1,720,978 research outputs found
Judicial Review of AI in UK Government::Two Emergent Forms of Legal Risk
No full textThis chapter argues that the development of AI and automation in the UK public sector is occurring in an unpredictable public law environment, in significant part because there have been so few judicial review judgments establishing how existing administrative law applies. We argue that two distinct forms of risk are emerging as a result. One risk is that public bodies are proliferating the use of systems that they will later realise to be unlawful, which could create serious and wide-scale implementation problems for public bodies. Another risk is that systems of ambiguous legality become so deeply embedded in bureaucratic practice that, by the time meaningful judicial review occurs, the courts will likely be placed in an invidious position. We conclude the chapter with some observations about how-beyond the growing debate about the possibility of new statutory forms of regulation-ensuring ventilation of claims, non-court redress mechanisms, and the flexibility of judicial review remedies might all have a role to play in allowing the public law system, and government, to effectively to manage these risks
The Laws of Public Data Gaps
No full textOne of the most significant developments in the digitalisation and automation of government infrastructure is that the capacity of officials to collect, with minimal costs, valuable data on the performance, users, and impacts of public services is increasing exponentially. Public law thought tends to view this growing capacity through a concern about over-collection and misuse of the public’s data, with privacy and the protection of data being a particular anxiety. But there is also an opposite problem that has generally been neglected by public lawyers: it is still the case that public sector organisations routinely do not collect, in many areas, even the most basic data on the operation and impact of public services. This chapter, which grounds its discussion in the UKcontext, argues that these ‘public data gaps’ are not only a significant and growing problem of modern digital governance, but they are also a problem with distinctly legal dimensions. The chapter provides a new conceptualisation of the nature, causes, and harms of public data gaps before demonstrating how the problem raises questions for a range of important ideas in public law, including rationality and equality, access to justice, data protection and privacy, and duties of record-keeping and disclosure. Ultimately, alongside and as a part of the increasinglysophisticated legal analysis of the problems of government collecting too much data, we suggest the field ought to develop much more nuanced thinking around the laws of public data gaps
Judicial Review of AI in UK Government::Two Emergent Forms of Legal Risk
No full textThis chapter argues that the development of AI and automation in the UK public sector is occurring in an unpredictable public law environment, in significant part because there have been so few judicial review judgments establishing how existing administrative law applies. We argue that two distinct forms of risk are emerging as a result. One risk is that public bodies are proliferating the use of systems that they will later realise to be unlawful, which could create serious and wide-scale implementation problems for public bodies. Another risk is that systems of ambiguous legality become so deeply embedded in bureaucratic practice that, by the time meaningful judicial review occurs, the courts will likely be placed in an invidious position. We conclude the chapter with some observations about how-beyond the growing debate about the possibility of new statutory forms of regulation-ensuring ventilation of claims, non-court redress mechanisms, and the flexibility of judicial review remedies might all have a role to play in allowing the public law system, and government, to effectively to manage these risks
The triumph of convention over law: ministerial advisers in the Australian system of responsible Government
No full textThe structure of the Executive has fundamentally changed in the last 30 years. Ministerial advisers have become major institutional actors within the Executive, interposed between Ministers and public servants. The number of ministerial advisers has expanded exponentially, and they exercise increasingly strong influence within the Executive. There has been a shift of the locus of power from public servants to ministerial advisers. Ministerial advisers are now a permanent and durable part of the Executive.
Ministerial advisers are increasingly involved in scandals that appear on the front page of the newspapers. Compared to the strict hierarchy of the public service that creates predictable outcomes, ministerial offices operate like a primordial soup, in a fluid and unconstrained manner, with ministerial advisers taking up roles and responsibilities on an ad hoc basis with limited regulation. This thesis argues that this is a symptom of broader systemic failure, rather than failings at an individual level.
This thesis utilises an empirical and doctrinal methodology to analyse the legal and political accountability of ministerial advisers within the Australian framework of responsible government. It is posited that constitutional and administrative law are not the best avenues to enhance the accountability of ministerial advisers. Although ministerial advisers post-date the Constitution, this thesis shows that the appropriation of the salaries of ministerial advisers is constitutional. Administrative law is an effective avenue of redress for individuals aggrieved by the actions of ministerial advisers, but only covers a small proportion of their actions. Thus, administrative law provides only a partial method of enhancing the accountability of ministerial advisers.
This thesis argues that the most effective resolution of this issue lies at the parliamentary level. It is primarily through parliamentary committees that ministerial advisers and Ministers can be properly held to account. This thesis shows that, contrary to the assertions of former Prime Minister John Howard and former Victorian Attorney-General Rob Hulls, there is no constitutional convention at the Commonwealth and Victorian levels that ministerial advisers do not appear before parliamentary committees. It is argued that responsible government means that ministerial advisers should appear before parliamentary committees where it facilitates the accountability of Ministers
The triumph of convention over law: ministerial advisers in the Australian system of responsible Government
No full textThe structure of the Executive has fundamentally changed in the last 30 years. Ministerial advisers have become major institutional actors within the Executive, interposed between Ministers and public servants. The number of ministerial advisers has expanded exponentially, and they exercise increasingly strong influence within the Executive. There has been a shift of the locus of power from public servants to ministerial advisers. Ministerial advisers are now a permanent and durable part of the Executive. Ministerial advisers are increasingly involved in scandals that appear on the front page of the newspapers. Compared to the strict hierarchy of the public service that creates predictable outcomes, ministerial offices operate like a primordial soup, in a fluid and unconstrained manner, with ministerial advisers taking up roles and responsibilities on an ad hoc basis with limited regulation. This thesis argues that this is a symptom of broader systemic failure, rather than failings at an individual level. This thesis utilises an empirical and doctrinal methodology to analyse the legal and political accountability of ministerial advisers within the Australian framework of responsible government. It is posited that constitutional and administrative law are not the best avenues to enhance the accountability of ministerial advisers. Although ministerial advisers post-date the Constitution, this thesis shows that the appropriation of the salaries of ministerial advisers is constitutional. Administrative law is an effective avenue of redress for individuals aggrieved by the actions of ministerial advisers, but only covers a small proportion of their actions. Thus, administrative law provides only a partial method of enhancing the accountability of ministerial advisers. This thesis argues that the most effective resolution of this issue lies at the parliamentary level. It is primarily through parliamentary committees that ministerial advisers and Ministers can be properly held to account. This thesis shows that, contrary to the assertions of former Prime Minister John Howard and former Victorian Attorney-General Rob Hulls, there is no constitutional convention at the Commonwealth and Victorian levels that ministerial advisers do not appear before parliamentary committees. It is argued that responsible government means that ministerial advisers should appear before parliamentary committees where it facilitates the accountability of Ministers
Regulating Money in Democracy:Australia's Political Finance Laws Across The Federation
Full text linkThis report provides a comprehensive overview of the current regulation of political finance laws across the federation. Part I outlines the scope and impetus of this report, which is commissioned by the Electoral Regulation Research Network.Part II provides an analytical framework of principles for political finance regulation. These principles are: protecting the integrity of representative government, promoting fairness in politics, the principle of transparency, supporting parties in performing their functions, and respecting political freedoms. It also provides regulatory options to promote these principles, such as transparency measures, supply-side measures such as source restrictions which regulate who can make financial contributions; and amount restrictions that limit the sums that can be given, as well as public funding of electoral campaigns.Part III outlines the history of major legislative changes to electoral legislation at the Commonwealth, State and Territory levels in Australia. Australian jurisdictions have previously had minimal regulation of political finance that was described as laissez faire or “lackadaisical” compared to other major democracies. In recent years, however, several Australian State jurisdictions have undertaken various dynamic political finance reforms that have tightened up the regulatory net, particularly Victoria, NSW and Queensland.Part IV identifies nine key elements of political finance regulation: disclosure requirements (donations and expenditure), caps on donations, caps on expenditure, indexation, bans on donations from certain sectors, foreign donations bans, political funding streams and funding rates, and enforcement. It examines and classifies these key elements of political finance regulation for all jurisdictions in Australia. It shows that there is a distinct lack of uniformity in the regulation of political finance in Australian jurisdictions at the Commonwealth, State and local government levels in all nine regulatory dimensions.Part V provides recommendations for law reform and harmonisation across jurisdictions
Between law and convention:ministerial advisers in the Australian system of responsible government
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Combatting the code ::regulating automated government decision-making in comparative context /
No full textAcross the world, governments are grappling with the regulatory burden of managing their citizens' daily lives. Driven by cost-cutting and efficiency goals, they have turned to artificial intelligence and automation to assist in high-volume decision-making. Yet the implementation of these technologies has caused significant harm and major scandals. Combatting the Code analyzes the judicial, political, managerial, and regulatory controls for automated government decision-making in three Western liberal democracies: the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia. Yee-Fui Ng develops a technological governance framework of ex ante and ex post controls within an interlinking network of horizontal and vertical accountability mechanisms, which aims to prevent future disasters and safeguard vulnerable individuals subject to automated technologies. Ng provides recommendations for regulators and policymakers seeking to design automated governance systems that will promote higher standards of accountability, transparency, and fairness
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