-27 e Dem. 24.113-114
Get PDFIn the essay entitled ''Flessibilità processuale e regime solonico del furto. A margine di Dem. 22.26-27 e Dem. 24.113-114'', the author criticizes the view that the Athenian legal system contained several different procedures for each substantive offense. I
Popular Prosecution in Early Athenian Law. The Drakonian Roots of the Solonian Reforms
Get PDFIs it possible to find some Drakonian antecedents for the Solonian reform concerning ‘popular prosecution’ by ὁ βουλόμενος? In the light of such a fundamental question, on the one side, the essay is directed to demonstrate that Drakonian law – even if it did not develop any formal and general concept of ‘crime’ – both treated, from a procedural point of view, some offences as wrongs injuring the πόλις (for instance ‘attempted tyranny’ and ‘breach of the exile rule’), and gave any citizen the right to bring ‘public cases’ before the proper court. On the other side, one supposes that prior to Solon the Athenian magistrates – entitled to pass final judgments and to impose penalties on their own initiative – took care of all the incapacitated victims who lacked ‘standing to sue’ (as one can conjecture with regard to the convicted killer harmed by blackmail and torture). It is accordingly assumed that Solon did not introduce ex novo the legal entity of ‘popular and voluntary prosecution’: indeed, the Athenian legislator – focused on a need of solidarity and cohesion in the whole community, rather than on a need of protection in favor of the whole community – through the institution of the general principle of ‘third-party prosecution’, diminished the role formerly played by magistrates and, at the same time, renewed a procedural feature that, already existing, was previously related to the safeguard of the community only
Brevi note sul diritto del cittadino al processo popolare dalla caduta del regno al decemvirato legislativo
No full textIl saggio affronta il problema della ampiezza delle garanzie processuali che il primo ordinamento repubblicano romano offriva ai cittadini; si esaminano i poteri dei sommi magistrati in qualità di giudici e di organi di polizia; si mettono in luce le differenze tra la legge Valeria del 509 a.C. e le disposizioni decemvirali in tema di ius provocationis nel 451-450 a.C
PROVOCATIO AD POPULUM E POTERI MAGISTRATUALI DAL PROCESSO ALL’ORAZIO SUPERSTITE ALLA MORTE DI APPIO CLAUDIO DECEMVIRO
No full textThe essay focuses on the relationship existing between ius provocationis, magisterial powers and judicial trials before the populum in archaic Roman law. After summarizing the main scholarly reconstructions of the topic, it tries to shed some light to the monarchic origins of the provocatio-institute, to sketch the statutory rules in force during the early Republican age, an
Custodia, receptum e responsabilità contrattuale
No full textProblems concerning contractual liability arise —regardless of the peculiar legal system of reference— in terms of the structure of the liability question, as well as of the allocation of the burden of proof. This article, after examining the main classical sources regarding custodia and receptum, puts forward an actualizing explanation of the criterion set in the phrase praestare custodiam, by means of a strict explanation of the article 1218 cod. civ. and of the provisions concerning the ex recepto liability. It is therefore emphasized the unitary and objective nature of the basis of contractual liability (i. e. the non-performance itself and not the fault). Finally, a re-interpretation of the locution «causa non imputabile» and similar linguistic expressions linked to the debtor’s non-liability area enhances the ductile casuistic method used by classical Roman jurists flowed in the utilitas contrahentium rule
Ius, nomos, ma'at. Riflessioni su 'inattualità' e 'alterità' delle esperienze giuridiche antiche
No full textThe essay starts with a methodological criticism to both the ‘neo-pandectistic’ approach and the
‘gernetian’ perspective in interpreting concepts and institutions of ancient legal systems; afterwards it focuses
on the ‘otherness’ of Roman, Greek and Pharaonic Law, by comparing the pivotal concepts of ius,
νomοs, and ma’at. The first one, at least as regards the discipline of private relations above all during the
last four centuries of the Roman Republic, neither amounts to state provisions, nor is a judge made law:
indeed, it is characterized by a scientific elaboration which finds its main creators in cives privati and its
most expressive shape in the so called ius controversum. The second one, considering fifth and fourth century
Athens, cannot be accurately qualified as a statutory law, given that its political nature, notwithstanding
its material structure, derives from an immemorial tradition (already attested in the Homeric poems)
that considers ‘positive rules’ an expression of a physical and theistic order existing in any case. The third
one is a clear paradigm of the primitive indistinction between religious, legal and political spheres, and it is
explained more as a particular ‘Reason of Cosmos’, than as the direct target or the basic source of
pharaonic laws and administration of justice
Scopi e metodi della storia del diritto e formazione del giurista europeo (cronaca).
No full textCronaca del convegno patavino ''Scopi e metodi della storia del diritto e formazione del giurista europeo'
'Themis' e 'dike' in Omero. Ai primordi del diritto dei Greci - Presentazione di Remo Martini
No full textÈ condivisibile, alla luce delle testimonianze dell’epica arcaica, la tesi secondo cui il diritto in sensooggettivo, anche con riguardo all’esperienza greca, si configura inizialmente come un ‘judge made law’,ossia come un diritto che emerge in sede di processo quale risoluzione particolare del caso concreto e siassesta, tendendo alla generalità e all’astrattezza, solo attraverso una costante stratificazione nel tempo dellepronunce giudiziali? È documentalmente fondata, inoltre, la convinzione secondo cui, anche nel panoramaellenico, l’idea di ‘azione’ precede logicamente e cronologicamente quella di ‘situazione soggettivasostanziale’, ciò assurgendo altresì a giustificazione – in termini di continuità storica – dell’asseritapreponderanza, nelle impostazioni nomiche e logografiche ateniesi, della cd. prospettiva processuale? Arispondere a queste due fondamentali domande, nonché, dunque, a meglio precisare i connotati del più anticodiritto dei Greci, è volto il presente studio: e ciò, sia attraverso una rilettura critica dei versi omerici dai qualiaffiorano i primordiali concetti di θέμις e di δίκη, sia attraverso un serrato esame delle ricostruzioni chesono state elaborate in materia dalla letteratura gius-grecistica a far tempo dal secolo diciannovesimo sinoagli scritti più recenti
Coscienza nomica e scienza giuridica: un confronto tra il modello ‘autoritativo’ ateniese e il modello ‘anarchico’ romano
No full textRoma e Atene sono due differenti modelli di diritto antico di cui soprattutto le peculiarità devono essere valorizzate dallo storico. Infatti è nella loro diversità reciproca e nella loro diversità rispetto al mondo giuridico contemporaneo che si trova la ricchezza e l’utilità dello studio dei diritti antichi: al trovare somiglianze e continuità è preferibile determinare il vero quid essentiae di questi due ordinamenti (ossia la creazione del diritto privato, ius, da parte di autentici scienziati in Roma e la concezione del diritto positivo, nomoi, come ordine fondamentalmente divino e naturale in Atene
The Myth of the Priority of Procedure over Substance in the Light of Early Greek Epos
Get PDFLaw can be shaped or considered ineach of the two following ways: on theone hand, as a ‘system of rights’, so thatactions are just the remedies created– on the subsidiary level of procedurallaw – to uphold them; on the other hand,as a ‘system of actions’, so that legalprotection comes conceptually and operativelybefore legal acknowledgment,since, if an action is made available, thatmeans that simultaneously an implicitright is given. In the light of such a basicdistinction, some general questions ipsoiure arise on the ground of both ‘jurisprudence’and ‘history of ancient Greeklegal systems’. Is it exact to assume thatthe above mentioned difference is onlyone of emphasis? Is it exact to supposethe chronological priority of procedurallaw over substantive law? Is it exact toconsider the State and its legal processas the essential requirements to meet inorder to consider a given system of rulesa very legal system? As regards the legalconcepts emerging from Homer and Hesiod,the communis opinio interprets thesign dike at first as ‘settlement or decisionbetween two parties’; consequentlyonce he one assumes that the so called‘forms of actions’ are the primeval pillarsof the archaic Greek legal systems,and that the ‘judge’ (or better the ‘arbiter’)is the prototype of the institutionalizedcreator of legal rules. Through theexegesis of early Greek epos, this articleaims at demonstrating: the incorrectnessof the analysis that considers the antithesisbetween substance and procedure asa mere question of emphasis, and, aboveall, the original Greek monism (giventhat the opposite view, supporting thepriority of procedure over substance,is just an anti-historical and aprioristicone, since it is deeply – perhaps unconsciously– influenced by the so calledRoman ‘aktionenrechtliches Denken’and it is founded on a partisan readingof the sources)
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