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    Tervek a Felvidék visszafoglalására 1920-ban: PLANS FOR REOCCUPYING HIGHLAND IN 1920

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    A magyar politikai és katonai vezetés és 1920-ban még reális lehetőséget látott az békefeltételek, módosítására. Az elképzelés részben a csehszlovák állam komoly belső problémáira épített. Másrészt szovjet-orosz Vörös Hadsereg Közép-Európát veszélyeztető sikerei teremthettek a régióban válsághelyzetet. Mindkét esetben számítani lehetetett arra, hogy a nyugati hatalmak kedvezően fogadnák a Magyar Nemzeti Hadsereg fellépését, a szovjetek által fenyegetett Lengyelország megsegítésére, a térség stabilizálására, a bolsevik veszély elhárítására. Ehhez azonban a magyar csapatoknak be kellett volna vonulniuk a Felvidékre. A magyar kormány titkos tárgyalásokat folytatott francia személyiségekkel, melyek hajlottak volna arra, hogy a magyar segítségért cserébe Felvidék, vagy annak legalább a keleti része ismét magyar fennhatóság alá kerülhessen. A katonai tervek (Ébredés, Pirkadás, Árpád) végül a politikai feltételek hiánya miatt nem valósulhattak meg. A szovjet előretörést a lengyelek megállították, Csehszlovákiában pedig nem került sor bolsevik fordulatra.   In 1920, the Hungarian political and military leadership still saw a realistic opportunity to modify the peace conditions. The idea was partly built on the serious interior problems of the Czecho-Slovakian. On the other hand, a crisis situation might have been created in the region by the success of the Soviet-Russian Red Army that was pushing forward towards the West. In both cases, it could have been possible to count on the Western powers’ favourable receipt of the act of the Hungarian National Army in order to help Poland that was threatened by the Soviets, to stabilise the region, and to eliminate Bolshevik threat. However, in order to do that, the Hungarian troops had had to march in the Highlands. The Hungarian Government held confidential negotiations with French personalities who would have propended to accept that in turn of Hungarian help, Highland or at least its Eastern part could belong again under Hungarian control. Eventually, the military plans (Awakening, Dawn, Arpad) could not be implemented because of the lack of political conditions. The Polish stopped the Soviets’ sudden attack, while in Czecho-Slovakia no Bolshevik turn took place

    A kormányzó utódlásának kérdése a Horthy-korszakban

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    The Treaty of Trianon prohibited the return of either Charles IV or any other member of the Habsburg family to the Hungarian throne. However, the Hungarian political forces hoped that the „king” question would be solved soon. By the 1930-ies, however, it became clear that for the time being it was impossible to occupy the throne, consequently, the institution of regency would last for a longer period. That was why regent succession needed to be regulated. Miklós Horthy wanted to have a determinant voice in his successor’s denomination. But the parliament wanted to keep this right to itself. Finally, in 1937, a compromise was reached. The regent was able to propose 3 people as successor, while the parliament had the right either to choose from them or nominate a 4th prospect. At the beginning of the 1940-ies, as a result of the war situation, it became inevitable to regulate even the substitution of the regent. That was why in February 1942, upon Horthy’s request, the parliament elected a vice regent. The new post was allocated to István Horthy (elder son of the regent). The vice regent, however, did not have the right of succession. He could only function as the head of state temporarily, until the parliament elected a new regent

    Magyarország csatlakozása a háromhatalmi egyezményhez

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    On 27th September, 1940, Germany, Italy, and Japan signed the tripartite pact. Hungary announced it immediately that it wanted to join the alliance. The Hungarian Government hoped to keep Germany away from Hungarian internal affairs and prevent Hitler’s raising the extreme right to power. On the other hand, the Government wanted to gain support from the Axis powers to get back all the Hungarian territories that had been detached in Trianon. For Berlin, expansion was important in order to gain control over the Balkans. On 20th November, Hungary joined, then in the following days Romania and Slovakia also joined. In order to counterbalance this Pact, Pál Teleki made efforts to improve the relationship with neutral Yugoslavia. With this joining, the Hungarian Government eventually committed itself to the Axis powers. In return, however, it could only strengthen its positions a bit compared to the local extreme right

    Magyarország légi honvédelme 1918-1919-ben: HOME DEFENSE OF HUNGARY IN THE AIR IN 1918–1919

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    Az I. világháború időszakában megjelent a légi hadviselés, a repülő erők önálló fegyvernemmé váltak. Magyarország saját légierővel nem rendelkezett, a „légjáró csapatok” a Monarchia közös haderejének részét képezték. 1918 novemberében, a Monarchia kettéválását követően a magyar katonai vezetésnek szinte a semmiből kellett megszervezni az önálló magyar repülő erőket. A szomszédos államok, a szerb, a román és a cseh haderő a térségben állomásozó francia Keleti Hadsereg támogatásával, illetve a Monarchia repülőeszközeinek lefoglalása révén már rendelkezett repülő egységekkel, melyek Magyarország bármely pontját akadálytalanul elérhették. Ezért meghatározó fontosságú volt, hogy a fegyverszüneti egyezmény előírásai, illetve a Károlyi kormányzat külpolitikai koncepciója nyomán végrehajtott jelentős mértékű haderőcsökkentés ellenére a honvédség ütőképes légierővel (és légvédelmi erővel) rendelkezzen. Az általános leszerelési rendelkezés a repülő csapatok állományára nem vonatkozott. A katonai vezetés 1918–1919 folyamán a kiképzett repülők szolgálatban tartásával, az országban található repülőanyag összegyűjtésével, a gyártó kapacitás aktivizálásával igyekezett egy kicsi, de ütőképes légierőt szervezni. A pilóták többsége nem ideológiai alapon, hanem egyszerűen a haza védelme érdekében teljesített szolgálatot a forradalmak időszaka alatt is.   In the period of World War I, air warfare had appeared; flying forces had become an independent arm. Hungary did not have an air force of its own. The “aviation troops” comprised part of the Monarchy’s joint military forces.  In November 1918, after the Monarchy’s slit-up, the Hungarian military leadership should have set up the independent Hungarian flying forces from almost nothing. The Serbian, Romanian, and Czech military forces had already flying units that could reach any location in Hungary without hindrance with the support of the French Eastern Army stationing in the region. That was why it was essential for the Hungarian army to have a combat worthy air force despite the substantial military force reduction implemented as a result of the regulations of the armistice agreement. The general disarmament provision did not apply to the stock of the aviation troops. In the course of 1918–1919, the military leadership made efforts to set up a small but combat worthy air force by keeping trained airmen in service, collecting the flying stock available in the country, and activating the manufacturing capacity. Most of the pilots served even during the periods of revolutions not on ideological basis, but simply in order to protect their homeland

    Az 1941. júniusi magyar hadba lépés nemzetközi vonatkozásai = International aspects of Hungary entering the War in June, 1941

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    After the Germans attacked the Soviet Union, extremely high internal and external pressure was put on the Hungarian government to join the war. The German diplomacy encouraged the Hungarian General Staff for voluntary participation only indirectly, while the German military leaders did it openly. The German economic, cultural, and minority organisations operating in Hungary, the SS, and the German intelligent service agents also urged Hungary to enter the war. Italy’s impatient behaviour, the rivalling neighbouring states (Romania, Slovakia, Croatia) joining the war, as well as the extensive European participation with voluntary troops had considerable impact on the government. All the above strengthened the fear in the Hungarian leadership that by keeping out they might lose the opportunity for further revision or they might even jeopardise the results achieved earlier. The air attack of Kassa (Kosice) gave the last push. Although the Hungarian government decided to enter the war on its own, in this decision international aspects greatly influenced it

    Horthy kormányzó németországi látogatása 1938 augusztusában

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    In summer 1938, Hitler was already preparing to gain control of Czechoslovakia. Hitler expected full co6operation of the Hungarian Government for the sake of re6acquiring Highland annexed in 1920. On 21st August 1938, Regent Horthy, accompanied by several of his ministers, visited Germany, where he was welcomed with high celebration. During the discussions, Hitler made attempts to induce the Hungarian delegation to get involved in the military action against Czechoslovakia. However, Horthy and his ministers rejected it. They referred to the unpreparedness of the Hungarian military forces, the intervention of France and Great Britain, and the unpredictable reactions of the Little Entente states. Hungarian politicians insisted on revision, but preferably they wanted to implement it by by way of negotiations. Consequently, on 22nd August they agreed with the Little Entente states that Hungary was allowed to get armed freely; however, they mutually relinquished to resort to force. The German government was disappointed to find that it could not count on Hungary in its plans

    Kettős játszma - Magyarország és az Antikomintern paktum: DOUBLE GAME – HUNGARY AND THE ANTI-COMINTERN PACT

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    Az Imrédy-kormány már 1938 végén lépéseket tett az Antikomintern paktumhoz való csatlakozásra. Az egyezmény megkötése azonban az Imrédy Bélát a miniszterelnöki poszton felváltó Teleki Pálra maradt. A magyar vezetés a tengelyhatalmak bizalmának megerősítése érdekében tekintette fontosnak, hogy szerződésben is elkötelezze magát a német és olasz külpolitika mellett. Ettől várták, hogy a Kárpátaljával kapcsolatos magyar igényt Berlin és Róma végre támogatni fogja. A Németországhoz fűződő szorosabb viszony és a kommunista törekvésekkel szembeni nyílt állásfoglalás a hazai szélsőjobboldal kormány elleni kritikájának semlegesítésére is alkalmasnak látszott. Ugyanakkor Teleki azt remélte, hogy a Szovjetunió elleni szimbolikus lépést brit politika is elismeréssel fogadja, így Magyarország lépéselőnyt szerezhet a nyugati hatalmaknál a Moszkvával katonai egyezményt fenntartó csehszlovák vezetéssel szemben is. A nyugati hatalmak nem tanúsítottak komoly érdeklődést a magyar lépés iránt. A szovjet kormány élesen reagált, befagyasztotta a diplomáciai kapcsolatokat, de nem elsősorban Budapest antikommunista megnyilatkozása, hanem a magyar lépés precedens jellege miatt, hogy azt a többi kelet-európai kisállam ne kövesse.   The Imrédy Government already took steps to join the Anti-Comintern Pact at the end of 1938. However, the Pact was signed by Pál Teleki who replaced Béla Imrédy in the post of the prime minister. The Hungarian leadership considered it important to commit itself even in an agreement for the German and Italian foreign policy in order to strengthen the trust of the Axis Powers. They expected from this act that Berlin and Rome would finally support the Hungarian claim concerning Subcarpathia. This closer relationship with Germany and the open standpoint represented against the communist efforts seemed to be suitable even for neutralising the anti-government critics of the Hungarian extreme right wing. In addition, Teleki hoped that the symbolic step against the Soviet Union is welcomed by British politics. Thus, Hungary can take advantage of the Western powers against Czechoslovak leadership, which signed a military agreement with Moscow. The Western Powers did not show serious interest in relation to this Hungarian action. The Soviet Government harshly reacted. It froze diplomacy relationships. However, it was not primarily because of Budapest’s anti-communist announcement, but because of the Hungarian action’s precedent character so that the rest of the small states in Eastern Europe would not follow it

    Zászlódiplomácia -1941 : az 1849-ben orosz kézre került honvédzászlók visszaadása

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    During the Russian intervention in 1849, 64 Hungarian military flags were captured by the Russians. Returning the flags was considered several times in the 1920’ies and 1930’ies for exchanging the imprisoned Mátyás Rákosi. However, the Hungarian Government did not want to make any concession to the communist movement and the Soviet Union behind it. As a result of the improvement of the Hungarian-Soviet relationship in 1940, confidential discussions had started about the exchange. Rákosi was released and he left for the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government solemnly returned 56 Hungarian military flags on 24th March 1941. Moscow decided to do this not only in return for Rákosi’s release, but also for foreign policy reasons. Hungary was the only country in the region, which preserved its independence from Germany, where no German troops were staying

    Honvédség Balkáni alkalmazására vonatkozó német igény elutasítása

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    1943 tavaszán a Honvéd Vezérkar főnöke javaslatot tett, hogy magyar csapatok is kapcsolódjanak be a Balkán német megszállásába. Ezen az áron a németek beleegyeznének a Donnál szétvert 2. magyar hadsereg megmaradt erőinek hazahozásába. Ezzel a magyar erők kevésbé veszélyes feladatot látnak el és közelebb állomásoznak az ország határához. Így könnyebb megőrizni a haderőt, hogy a szomszédokkal való területi viták rendezéséhez kellő erő álljon Magyarország rendelkezésre. A magyar kormány elvetette a szerb területek megszállásában való részvételt. Nem akarták kockáztatni, hogy a szövetségesek balkáni partraszállása esetén a magyar katonák szembe kerüljenek angol vagy amerikai erőkkel. Úgy gondolták, hogy a honvédség megjelenése csak tovább rontaná az egyébként is feszült magyar–szerb viszonyt. Titkos üzenetváltás során kiderült, hogy egy ilyen lépést a nyugati hatalmak is elítélnének. A kialakuló vita megrontotta a Vezérkar főnöke és a miniszterelnök viszonyát. In spring 1943, the Chief of the General Staff, made a proposal that the Hungarian troopsshould have also joined theGerman occupational operations of the Balkans. In return the Germans would have agreed to bring home the remaining forces of the 2nd Hungarian Army routed at Don. The Hungarian forces would have had a less dangerous task and stayed closer to the Hungarian border. In this way it is easier to prevent the military force, so that there is enough force available for Hungary to settle territorial debates with the neighbours. However, the Hungarian Government rejected Hungary’s participation in occupying Serbian territories. They did not want to risk that in case the allies landed in the Balkans the Hungarian soldiers would have to face English or American forces. They thought that the appearance of the Hungarian army would have only worsened further the otherwise stressed relationship between the Hungarians and the Serbians. In the course of a secret exchange of messages, it turned out that even the western powers would have disapproved such a step. This debate infected the relationship between the Chief of the General Staff and the Prime Minister
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