3 research outputs found
The radical right in Europe, between slogans and voting behavior. IHS Political Science Series No. 123, July 2011
No full textThe paper analyzes the radical right‘s attitudes toward the EU focusing in particular on the level of congruence between the programmatic statements of the central office and the voting behavior of their MEPs. It shows that although radical right parties represent a source of opposition to the EU, within the EP they express their dissent making use of the rules of the game, voting with the opposition more than the other forces do, but voting almost as much with the majority. The party public office in the EP is inserted in the legislative process and even more collusive with the other parties of both sides of the political spectrum than the Eurosceptical rhetoric and statements of central office makes the public believe
Narrow bottlenecks affect pea seedborne mosaic virus populations during vertical seed transmission but not during leaf colonization.
No full textThe effective size of populations (Ne) determines whether selection or genetic drift is the predominant force shaping their genetic structure and evolution. Populations having high Ne adapt faster, as selection acts more intensely, than populations having low Ne, where random effects of genetic drift dominate. Estimating Ne for various steps of plant virus life cycle has been the focus of several studies in the last decade, but no estimates are available for the vertical transmission of plant viruses, although virus seed transmission is economically significant in at least 18% of plant viruses in at least one plant species. Here we study the co-dynamics of two variants of Pea seedborne mosaic virus (PSbMV) colonizing leaves of pea plants (Pisum sativum L.) during the whole flowering period, and their subsequent transmission to plant progeny through seeds. Whereas classical estimators of Ne could be used for leaf infection at the systemic level, as virus variants were equally competitive, dedicated stochastic models were needed to estimate Ne during vertical transmission. Very little genetic drift was observed during the infection of apical leaves, with Ne values ranging from 59 to 216. In contrast, a very drastic genetic drift was observed during vertical transmission, with an average number of infectious virus particles contributing to the infection of a seedling from an infected mother plant close to one. A simple model of vertical transmission, assuming a cumulative action of virus infectious particles and a virus density threshold required for vertical transmission to occur fitted the experimental data very satisfactorily. This study reveals that vertically-transmitted viruses endure bottlenecks as narrow as those imposed by horizontal transmission. These bottlenecks are likely to slow down virus adaptation and could decrease virus fitness and virulence.[br/]
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Author Summary Short generation times and high mutation rates are the hallmarks of virus. They favor their fast adaptation as illustrated by their ability to overcome natural as well as man-made barriers such as host resistance or drug treatments. However, such a fast adaptation could be slowed down when genetic drift, which introduces random sampling effects in the evolution of virus populations, is important. Whether genetic drift or selection dominates depends on the effective size of populations (Ne). Ne has been estimated for several steps of plant virus infectious cycle, such as horizontal transmission by insects and the colonization of plant cells and tissues. However, although economically important, no estimate of Ne during vertical transmission of viruses, i.e. the infection of plant progenies from parental plants, is available. Here, we report that Pea seedborne mosaic virus (PSbMV), a seed transmitted virus infecting pea crops, undergoes very drastic genetic drift during vertical transmission, with an average number of infectious virus particles contributing to the infection of a seedling from an infected mother plant close to one. Such bottlenecks, as narrow as those imposed by horizontal transmission, could slow down virus adaptation and should be taken into account to improve plant protection strategies
Changing rules of delegation : a contest for power in comitology
No full textWith each legislative issue, legislators have to decide whether to delegate decision-making to the executive and/or to expert bodies in order to flesh out the details of this legislation, or, alternatively, to spell out all aspects of this decision in legislation proper. The reasons why to delegate have been of prime interest to political science. The debate has concentrated on principal-agent theory to explain why politicians delegate decision-making to bureaucrats, to independent regulatory agencies, and to others actors and how to control these agents. By contrast, Changing Rules of Delegation focuses on these questions: Which actors are empowered by delegation? Are executive actors empowered over legislative actors? How do legislative actors react to the loss of power? What opportunities are there to change the institutional rules governing delegation in order to (re)gain institutional power and, with it influence over policy outcomes? The authors analyze the conditions and processes of change of the rules that delegate decision-making power to the Commission's implementing powers under comitology. Focusing on the role of the European Parliament the authors explain why the Commission, the Council, and increasingly the Parliament, delegated decision-making to the Commission. If they chose delegation, they still have to determine under which institutional rule comitology should operate. These rules, too, distribute power unequally among actors and therefore raise the question of how they came about in the first place and whether and how the "losers" of a rule change seek to alter the rules at a later point in time.-- Introduction ;
-- 1. European Legislation and Comitology: The Development of the Comitology System ;
-- 2. Theory and Hypotheses ;
-- 3. Changing the Rules of Comitology: More Competences for the Parliament ;
-- 4. Delegation Under the Lisbon Treaty ;
-- 5. Patterns and Trends In European Legislation and Delegation ;
-- 6. The Impact of Codecision on Comitology ;
-- 7. The Impact of the 1999 Comitology Decision ;
-- 8. Conclusion ;
-- Appendix 1 The Data: Sources And Classification ;
-- Appendix 2 Directory Codes ;
-- Appendix 3 The Number of Laws Adopted In Policy Areas Per 5 Years ;
-- Appendix 4 The Average Number of Laws In Force In Policy Area Per 5 Years ;
-- Appendix 5 Directives and Regulations by Author Institution and Legal Basis
-- References ;
-- Inde
